Dissecting the relentless maritime security situation in Nigerian waters: an investigation

Lamir Ado Mohammed

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A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Science in Maritime Affairs

2023
Declaration

I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not necessarily endorsed by the University.

(Signature):

(Date): 14/09/2023

Supervised by: Prof. Dimitrios Dalakis

Supervisor’s affiliation: Professor, Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration, World Maritime University
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Abstract

Title of Dissertation: Dissecting the Relentless Security Challenges in Nigerian Waters – An Investigation

Degree: Master of Science

This dissertation comprehensively examines the Nigerian waters` complex maritime security situation and the wider Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region with focus on piracy. Its objective is to identify the facts regarding the current situation and assess the effectiveness of existing policies and strategies aimed at addressing this multifaceted challenge. The study was prompted by the adverse impact of piracy and other maritime crimes on Nigeria's socio-economic progress, underscoring the importance of well-informed policy responses. The research methodology employed a two-pronged approach, using quantitative methods to analyse both primary and secondary data. To obtain primary data, a well-designed survey was administered to relevant stakeholders in the study area, while authoritative sources such as the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) databases provided secondary data. The data collection process served as the foundation for the analysis and conclusions presented in this dissertation.

The research reveals a significant decline in piracy attacks and other sea crimes in Nigerian waters, thanks to the collective efforts and cooperation of several organizations such as NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy, and G7++FoGG Navies. These combined measures have enhanced security and minimized criminal activities in Nigerian waters. However, it is worth noting that there has been a shift in criminal activities to other parts of the GoG. As pirate incidents decrease in Nigerian waters, similar cases have increased in other regions, possibly due to pirates evading detection and prosecution under the Nigerian Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offenses (SPOMO) Act.

Based on the findings, the dissertation presents several key recommendations. The foremost suggestion is for regional countries to adopt the SPOMO Act's provisions to
strengthen maritime security efforts. Moreover, improving the livelihoods of coastal communities, promoting Blue Economy initiatives, enhancing surveillance capabilities, combating corruption within armed forces, and safeguarding the marine environment against pollution and illegal fishing practices are all crucial components of a comprehensive strategy aimed at eliminating piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. These are evidence-based recommendations to guide policy formulation and implementation, promoting a safer and more prosperous maritime environment in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea.

**KEYWORDS:** Piracy, Surveillance, Maritime Security, corruption, Gulf of Guinea, Socioeconomic, coastal communities, Nigerian waters, NIMASA, Navy, Oil theft, Kidnapping, Hijacking Gulf of Aden, Legal framework, Regional Agreements, strategies, cooperation, collaboration.
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List of Abbreviations

NPA  Nigerian Port Authority
OPEC  Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
NIMASA  Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
C4i  Command, Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence
ISPS  International Ships and Port Facilities Security Code
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States
CEMAC  Central African Economic and Monetary Community
MOWCA  Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa
UNCLOS  Laws of the Sea Convention
IUU  Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
IMB  International Maritime Bureau
FAO  United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
UN  United Nations
IMO  International Maritime Organisation
ITLOS  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
ICJ  International Court of Justice
SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
PFSP  Port Facility Security Plan
ReCAAP  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DCOC</td>
<td>Djibouti Code of Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community Maritime Security Strategy</td>
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<td>YCC</td>
<td>Yaoundé Code of Conduct</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Interregional Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>CRESMAC</td>
<td>Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIMS</td>
<td>ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy</td>
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<td>G7++ FoGG</td>
<td>G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Committee</td>
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<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification Systems</td>
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<td>JMLC</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial vehicles</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCF</td>
<td>Trillion Standard Cubic Feet</td>
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<td>SPOMO Act</td>
<td>Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences act</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint task force</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>maritime operations centres</td>
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<td>MMCC</td>
<td>marine multinational coordination centres</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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<td>U.S.C.G</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<td>NMA</td>
<td>National Maritime Authority</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes</td>
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<td>NCS</td>
<td>Nigerian Customs Service</td>
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<td>NDLEA</td>
<td>National Drug Law Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Nigerian Immigration Service</td>
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<td>MSIS</td>
<td>Multi-Sensor Integrated System</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>GWVSA</td>
<td>Global West Vessel Specialist Agency</td>
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<td>KGNL</td>
<td>Kings Guards Nigeria Limited</td>
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<td>NDDC</td>
<td>Niger Delta Development Commission</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>Nigerian Shippers Council</td>
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<td>GoG</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Geographic Area of Study
According to Nigerian High Commission (2009), Nigeria is a country in West Africa that spans a land area of 923,768 square kilometers between the latitudes of 4 degrees and 14 degrees and the longitudes of 3 degrees and 14. It extends to the Atlantic Ocean’s coasts, which serve as its southern boundary, and shares boundaries with the Republics of Niger and Tchad to the north, the Republic of Benin to the west, and the Republic of Cameroun to the east. Nigeria has an 853 km long coastline, which offers tremendous potential for marine power. Between the highlands and the ocean, there is a coastal plain that stretches from the Benin border to the Niger Delta and is about 80 km broad.

The delta, with a surface area of 36,000sq km, is located at the foot of the Y that divides the southwestern coast from the south-eastern shore. The waters of the huge river pour
into the ocean through various channels in the delta's low-lying, swampy terrain. The delta's many channels and some of its inshore lagoons can be navigated. Oil and gas, which are explored and extracted in the Niger Delta basin as well as in the continental shelf and territorial waters, are the most significant minerals in terms of value. On land, there are also significant non-oil mineral resources such as gold, limestone, marble, columbite, kaolin, gypsum, iron ore, phosphates, and coal. An overview of Nigerian waters is shown in the Figure 1 below.

1.2 Background of the study
The important development in relation to the Nigeria maritime domain can be traced back to the colonial era, when the British government established the Lagos Pilotage District in 1887 to regulate navigation and ensure the security of ships in the Lagos Harbor. This was followed by the establishment of the Nigerian Marine Department in 1914, which was responsible for ensuring the security of ships and preventing piracy in Nigerian waters (Nigeria, 1923). On 1 April 1955, the Marine Department which only carried out routine marine functions became the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), a statutory body responsible for managing the ports and waterways of Nigeria. As a consequence, it offered a good chance to finally execute maritime projects that people have been thinking about for nearly a generation. (Duyile W & Duyile A, 2019).

The origin of the rampant security threats in Nigerian waters is said to be linked with the discovery of oil. According to reports, Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta was where oil was first discovered in Nigeria in 1956 (UNEP, 2017). In 1960, Nigeria gained its independence and since then, corruption and political instability has been a major issue in the country (Awofeso & Odeyemi, 2014). Oil exploration and exploitation in the Niger Delta have devastating effects on the region's farmlands, rivers, and coastal waters, leading to the destruction of the livelihoods of communities that rely on fishing and agriculture. Despite community complaints, corruption has allowed multinational oil companies to continue their unchecked activities without implementing measures to clean up the environment, control pollution, or provide compensation for affected
communities. The resulting unemployment, poverty, and hunger have driven some to resort to militancy, vandalism, robbery, and piracy in desperation.

Presently, Nigeria has the tenth biggest crude oil reserve and is the thirteenth largest crude oil producer in the world, as determined by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (UNEP, 2017). However, maritime security threats continue to have serious negative consequences on the nation's economy and ecology in addition to endangering the safety of ships and crew on board (Nte et al., 2022). Figure 2 below shows the high-risk area in the Gulf of Guinea with Nigerian waters ranking the highest.

![Gulf of Guinea red zone for piracy](image)

Figure 2: Gulf of Guinea red zone for piracy. Source: DRYAD GLOBAL (2023)

1.3 Problem Statement

With shipping holding responsibility for the transportation of 90% of global trade, modern-day piracy and other maritime offenses are significant global concerns as they pose a threat to the safe navigation of maritime vessels carrying goods and passengers (Nwalozie, 2020). Maritime security threats have grave consequences as they disrupt the flow of the global supply chain leading inevitably to shortages and rises in prices.
as well as loss of life, cargo, ships, and other offshore installations through terrorism and vandalization.

The West Coast of Africa, which is mainly dominated by Nigeria in terms of shipping and freight traffic, has become a hotspot for sea pirates, subject to frequent attacks against ships (Dalakis, 2012). Particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has been a major issue, with countless vessels and crew members being held captive for ransom. Theft of natural resources, including oil, has also been a significant problem as a result of criminal gangs breaking into pipelines and taking massive amounts of oil. Equally common are illegal smuggling and fishing, as well as trafficking all prosper due to the lack of effective enforcement in Nigerian waterways (Usman et al., 2019). Nigeria serves as a transit country for illegal narcotics and weapons coming from South America as well as the Caribbean on their way to Europe and Asia because of its geographic location.

1.4 Research Aim
The aim of this research is to identify the reason for the persistent insecurity that ravaged the region and the gaps in the implementation of policies and enforcement in Nigerian waters.

1.5 Research Objectives
The purpose of this research is:

1. To examine the current state of the security apparatus of the NIMASA as well as the Nigerian Navy in terms of personnel capacity and equipment.
2. To evaluate their operation coordination methods and techniques.
3. To analyse the current state of security in order to give recommendations on how to bring about improvement in the future.

1.6 Research Questions (RQ)
1. What is the current state of security in Nigerian waters?
2. Why is there a gap in the implementation of policy and regulations?
3. How to improve the current state of affairs with regard to the agencies of
government responsible for maritime security such as NIMASA, the Nigerian
Navy, and the Marine Police?

1.7 Significance of the Study
After gaining independence, Nigeria had a protracted period of economic stagnation,
with an increase in poverty rates and a deterioration in its public institutions, following
several years of military rule and poor economic management (Okonjo-Iweala &
Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). According to some metrics, from 1960 to 2000, Nigeria's
economy was one of the most volatile in the world (World Bank, 2003). With the
coming of democracy in 1999, several economic and infrastructural reforms were
implemented which exponentially boosts the country’s participation in global trade
(Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). Furthermore, due to its strategic
location and resource potential, the marine space of Nigeria is very significant. Almost
70% of West Africa's crude oil production comes from there, and it is part of the crucial
GoG shipping lane, a transoceanic route that competes with the Suez Canal (Babatunde
& Abdulsalam, 2021).

Piracy has been a major problem in Nigerian waterways for a number of years,
seriously hurting the economy and reputation of the nation abroad. Nigerian maritime
territory is considered a dangerous area of the GoG, where 80% of attacks in the area
take place (Babatunde & Abdulsalam, 2021). Consequently, Nigerian officials have
increased naval patrols and worked with international organizations to combat piracy
in their waterways (Dalaklis, 2022). Nonetheless, occurrences of attacks on ships in
Nigerian seas continue despite efforts to suppress piracy. To restore Nigeria’s
reputation in the international community and to minimize the economic losses caused
by insecurity and illegal activities in Nigerian waters, it is, therefore, necessary to carry
out such studies. The aim is to attain an in-depth understanding of the extent of the
problem and to initiate a decisive solution to the problem. Additionally, the proposed
research will have practical implications for addressing security challenges in Nigerian
waters, and will be of value to policymakers, practitioners, and other stakeholders (Ion
et al., 2018).
1.8 Scope and Limitations
The research is conducted within the framework of the sensitive national security architecture of the Nigerian state and in the section of the country that is diverse in terms of culture and ethnicity. The area is mostly tropical creeks and lagoons that are only accessible through the narrow rivers. It is therefore subject to limitations such as data availability, accessibility, bias, limited scope, time constraints, funding constraints, and ethical considerations (Ross & Bibler Zaidi, 2019).

1.9 Research Methodology
This research is conducted mainly using quantitative method to gather data from a range of sources, using surveys with questionnaires, secondary data published or not, and literature review of the works of experts. As described by Sukamolson (2007), Quantitative research involves the utilization of numerical data to explicate the phenomena that the observations reflect. This approach is employed in a variety of natural and social sciences, ranging from physics and biology to psychology, sociology, and geology. The method entails the collection and analysis of numerical data using mathematically-based techniques, while qualitative data cannot be subjected to statistical analysis and does not necessarily consist of numerical values (Sukamolson, 2007). However, it is essential to choose the appropriate methodology based on the research objectives and the nature of the data being analysed (Queirós et al., 2017).

1.10 Sources of Data
The data used for this research were mainly sourced from the literature review of scholarly writings such as articles and journals relevant to maritime security, especially those involving Nigeria, the Gulf of Guinea, and Africa as a whole. The data are from credible reports and surveys whether published or not. Some are sourced from the description of the experience of the personnel on NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy, and other relevant stakeholders as well as from 10 years of experience of the author working for the Maritime Safety Department of NIMASA. Additional sources are the World Maritime University Library, internet sources, and information from the activities of the NIMASA Deep Blue Project (C4i Centre, Lagos). The qualitative
methodology seeks to comprehend the nuanced nature of reality and the significance of actions within a given context while the quantitative methodology focuses on obtaining accurate and dependable measurements for statistical analysis (Queirós et al., 2017). Additionally, both methodologies are valuable in their respective ways and can provide valuable insights when appropriately applied.

1.1 Research Approach
The approach used in this research is based on the consideration of international best practices in comparison to Nigeria’s approach to maritime security. It is also based on the consideration of International legal instruments relevant to Maritime security like international conventions, codes and guidelines such as the SUA convention and ISPS code as the minimum acceptable requirements.

1.12 Structure
The first chapter discussed the background of the study; the aims and objectives of the research; the research methodology as well as the scope and limitations of the study. Chapter two consists of literature review of documents relating to maritime security with emphasis on Nigerian waters and the GoG. It discusses the international and regional legal and institutional frameworks on maritime security. It further discusses the Nigerian Maritime domain; maritime security threats with focus on piracy and the evaluation of maritime security measures. Chapter three consists the methodology used for data analysis; the analysis of primary and secondary data as well as the discussion of results. Chapter four elaborates on the existing maritime security policies and strategies in Nigeria in relation to the research question regarding the current state of security in Nigerian water. Chapter five provides a conclusive discussion of findings and also recommends measures that may be necessary to solve the problem of piracy and other maritime crimes. Additionally, the recommendation for the area of future study is also discussed in chapter five.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

2.1 Historic Background of Maritime Security of the Gulf of Guinea

Around 90% of global trade are transported by sea and any form of disruption to seaborn transport have serious consequence for the global supply chain and economies as well as political and social stability (UNCTAD, 2023). It is also true that the sea has been regarded as a dangerous and insecure area throughout human history, with historians such as John Mack arguing that it has been consistently portrayed as an "unwelcome and unwelcoming wilderness where the land is a reassuring point of reference" (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). Around 1350 BC, the Minoan were the first civilization on record to have organized a naval campaign against pirates and went on to expand its influence across the Mediterranean region, with a strong emphasis on the values of "freedom of navigation" and trade (Dalaklis, 2022). In the course of history, states have been aware of their duty to provide marine security. However, the deployment of armed security for civilian vessels has been opposed by several stakeholders in marine transportation until the surge of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and GoG (Patriarca & Lopes, 2020). Somali pirates have been attacking ships near the coastline and the Gulf of Aden since the early 2000s, with their activity peaking in 2008 followed by a significant decline in the 2010s due to intense Naval patrol in the region. However, analysts believe that GoG will become the next hotspot due to the substantial rise in the number of incidents (Dalaklis, 2012).

The GoG covers a vast area of coastline stretching from Senegal to Angola, encompassing over 20 sovereign coastal states and islands. It serves as a crucial shipping corridor for oil and cargo transportation between the Niger Delta and central/southern Africa. (Dalaklis, 2019). It was estimated that the region generates about 4% of the global oil supply and a significant quantity to Asia and Europe (Dalaklis & Ndze, 2017). Therefore, it is for these qualities that the region faces serious maritime security challenges such as piracy, kidnapping, sea robbery, and oil theft/bunkering with Nigeria's waters ranking highest in this regard. It is also true that
the GoG took over from the Horn of Africa in terms of piracy risk in 2013, with the highest number of piracy attacks and armed robbery against ships, representing a fifth of all global maritime incidents (Osinowo, 2015). In 2014 alone, 41 incidents resulting in 5 kidnappings were recorded (Warner & Kaye, 2016). In the GoG, the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and CEMAC are the regional economic communities that have the security structure to address maritime insecurity in the region. Furthermore, regional institutions such as the MOWCA and the GGC are specifically created to ensure cooperation in dealing with maritime activities in the region (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).

The right of a coastal state to exercise control over extensive territories outside of its sovereignty and to explore its resources was solidified through the Laws of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) (Warner & Kaye, 2016). Article 21 of the UNCLOS emphasizes that states must make laws to protect the marine environment from threats including security. However, due to its enormous scope and generally unregulated character, the maritime domain is particularly suited to several forms of threat matters such as piracy, drugs and weapons smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, and IUU’s among others. Acts of terrorism used to be of concern in Nigeria with militant groups threatening to vandalise offshore oil installations for political reasons. The problem of terrorism at sea was first addressed with the ratification of the SUA Convention in 1988, which came into effect on 1 March 1992, following the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro (Pristrom et al., 2013). While the goal of piracy is to attain monetary gains, the goal of terrorism is mainly to send a political statement. Presently, maritime terrorism is not a common event or concern in comparison to the rate of piracy and other maritime offenses around the globe. During the course of Maritime Policy & Management's existence starting from the adoption of UNCLOS, the significance of maritime security and piracy issues has grown (Pristrom et al., 2013). Years after 9/11, it appears that the distribution of law enforcement resources is being reviewed in both the United States and Europe, with the emphasis seemingly turning a bit from terrorism back to organized crimes such as piracy syndicates (von Lampe, 2012).
By definition, incidents involving maritime security and piracy are intentional, while maritime safety accidents are unintentional. Academically, maritime security studies must set itself apart from industrial and policy interests in order to become a field of study that is intellectually excellent and the field must create an all-encompassing research program based on comprehensive evaluations of a wide range of conventional and novel maritime security issues (Amirell, 2013). Consequently, the cost of piracy to the global economy is estimated by global insurer Allianz to be $12 billion annually, and yet, most people outside the maritime and insurance industries are unaware that piracy is still an expensive risk in the twenty-first century. Positively, maritime piracy is down to its lowest level since 1994 in the first half of 2022. 58 occurrences were reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), compared to 68 over the same time period last year. As it is linked to underlying social, political, and economic issues, the COVID-19 pandemic may have contributed to that increase in pirate activity, and 2022 may herald the beginning of a downward trend (Dalaklis, 2022).

2.2 Maritime Security Threats

![Figure 3: Piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (2020)]
Security threats in the context of maritime encompasses a wide range of issues that pose risks to the safety and security of ships, ports, and coastal regions, as well as the global economy. These threats can be divided into several categories such as Piracy and armed robbery at sea, Terrorism and sabotage, Smuggling and trafficking, IUU fishing, Maritime territorial disputes, Cyber threats, and Environmental threats (Morris & Paoli, 2018). Piracy has been a persistent threat to maritime security, especially in regions like the Gulf of Aden, the GoG, and the waters around Southeast Asia as described in Figure 3. Pirates often target ships for their cargo, crew, or both, causing significant financial losses and jeopardizing the safety of seafarers (Pristrom et al., 2013). In contrast, terrorist organizations may target maritime assets, such as ships, ports, or offshore facilities, to disrupt trade, cause large-scale casualties, or make a political statement (Pristrom et al., 2013). Examples include the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008. The maritime domain is often used for the illegal movement of goods and people, such as drugs, weapons, and human trafficking (Bruwer, 2020). Additionally, Organized crime groups exploit the vastness and complexity of the maritime environment to evade detection and facilitate their illegal activities such as in the case of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUU).

IUU fishing threatens the sustainability of global fish stocks, destabilizes the marine ecosystem, and undermines the livelihoods of legitimate fishers (Petrossian, 2015). The poverty it generates for the coastal/fishing communities is considered to be one of the major catalysts of piracy and other maritime crimes. Another global maritime security threat is border disputes. Disputes over maritime boundaries and resources can lead to tensions and even conflicts between states. For example, the South China Sea has been a hotspot for territorial disputes, with several countries claiming overlapping areas of the sea and its resources as well as China trying to assert its dominance over the entire region (Kuo et al., 2021). Additionally, cyberattacks on maritime infrastructure and shipping companies, though not a weapon of choice for pirates in Nigerian waters and the GoG, can disrupt operations, lead to financial losses, and even compromise the safety and security of vessels and their crew. The economic
impact of marine cyberattacks has been discussed only very briefly because of the lack of real-time data on the attacks (Afenyo & Caesar, 2023).

2.3 International Legal Framework for Maritime Security
The UN and its specialized agency IMO have in place legal frameworks that include regulations and guidelines specifically for the purpose of combating piracy and other maritime offences. These include:

2.3.1 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The UNCLOS is an international treaty that serves as a legal framework for the use and conservation of the world's oceans and their resources. Adopted in 1982 and entering into force in 1994, UNCLOS establishes the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, aiming to balance the benefits derived from the oceans and the need to protect their resources and environment. UNCLOS plays a crucial role in maritime security, as it outlines the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states and lays down the legal foundation for the control and prevention of various maritime threats. It provides guidelines for the delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent or opposite states, helping to resolve disputes over maritime rights and jurisdiction. By establishing clear boundaries, the Convention contributes to the prevention of conflicts and promotes regional stability and cooperation. Additionally, it contains a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism, which encourages states to resolve their disputes peacefully through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudication before the ITLOS or the ICJ.

Article 21 allows coastal states to adopt laws and regulations to ensure the safety of navigation, the preservation of the environment, and the prevention of infringement of their customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations within their territorial sea, contributing to maritime security. Article 110 outlines the right of visit and the conditions under which a warship may approach and visit a foreign ship on the high seas in cases where there are reasonable grounds to suspect it is engaged in piracy, slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting, among other activities. Article 101 defines piracy under international law. The article reads as follows:
Article 101 - Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraphs (a) or (b) (United Nations, 1982).

2.3.2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)

is an international treaty aimed at enhancing maritime security and preventing unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships, their passengers, and crew? It was adopted by the IMO in 1988 and entered into force in 1992 (Mensah, 2004). The SUA Convention was created in response to growing concerns about maritime terrorism, piracy, and other unlawful acts at sea (Mensah, 2004). It requires state parties to criminalize unlawful acts within their domestic legal systems and cooperate with other states to investigate and prosecute suspected offenders. The convention also provides guidelines for the extradition of offenders between state parties and mutual legal assistance in the collection of evidence, taking of statements, and other aspects of the legal process. In 2005, the SUA Convention was amended by the Protocol of 2005, which expanded the list of offenses to include the use of ships as weapons or as a means of committing terrorist acts and anti-trafficking (Macdonald, 2013). The Protocol also introduced provisions related to the boarding of ships by law enforcement authorities to prevent or suppress the commission of unlawful acts (Macdonald, 2013).
2.3.3 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

SOLAS is a key element of the legal framework for maritime security. Established in 1914 and updated several times since, it is an international treaty that sets minimum safety standards for the construction, equipment, and operation of merchant ships. The primary objective of SOLAS is to ensure the safety of ships and their crew at sea, but it also plays an important role in maintaining maritime security. SOLAS contributes to maritime security by setting standards for the design, construction, and maintenance of ships, ensuring that they can withstand various threats and hazards. SOLAS Chapter XI-2 specifically focused on maritime security. Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS outlines the measures required to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, while the ISPS Code provides detailed guidance on how to implement these measures. Together, they establish a comprehensive security regime for the international maritime sector, addressing issues such as access control, surveillance, and communication between ships and port authorities.

2.3.3.1 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code

The ISPS Code is a comprehensive set of measures aimed at enhancing the security of ships and port facilities. It was developed in response to the heightened global concerns about maritime security following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The code was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2002 and entered into force in July 2004. The ISPS Code consists of two parts: Part A (mandatory) and Part B (recommended guidelines).

Part A outlines the mandatory requirements for security management, including:

1. Defining the roles and responsibilities of governments, port authorities, and shipping companies in ensuring maritime security.

2. Establishing security assessment processes for ships and port facilities.

3. Develop security plans based on the results of security assessments.
4. Implementing security measures, including access control, surveillance, and communication systems.

5. Providing training and certification for relevant personnel.

6. Conduct regular audits, inspections, and drills to test and improve security measures.

Part B provides recommended guidelines and best practices to support the implementation of the mandatory measures outlined in Part A. It is essential to keep in mind that the code is not a one-size-fits-all solution. It must be adapted to the specific needs of individual ships and port facilities, taking into account factors such as size, location, and operational characteristics (Mensah, 2004). Continuous efforts to update and improve the ISPS Code in response to emerging threats and evolving security standards are crucial for maintaining a safe and secure maritime environment (Mukherjee, 2007).

The ISPS code expresses ships and port security in three different levels. Security Level 1 covers minimum security measures to be placed at all times; Security Level 2 requires the introduction of additional measures in response to an increase in the level of security risk for a period of time; and Security Level 3 which is the highest level of security measures and it contains specific measures that are to be applied for a period when the risk of security threat is imminent. The goal of these measures is the protection of port facilities, ships and the public from security threats. Security Level 3 could be so strict depending on the perceived threats that it may lead the suspension of operations (IMO, 2012).

The PFSP is a tool included in the ISPS Code that ensures the implementation of security measures intended to safeguard the port facility, its serving boats, and the people and cargo on board at the appropriate security levels (Şakir et al., 2018). The ideas of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as marine security management and the issue of port security, have a strong interaction and dominant status in research activities centered on the ISPS Code and the construction of a PFSP (Şakir et al., 2018). Despite piracy being considered as a threat at sea, the risk of armed attacks on
merchant ships at sea must be of great concern for port security managers (Christopher, 2014).

2.3.4 Regional Agreements

Across the world, there are several agreements made at the regional level to combat the menace of piracy and other maritime crimes. Examples of such agreements are as follows: ReCAAP; DCOC; SADC; ARF; CARICOM and YCC. However, for the purpose of this research, we will focus on the Central African regional agreements, mainly the DCOC and YCC.

2.3.4.1 Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC)

The DCOC is a regional agreement among countries in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden for the repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the region. The code was formally adopted on January 29, 2009, and 20 of the 21 qualifying nations are members (Mishra, 2019). During a high-level gathering of DCoC signatories in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in January 2017, the DCoC+, a revised code of conduct, was approved which acknowledges the contribution of the "Blue Economy," and its contribution to sustainability (Mishra, 2019). Examining the potential impact that the code will have on tackling the issue is necessary given the scope and implications of wildlife trafficking (Gikonyo, 2019).

2.3.4.2 Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC)

Signed in 2013 by 25 West and Central African countries, like the DCOC the YCC seeks to improve maritime security and safety in the region through cooperation, information sharing, and capacity building (Warner & Kaye, 2016). Based in Yaoundé, Cameroon, the ICC is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the YCC and promoting cooperation among regional organizations, such as the ECOWAS and ECCAS. Figure 4 illustrates the locations of the many organizations the YCC has founded, as well as the signatory governments. In order to prevent regional crises, which is a goal for the African Union in maintaining peace and security on the continent, CEMAC collaborates closely with ECCAS and to connect ECCAS with ECOWAS, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) was established (Dalaklis & Ndze, 2017). Other Regional Maritime Security Centres
are located in various countries in the region and are tasked with coordinating maritime security operations, such as surveillance, patrolling, and response to incidents. In addition to the YCC, other regional initiatives and organizations, such as the EIMS and the G7++FoGG, also contribute to enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The most recognised of these initiatives is the G7++FoGG.

According to MSC 102/INF.22, 2020 (page 3) The G7++FoGG organization was established in 2013 in response to the international community's ad hoc responses to the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The G7++FoGG's goals are to support the Gulf of Guinea nations in improving the security of their maritime domains, unifying the diverse legal frameworks used to combat maritime crime, fostering interstate collaboration, and advancing the blue economy. It was created by three regional organizations, GGC, ECCAS, and ECOWAS to support the marine security framework created under the YCC regarding the menace of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit marine Activities in West and Central Africa. The G7++FoGG's presidency is a rotating office. On November 5 and 6, 2019, in Accra, Ghana, the annual plenary meeting of the G7++FoGG was hosted under the theme "Working Together for the Common Security of the Gulf of Guinea" by the holders of the 2019 G7++FoGG chair, France and Ghana as described in MSC 102/INF.22 (page 3). Some of the outcomes from the meeting were as follows:

- Participants praised the international community's intervention and demanded that efforts to assist maritime security in the GoG be better coordinated.
- Participants acknowledged the crucial roles of non-governmental organizations and maritime businesses (IMO, 2020b).

UK (2022) reported that the UK and Senegal jointly headed the second ministerial meeting of the G7++FoGG, which was held in Dakar from November 24 to 26, 2021. At the end of the session, a major recommendation with regard to international cooperation and support was noted:

- A practical and focused approach to funding and enlisting the assistance of international partners, including making sure offers of assistance are in line with
the needs noted by the GoG states, improving communication and coordination to prevent duplications, and taking sustainability of initiatives into account.

According to Yücel (2021), the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea continues to be a major source of concern, underscoring the urgent need for effective transnational collaboration. Nevertheless, the existing YCC for cooperation is plagued by certain limitations stemming from issues of sovereignty. Overcoming these limitations will be of utmost importance in order to unlock the full potential of transnational cooperation and guarantee the timely implementation of the indispensable measures. The Yaoundé Architecture must clarify the roles of its various organizations to ensure effective network coordination. Social elements such as education must be revised. Additionally, the effectiveness of the Yaoundé Architecture is hindered by a lack of implementation, funding, and trust between maritime actors, but it can guide member states towards improving the structure despite the fact that it is unlikely to expand the YCC mandate (Warner & Kaye, 2016).

Figure 4: Signatory states, zones, and organisations of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
Source: Yücel (2021)
2.4 Evaluation of Current Maritime Security Measures
The strength and clarity of international and national laws play a crucial role in defining the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders in maritime security (Broohm, 2021). The effectiveness of these laws can be evaluated based on the number of adoptions, degree of implementation, and enforcement by individual states. Ismail et al. (2021) outline that, technological innovations have significantly improved maritime security. The use of satellite-based AIS, KOMPSAT-5 SAR images, HF radar data, and UAVs for monitoring maritime activities has enhanced the ability to detect and respond to potential threats (Sang Hoon Kim et al., 2020). Laksmana (2022), argues that effective maritime security is dependent on international and regional cooperation among various stakeholders, such as navies, coastguards, port authorities, and law enforcement agencies. Another necessary measure that has proven to be effective is developing and maintaining the necessary capabilities through Improving the quality of training programs and the availability of equipment and resources as well as the ability to respond to incidents in a timely and effective manner (Bueger et al., 2019).

2.5 The Nigerian Maritime Domain
2.5.1 Overview of the Nigerian Maritime Domain
The EEZ, coastal regions, territorial seas, and other maritime territories under Nigeria’s control are referred to as the Nigerian Maritime Domain. It stretches up to 200 nautical miles from the nation's baselines and encompasses the waters of the Gulf of Guinea along Nigeria's coastline. Nigeria's marine domain, which supports a variety of maritime activities like shipping, fishing, offshore oil and gas development, and trade, is strategically significant for Nigeria's economy. In order to maintain safety, security, and the sustainable exploitation of marine resources, the Nigerian government manages, safeguards, and regulates activities within its maritime domain. Nigeria's maritime region is made up of a variety of ecosystems, including coral reefs, estuaries, and coastal mangroves, all of which support a significant amount of marine biodiversity. Because of the abundant fisheries resources in the nation's waterways, both artisanal and industrial fishing are popular there.
2.5.2 Nigeria's maritime resources

Nigeria is renowned for having large offshore gas and oil reserves. The economy of the nation benefits greatly from these resources, which are also a substantial source of income and foreign exchange revenues. In numerous oil fields and exploration blocks located inside the maritime territory of Nigeria, offshore drilling and production activities are conducted; The nation's coastal regions, estuaries, and continental shelf serve as habitats for a variety of fish species, including tuna, snapper, grouper, mackerel, and shrimp. Food security, livelihoods, and export potential for Nigeria all heavily rely on the country's fisheries.

Mineral resources are also found in Nigeria's marine region domain such as those for tin, limestone, sand, and gravel, which could be found offshore and mined for use in building and other industries. Additionally, tourism and leisure opportunities are provided by Nigeria's coastal areas and marine attractions. Clean beaches, marine parks, and water activities draw both domestic and foreign tourists, fostering the expansion of the tourism industry and producing positive economic effects.

2.5.3 Economic Importance of Nigeria's Maritime Domain

Because they are the most significant and generate in the most income for the Nigerian government, the 2 types of coastal and marine resources listed below are also the most prevalent in Nigeria.

2.5.3.1 Fisheries

The FOA report from 2018 estimates that Nigeria's teeming population of approximately 186 million people results in an annual fish demand of 3.32 million metric tonnes, but domestic production only manages to produce about 1.12 million metric tonnes (Ateme, 2021). This results in a 2.2 million metric ton shortage that must be filled mostly through the importation of fish, which costs roughly 700 million USD yearly. Protecting the Nigerian maritime domain is therefore significant in order to close the gap (Ateme, 2021).
2.5.3.2 Oil/Gas Exploration and Mining

Offshore oil reserves are the primary marine natural resource operations that significantly boost Nigeria's blue economy as illustrated in figure 5. Large natural gas and crude oil deposits can be found in Nigeria. Her recoverable crude oil reserves are estimated to be 28.5 billion barrels, with a substantial portion of these being offshore, and her natural gas reserves are projected to be more than 166 TSCF (Trillion Standard Cubic Feet) (Ateme, 2021). Sand, considered a highly valuable commodity in the Nigerian coastal region, second only to petroleum, is extensively mined from major estuaries, lagoons, the near coast, and beaches for various purposes such as beach nourishment, land reclamation, and construction of infrastructure and buildings. An example of a major reclamation activity in Nigeria is the Bar Beach project in Lagos (Ateme, 2021).

Figure 5: Oil and Gas Industry in the Niger Delta area and the Coastal Zone of Nigeria. Source: Fatubarin (2015)
2.6 Nigeria's maritime security challenges
Numerous marine security challenges are brought on by Nigeria's extensive coastline and beneficial placement in the GoG. Piracy, IUU fishing, oil theft and smuggling, guns and drug trafficking, and human trafficking are a few of the significant issues. All of the concerns are serious, but piracy stands out because it has the potential to disrupt trade and send economies into a tailspin. With this in mind, piracy will be more of our primary concern. Chart 1 below depicts the decline of piracy activities in Nigerian waters.

Chart 1: Piracy activities in Nigerian waters. Source: Joint Operation Centre (2022)

2.6.1 Piracy in Nigerian Waters/Gulf of Guinea
According to Ezeozue (2019), since 2007, the African continent has witnessed a higher number of pirate attacks compared to Asian waters, with a focus on regions such as Somalia, Nigeria, and Benin, although the attacks extend beyond these specific areas. Nigeria's maritime security challenges have escalated to the extent that it is now considered one of the most hazardous nations globally for marine piracy attacks. There is little doubt that poverty and deprivation in the Niger Delta region, corruption, inadequate law enforcement, weak laws and jurisdictions, a lack of legitimate employment, and a weak security apparatus are contributing factors to the rise in pirate attacks and illicit activity on Nigerian waters (Ezeozue, 2019). In comparison, the
pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are more sophisticated than those in the Gulf of Aden. For example, The Somali pirates are known for kidnapping for ransom piracy while the Nigerian pirates are known for the more lucrative and more advanced piracy which involves the hijacking of an entire vessel for its cargo/oil. Nigerian pirates typically use small skiffs with powerful outboard engines that are highly manoeuvrable and suitable for quick attacks, boardings, and escapes which reflects the fact that their targets are closer to the coastline or mother ships compared to Somali pirates. Figure 6 below shows the skiffs and the type of weapons used by the Nigerian/ Gulf of Guinea pirates.

Figure 6: Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea. Source: Nwalozie (2020)

Jimoh (2015) established that the discovered corruption and shady dealings inside the security system represent a significant defeat in the war against piracy. By deliberately relaxing naval surveillance, the security employees who are supposed to defend the vessels expose them to attacks and render aboard guards ineffectual. Security officers also occasionally directly participate in violent crime. Particularly the Nigerian
military has a history of making murky arrangements with insurgents to split the spoils. Jimoh (2015) also emphasized that Although pirates are always armed during operations, if the pirates work with the security personnel who are supposed to prevent them, they might not feel the need to kill victims. Without much resistance, maritime companies and multinational oil companies opt to hand over ransoms to pirates knowing they may not receive recompense or legal redress. It is in fact one of the reasons why the piracy problem persists.

If there are gaps in domestic, regional, and international rules or if there are no deterrent punishments, marine security will not be possible. Msheliza et al. (2023) argued that the majority of marine laws, agreements, and protocols at the international, regional, and domestic levels have not yet been incorporated into Nigerian maritime law or connected to drug trafficking, money laundering, or kidnapping. More than only national measures are required to combat international crimes like piracy. One might also observe Nigeria's anti-piracy laws clashing with regional marine legal frameworks, the YCC, as well as national laws governing kidnapping, guns, and money laundering. The Armed Forces Act of 1993 designated the navy as the only agency responsible for Nigeria's maritime security. In contrast, Section 17(1-2) of the SPOMO Act charged NIMASA with coordinating all maritime security measures, including the fight against piracy, maritime offenses, and any other unlawful acts. such lack of clarity must be resolved as it interferes with the effectiveness of implementation and degree of collaboration (Msheliza et al., 2023).

2.7 Literature Review Summary
Researchers and policymakers alike have paid close attention to the maritime security issues that Nigeria faces in its coastal seas, notably in the Gulf of Guinea. This is because of the socioeconomic impact of piracy on the region. In order to emphasize the main issues and their implications for Nigeria's maritime security, this chapter attempts to highlight key findings from the relevant research that have already been conducted. The marine security issues that Nigeria is currently dealing with in its coastal seas are thoroughly summarized in this chapter. It emphasizes the seriousness of piracy, illegal fishing, oil theft and smuggling, trafficking in weapons and illegal
drugs, and human trafficking as well as the interrelationship between all the other crimes and piracy. In order to verify findings and to ensure the credibility of reports, survey questionnaires were deployed to the Nigerian maritime domain and the data description and analysis will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 - Data Analysis

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will fully explain the combination of the methodology chosen and elaborate on the reasoning for selecting this. Additionally, statistical results gathered from questionnaires and various secondary data sources, both published and unpublished will be examined. These findings will be scrutinized to provide answers to the research question which seeks to determine the current state of maritime security situation in Nigerian waters.

3.2 Research Methodology
The research was initially conducted by using secondary data from a literature review of the works of experts which includes books, journals, and articles as well as reports, logs, internet data, and government documents. Questionnaires were deployed to the area of study (Nigeria) to obtain primary data which are combined with unpublished secondary data for thorough analysis. The questionnaires contain mainly closed-ended questions and one open-ended question to expand the range of responses from different spectrums of the maritime industry. The questionnaires were sent to a trusted colleague in the Search and Rescue unit of NIMASA who then printed them and sent the hard copies to the targeted participants. The total number of questionnaires sent out was 60 and were evenly distributed among private, civil servants and security operatives’ participants working in the Nigerian maritime domain. 53 questionnaires were sent back and analysed with the quantitative method which involves statistical and comparative analysis to derive results.

Qualitative data allows participants to provide more detail in response to the questions being asked by the researcher, whereas quantitative data is frequently confined to "yes or no" or many pre-chosen options that participants can choose from (UK Statistics Authority, 2022). In this research, the quantitative method is necessary as it allows for a more significant number of participants to be included. This is important because the study aims to examine how different classes of society are impacted by the insecurity
in Nigerian waters. Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of the security questions involved, some public servants and security personnel may prefer to remain anonymous and only answer predetermined options. Therefore, the qualitative method may not provide the in-depth insights required for this study.

Figure 7: Flowchart of Methodology (Prepared by Author)

3.3 Statistical Secondary Data
3.3.1 Piracy Data Analysis
Individuals not involved in data collection analyse secondary data, which can be derived from published sources or the original data (Church, 2002). For the purpose of this research, GoG piracy data from January to June 2023 (Table 1) were obtained from the IMB. 2021 piracy log (Table 2), 2022 and 2023 NIMASA Operational Log were also obtained from the NIMASA C4i Centre. As shown in Table 1, it can be assumed that piracy has moved from Nigerian waters to other countries of the GoG in answer to the research question regarding the current state of affairs in Nigerian waters. According to the UN Secretary General’s 2022 report on piracy in the GoG, pirate groups, primarily located in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, have expanded their operations to the waters near Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe for operational reasons, such as avoiding the heightened patrols of Nigerian
naval assets (UN Security Council, 2022). Cameroon recorded two vessels being fired upon which is an indication that the pirates in the Cameroonian waters are more prone to violence and it should be taken into account by response and patrol teams.

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<th>Location</th>
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<th>Fired Upon</th>
<th>Attempted</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Congo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: 2021 Piracy Attacks in Nigerian Waters. Source: NIMASA, C4i**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S n</th>
<th>Vessel's name</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Vessel's class</th>
<th>Date Of Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Nature of the attack</th>
<th>Nature of Event</th>
<th>Successful/Unsuccessful</th>
<th>Crew kidnapped</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

28
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>PASSENGER BOATS</th>
<th>05/01/2021</th>
<th>04 30N – 007 16E</th>
<th>BOARDED/ HIJACK</th>
<th>SEA ROBBERY</th>
<th>SUCCESSFUL</th>
<th>NIL</th>
<th>IMB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MANTA ASLI</td>
<td>MARSHALL ISLANDS</td>
<td>BULK CARRIER</td>
<td>08/01/2021</td>
<td>03°38N 006°17E</td>
<td>ATTEMPTED BOARDING</td>
<td>PIRACY</td>
<td>UNSUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>IMB/M DAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MAERSK CARDIF</td>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>CONTAINER</td>
<td>13/01/2021</td>
<td>02°23’ 36N-005°39’48E</td>
<td>ATTEMPTED BOARDING</td>
<td>PIRACY</td>
<td>UNSUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>IMB/M DAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CONTAINER</td>
<td>21/01/2021</td>
<td>03°31N – 005:29E</td>
<td>ATTEMPTED BOARDING</td>
<td>PIRACY</td>
<td>UNSUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>IMB/M DAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SPEEDBOATS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>SPEEDBOATS</td>
<td>09/02/2021</td>
<td>02:58N – 002:53E</td>
<td>KIDNAPPING</td>
<td>SEA ROBBERY</td>
<td>SUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>IMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>BOURBON EVOLUTION</td>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>SUPPLY VESSEL</td>
<td>14/03/2021</td>
<td>02:58N – 002:53E</td>
<td>BOARDED/ HIJACK</td>
<td>PIRACY</td>
<td>UNSUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>IMB/M DAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As highlighted in Table 1, there was only 1 piracy attack recorded in Nigerian waters in the space of six months in 2023. Nigeria recorded no incident in the entire 2022 according to NIMASA C4i records. However, when compared with the 6 incidents recorded in just the first quarter of 2021 (Table 2), it is apparent from the records that piracy attacks have significantly reduced but not exactly eliminated in Nigerian waters.

Chart 2 below puts it in a clearer perspective. 4 of the 6 piracy attacks were unsuccessful meaning that the boarding attempt failed or the crew and vessel are neither kidnapped or robbed. The number of unsuccessful attacks due to security forces intervention means that the current capabilities of the Nigerian government are fairly effective but need a lot of improvement.
In the case of container ship MAERSK CARDIFF, the attack took place on 13th January 2021, southwest of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The attack was fended off by a security vessel who then escorted the vessel to safety. On 14 March 2021, pirates boarded the Luxembourg-flagged offshore supply vessel BOURBON EVOLUTION 802 approximately 208 NM south of Lagos near position 02:58N – 002:53E. The crew was safe and stayed in the citadel during the boarding. However, the people onboard the un-named Speedboat were not so fortunate, on 9 February 2021, pirates in speedboats successfully abducted at least six people near the Kpoma/Odioma and Nembe/Brass waterways in Bayelsa State.

Chart 2: 2021-2023 Piracy Attacks in Nigerian Waters (Prepared by Author)

According to the Joint Operations Centre (2023), as of 2023, only one incident has been reported in Nigerian waters, a robbery of a berthed vessel in the Tin Can Island terminal. 14 events have occurred in other nations of the GoG waters. Two maritime kidnappings have occurred, with six crewmen taken from a hijacked product tanker in the Congo Republic and three crewmen taken from a bulk carrier in Gabon. The bulk carrier was boarded and the crew was abducted while berthed in the port of Ownedo. In comparison, only one maritime kidnap was reported from GoG in the entire year of 2022. A tanker was also hijacked over 300 nautical miles off Abidjan, but the vessel and crew were reported safe five days later. this is an indication that better measures in Nigeria are pushing piratical activities further away.

As per NIMASA (2022) report, the GoG Declaration on Suppression of Piracy (GoG-DSP) has revealed that there have been no incidents of kidnappings in 12 months following the declaration in May 2021. This is a significant improvement compared to
2020, which saw 130 seafarers kidnapped. The latest update from the GoG declaration confirms that there have been no cases of kidnappings for ransom in 2022 (contradicts Joint Operation Centre (2023) report), compared to 20 cases in 2020 and 12 in 2021. Additionally, the IMB has confirmed no reported cases of vessel hijacking in Nigerian waters during the first half of 2022.

It can be observed in Figure 8 below that piracy and kidnapping occur both in Nigerian territorial/inland waters and at the high sea adjacent to the Nigerian Baseline. Pirates who operate in the waterways have a higher success rate in kidnapping and hijacking due to their familiarity with the terrain, allowing them to set up ambushes and take hostages to their hideouts in the mangrove creeks. It is possible that security patrols are more concentrated in the open sea to safeguard merchant shipping routes, leaving vessels in the waterways more exposed. Alternatively, it could be that the pressure from security forces like JTF and special forces patrols has forced pirates to operate closer to their hideouts in the waterways. Furthermore, the pirates’ lack of sophistication is evident from the failed boarding attempts on container ships and bulk carriers, highlighting the effectiveness of present-day large vessel security measures.

Figure 8: 2021 Piracy Attacks in Nigerian Waters (Prepared by Author)
3.3.2 Dark Activities Analysis

The NIMASA C4i centre, under the DBP, is responsible for monitoring vessels entering Nigerian waters. This is done using an intelligence system that detects any suspicious activities. The system tracks the history of the vessel including its voyage. Any questionable activities are investigated and analysed to establish the facts. These include issues such as shady ship-to-ship transfers, turning off the AIS, frequent change of initials, and sudden stops among others. Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of dark activities detected in Nigerian waters and beyond using the intelligent system.

![Figure 9: Map showing the location of dark activities in Nigerian waters (prepared by Author)](image)

Here are some samples of details of Dark Activities recorded in the C4i operations log book selected randomly between January to July 2023 records. Refer to Appendix G for more data.
1. On January 22nd, 2023 at approximately 4:44 PM, the Intelligence System detected a high-risk (border security) Panama-flagged tanker (oil products) vessel. The vessel is owned by Smart Tankers Inc. (beneficial owners) and Sinoi Shipping Inc. (registered owner). During the past 180 days, the vessel had a change in flag, MMSI, and ownership, and it is owned or managed by a company with an unusual structure. Additionally, the vessel is on a course that is suspiciously different from its normal sailing pattern. The vessel had conducted a number of dark activities in Asia and is now on its first visit to Nigeria since March 21st, 2023, at approximately 6:48 AM. At the time of the report, no single maritime infraction had been recorded, but due to the vessel's risk category (high risk) and previous activity, it requires constant monitoring and surveillance. The vessel's last port call was recorded on November 29th, 2022 at approximately 12:25 AM at Thilawa, Myanmar. Currently, the vessel is in Lagos, Nigeria at coordinates 6°19'40"N, 3°18'46"E.

2. On 31st May 2023 about 20:25 hours, the Intelligence System spotted a Moderate risk (safety), Liberia flagged Cargo (Bulk Carrier) vessel, owned by Ikaros Shipping & Brokerage Co. Ltd (Beneficial owner) and Orchid Navigation Services Sa (Registered owners). Checks revealed that the vessel had been drifting suspiciously in unusual areas within the North Atlantic Ocean for 5 days, since on 26/05/2023 around 1°30'59"N, 2°2'58"E coordinate. Furthermore, her destination is Port Harcourt-Nigeria with an estimated time of arrival on 27/05/2023. However, the vessel's last port call was recorded in Houston, United States.

3. On 23rd July 2023 about 0943 hours, the Intelligence System spotted a Cameroonian flagged Tanker (Oil Products) vessel without a Beneficial nor Registered owner. Findings revealed that the vessel was reported on 18/07/2023 for engaging in over 18 days dark activity. Today’s report found the vessel to have turned OFF AIS signal transmission on 19/07/2023, which lasted for 4 days and identity tempering (Name change: MT FLOMAR to EMS). Worthy of note, is that the anomaly (Name change) occurred while AIS signal
transmission was lost. The vessel had over four (4) different dark activities from 08/06/2023 till date at Oil facilities (Offshore) the least being thirteen (13) hours. The series of events recently carried out by the vessel seems unusual and highly suspicious. However, her last port call was at Lagos, Nigeria on 17/07/2023. Meanwhile, the vessel is currently at Lagos, Nigeria at 6°26'32"N, 3°18'38"E coordinate.

The system detects vessels as far as 400 km from Lagos baseline as shown on the map above which is an indication of the current state of improved government effort. With this level of surveillance and tracking, piracy activities which mostly rely on a network of ships (pirate mother ships and cargo transfer vessels) can easily be detected and dealt with. It is apparent perhaps why the record of piracy and crimes in Nigerian waters has seriously declined. Chart 3 shows the number of dark activities recorded in 2023 alone. The high number indicates that currently, so many illegal activities other than piracy are taking place in Nigerian waters and indeed the GoG.

Chart 3: Dark Activities in Nigerian Waters (Prepared by Author)
The frequency and the high number of dark activities as shown in chart 3 is an indication that a lot needs to be done in Nigerian water in terms of enforcement to rid the region of maritime crimes despite the decline in piracy. It also shows the vulnerability of the region and the need to not relent on the measures against piracy and other maritime crimes.

3.4 Primary Data (Survey Questionnaires)
A total of 53 out of 60 participants fully responded to the survey which led the 7 remaining questionnaires to be discarded. 83% are males while 17% are females of which 16 respondents had been victims of piracy or had a direct encounter with victims of piracy activities including those in the armed forces. This is a clear indication of the lack of participation of women in Nigerian maritime enforcement and the maritime sector in general. The 83% of the respondents are predominantly senior officers and managers between the ages of 30 to 49. They are from different walks of life within the Nigerian Maritime Domain which includes Nigerian fisheries, armed forces, maritime private sector, seafarers, and civil servants. The participants are mostly educated with 32.1% having either master's or doctorate degrees. The participants were carefully selected based on their exposure, knowledge or experience in the law enforcement of Nigerian maritime security. For example, the selection in NIMASA is mainly between the ISPS unit, RM RCC and the NIMASA Deep Blue Project Staff. Refer to Appendix D for the demographic data and survey results. A very important point to note is that the result shows that out of the 53 respondents, 79.2% (19 public servants, 10 armed forces, 10 private sector, and 3 self-employed) are satisfied with the Nigerian Armed Forces's capabilities.

3.5 Analysis of the Current Security Situation in Nigerian Waters
In order to critically dissect the current security situation in Nigerian waters, this research analyses survey parameters such as:

- Awareness of the current maritime security situation
- Government effort and resources allocated to tackling the problem
- Reporting of the Nigerian maritime security situation
Impact of the security situation on the economy
Private sector participation

3.5.1 Awareness of the current maritime security situation
Based on the survey results, it's clear that the participants are well-informed about the security situation in Nigerian waters and possess substantial knowledge regarding piracy and other maritime offenses as shown in Chart 4 and Chart 5 below. Their positions as senior officers, managers, and professionals from a variety of sectors working within the Nigerian Maritime Domain may have contributed to their understanding and knowledge. The large percentage of the respondents (32.1%) with master's or doctoral degrees implies that they have a solid educational background. Higher education levels are often associated with a stronger comprehension of complicated subjects like marine security, enabling individuals to critically analyse circumstances and contribute to discussions.

➢ An overwhelming number of respondents concurs with Q1 (Chart 4) and Q2 (Chart 5)

![Chart 4: Response to Q1(Prepared by Author)]
As stakeholders in the maritime industry, the participants have direct or indirect exposure to information about the current situation in Nigerian waters. This is likely due to the efforts of NIMASA's Public Relations Unit, which has established several initiatives to raise awareness about maritime activities and NIMASA operations. These initiatives include a weekly 30-minute TV program called "NIMASA This Week" on a popular Nigerian station called "Channel Television", as well as social media and newspapers. The astonishing percentage of participants with in-depth knowledge of piracy and other maritime offenses suggests that these individuals are not merely conscious of the situation but have also tried to educate themselves on the complexities of maritime security challenges. This might be as a result of the seriousness of piracy and marine offenses in the area, which forces these specialists to keep up with the most recent information and best practices for fending against such threats. On this note, the current state of affairs is that there is a significant awareness and knowledge of piracy and other crimes within the maritime sector.

3.5.2 Government effort and resources allocated to tackling the problem
For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to have insight into the Nigerian government's efforts in tackling the maritime security problem which include the agencies responsible as well as policies and initiatives implementation. Consequently, the questions in the survey such as Q3, Q7, and Q8 are based on the query on the efforts of the government. The charts 6, 7 and 8 below show the results accordingly.
➢ 62.3% of respondents concur to Q3, 52.8% concur to Q7 and 96.2% concur to Q8

Chart 6: Response to Q3 (Prepared by Author)

Chart 7: Response to Q7 (Prepared by Author)

Chart 8: Response to Q8 (Prepared by Author)
Coordination and Enforcement

3.5.2.1 NIMASA and Nigerian Navy
According to Q3 of our survey, 37% of the respondents do not agree that the Nigerian government is doing enough precisely NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy. The argument is backed by Q7 which suggests that even public opinion and perception do not fully agree that enough is being done with regard to maritime security. It is further reinforced by the responses to Q8 which is a bit contradictory to responses to Q3 with an overwhelming 96.2% agreeing that much needs to be done. In response to the research questions, the responses to Q3, Q7, and Q8 indicate that NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy despite their successes, are currently not at their best potential and more in terms of conduct and enforcement is needed.

30.2% of our respondents have been victims of piracy or they are familiar with someone who was a victim of piracy. Their responses to Q13 which is an open-ended question are shown in Table 3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Civil servant (Maritime)</td>
<td>“Ransom paid”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>Civil servant (Maritime)</td>
<td>“No Satisfactory resolution was reached. It was a case of robbery in the port facility”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Civil servant (Maritime)</td>
<td>“Resolved by the company involved”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“Ransom was paid before their release”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“We were able to contact MGC, NIMASA which replied rapidly and sent us a rescue team at sea.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>“We received an emergency call from a merchant ship and by the time we reached the coordinate, the pirates saw our mounted guns and took off”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“A distress call was placed through to the Nigerian Navy; an immediate investigation was carried out and a prompt response was adhered to”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“It was reported at the Maritime Police Unit and an investigation was carried out”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“By the grace of God, no government intervention but God took control”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“Pirates attacked us at sea but we were able to escape due to the intervention of the Navy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“A few times pirates attacked us at sea in which the Navy came to our rescue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12</td>
<td>Private (Maritime)</td>
<td>“A distress call was placed to the appropriate authority (Nigerian Navy), the swift response was followed immediately”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 16 respondents who had experience with piracy attacks, 50%, mainly civil servants and private sector workers as well as 1 member of the armed forces indicated that it was not effectively resolved as shown in Chart 9 below. This is a clear indication that the detection and response time of an incident is practically inadequate and a lot needs to be improved in terms of surveillance, ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication, and patrol to meet the level of the challenges.

![Chart 9: Respondent first hand and second-hand experience with piracy attacks (Prepared by Author)]
The Nigerian Navy’s capacity in terms of equipment and personnel training is not the problem as it is shown in Chart 10, rather, it may be from their conduct at different levels of the hierarchy.

Chart 10: Nigerian Maritime Security Forces Capacity Q11 (Prepared by Author)

Surveillance

3.5.2.2 NIMASA Deep Blue Project and Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye Project

It is highly probable that the majority of respondents (72.7%) in the research survey who expressed satisfaction with the Nigerian security forces’ ability to handle maritime security were influenced by their awareness of the assets, personnel training, and operations of the DBP, as well as the significant decline in piracy incidents in 2022 and 2023. On the other hand, half of the unsatisfied respondents work in the private sector and have experienced piracy attacks where the security forces did not provide assistance. With reference to Q13 (Table 3), we further asked the respondents to confirm the date of incidents and names of the vessels which was initially not indicated in the questionnaires. Only 4 out of the 16 respondents replied to the requisition which is as shown in Table 4 below:

Table 4: Q13 Names of Vessels and Dates of Incidents (Prepared by Author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Name of Vessel</th>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Prince Joseph I (Supply Vessel)</td>
<td>03/03/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though the incidents occurred before the establishment of the DPB in 2021, only R8 indicated that the incident was not resolved by the security forces. This could be due to the fact that the incident was initially reported to the police instead of the Navy causing a delay in response.

By considering the details of the combination of DBP and Falcon Eye Project capabilities, it is clearly another reason why 42 (79.2%) of our respondents, predominantly the Nigerian Navy and public servants, believed that the security forces' capabilities are satisfactory as shown in Chart 11 below. However, there is 20.8% room for improvement.

> 45.2% of public servants, 23.8% of Armed forces, 23.8% of private sector workers and 7.1% of self-employed respondents are satisfied with Q11 (Chart 11)

![Chart 11: Respondents Satisfied with Q11 According to Profession (Prepared by Author)](image-url)
3.5.3 Reporting of the Nigerian maritime security situation

Chart 2 shows the piracy activities reported between January 2021 and June 2023 which shows a tremendous decline in piracy incidents. The point of concern is that only 20.7% of our respondents believe that the information being reported regarding the maritime situation is genuine as shown in Chart 12 below. This leads to the conclusion that there could be the distortion of information either by the security forces which could be an indication of corruption/collusion or by the shipping companies to avoid delays by coastal states due to investigations. The high possibility of corruption and collusion also answers the question regarding the gap in policy implementation.

According to Jacobsen et al. (2021), both the IMO and IMB have their own specifications for information gathering, which are frequently dependent on reports from ships, ship owners, flag states, MOC, MMCC, and other elements of the inter-regional maritime security framework. The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre keeps track of all attacks and attempted attacks on ships flying any flags, whether they are berthed, at anchor, or at sea. The majority of the incident data collected by the IMB comes from voluntary reports from ships, ship owners, and/or flag states, hence it's possible that not all incidents are reported to the IMO/IMB. It's important to note that the database excludes incidents that happened in Nigerian waterways, against local ships, or to oil and gas infrastructure.

➢ 64.2% of respondents concurs to Q5 (Chart 12)
3.5.4 Impact of the security situation on the economy
An overwhelming 94.3% of respondents to Q9 believe that Nigeria's maritime security situation is a serious contributing factor to the worsening economic situation in the region, especially within coastal communities. Addressing the issue could attract investors in maritime-related businesses, leading to employment and opportunities for the communities. The concept of the blue economy is inextricably linked to the effective management of marine resources, which can only be achieved through the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. It is critical to create a secure maritime environment to ensure that these resources are managed in a responsible and effective manner, thereby achieving sustainable outcomes (Bueger, 2015). Chart 13 below is an indication of the reason for gaps in implementation because the higher the impact on the economy, the easier it is to recruit pirates and the more difficult it is for the government to cope with the increase in level of crimes.

➢ 94.3% of respondents concurs to Q9 (Chart 13)

![Chart 13: Response to Q9 (Prepared by Author)](image)

3.5.5 Private Sectors Participation
An overwhelming 84.9% of respondents believe private sector involvement can curb piracy and other maritime offenses as shown in Chart 14 below. It offers a possible answer to the question on how to improve the current state of affairs. This includes hiring private security companies and implementing security measures by shipping
companies. Private security companies are capable of providing comprehensive protection to ports, maritime installations, and vessels, and are even capable of managing entire Exclusive Economic Zones in the case of Benin Republic (Bueger, 2015).

➢ 84.9% of respondents concurs to Q10 (Chart 14)

![Chart 14: Response to Q10 (Prepared by Author)](chart.png)

3.6 Data Description and Analysis Summary

This chapter is predominantly the analysis of primary and secondary data obtained for the purpose of this research. It also described the methodology adopted as well as the justification for the choice. The results obtained from the analysis of both the primary and secondary published/unpublished data revealed that piracy and other maritime crimes have currently declined in Nigerian waters due to the effective policies and strategies deployed by the Nigerian government. The result also shows that despite the strategies deployed, there is still a high volume of “Dark Activities” occurrences in the region that must be addressed.
Chapter 4 – Elaboration on Maritime Security Strategies in Nigeria

4.1 Introduction
Due to piracy, and other illicit activities in its territorial waters and the GoG, Nigeria has experienced major difficulties with regard to maritime security. To address these concerns, the Nigerian government and other GoG regional stakeholders have launched a number of strategies such as regional cooperation (YCC), joint patrols and JTF, MDA, policy and initiatives, capacity building, and community engagement among others. In the Nigerian context, these strategies are the responsibility of NIMASA in collaboration with the Nigerian Navy, NCS, NDLEA, and other law enforcement agencies. An illustration of the cooperation and collaboration between NIMASA and security agencies is depicted in Figure 10.

The current decline in piracy and other maritime crimes in Nigerian waters as well the rate of detection of illicit activities through surveillance is an indication that the employed strategies are quite effective. The fact that piratical activities are still emerging in other parts of the GoG and Dark Activities still take place in the region means that a lot of efforts such as in terms of legislation, enforcement and socioeconomic reforms are still needed. In order to answer the research question (RQ), It is imperative to examine the maritime security capabilities of Nigeria.

Figure 10: NIMASA and Nigerian Navy Collaboration. Source: NIMASA (2021)
4.2 Government Agencies and their roles

Best practices in maritime security efforts can mainly be determined by a country’s allocation of resources for the purpose of securing its maritime domain. Its naval power, systems of surveillance and rapid response, a highly effective legal and institutional framework, coastal communities support, effective regional and international mutual assistance agreements and participation as well as its degree of coordination and collaboration between stakeholders are presumed to be the key to a successful maritime security management. However, it can also be argued that a country’s or region’s geographical location, poverty level, and degree of determination are the major elements that determine its success or failure. Some superpowers like the United States can be considered as an example of best practices because of the size of their coverage area around the globe in terms of maritime security, their potential threats both from state and non-state actors as well as their huge defence budget.

The U.S. Navy is one of the largest and most powerful naval forces in the world, with a fleet that includes aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and amphibious assault ships as well as advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. With its large defence budget and strict regulations, the United States has developed a comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime Security based on principles such as enhancing global maritime partnerships, building the capacity of partner nations, improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and ensuring a robust and agile naval force. Key duties and significant obligations in carrying out the national plan fall on the Departments of Commerce, Defence, Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Transportation. The U.S.C.G primarily focuses on law enforcement, search and rescue, and environmental protection in U.S. waters and beyond. (CSIS, 2021). In response to the research question (RQ1), Nigeria in its own right possess quite a substantial operational capability as illustrated in figure 11 below.
4.2.1 Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)

Regulations concerning Nigerian shipping, maritime labour, maritime capacity building, and the execution of coastal state obligations including maritime security are handled by NIMASA, formerly the NMA (Bekesuomowei, 2020). By the Shipping Policy Decree on May 11, 1987, the Federal Ministry of Transport formed the NMA, the predecessor of NIMASA, which it oversaw (Bekesuomowei, 2020). On August 1st, 2006, the Federal Ministry of Transport's former parastatals, the National Maritime Authority and Joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council, merged to form the agency. Its goal was to ensure the Nigerian maritime industry's orderly growth, protection, and training of its workforce (Bekesuomowei, 2020). The Agency is tasked with regulating the maritime sector in Nigeria through the appropriate legislation, including the Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act of 2003, the Merchant Shipping Act of 2007, and the NIMASA Act of 2007. To better administer and coordinate its functions, NIMASA has been divided into three operational zones namely Western (Lagos), Central (Warri), and Eastern (Port Harcourt) zones.
4.2.2 Nigerian Navy

Nte et al. (2022) state that the largest naval force in the Gulf of Guinea is the Nigerian Navy, which can be deployed anywhere to project strength, fend off aggression, and carry out long-term combat operations in the area. The Nigerian Navy is the cornerstone of Strategic MDA in the GoG due to its mobility, accessibility, and fighting strength (Nte et al., 2022). According to UNODC (2013), the Nigerian Navy deals with a variety of serious security challenges in its operational region, including smuggling of weapons and drugs, human trafficking, oil theft, insurgency, piracy, and possible terrorism (Østensen et al., 2018). One of the major initiatives established by the Nigerian Navy for surveillance and development of MDA is the Falcon Eye Center in Bayelsa. The Nigerian Navy participates in drill Obangame, a joint annual drill in the Gulf of Guinea, together with roughly thirty foreign navies as illustrated in Figure 12 (Nte et al., 2022).

Figure 12: Nigerian Navy During Maritime Security Drill. Source: Joint Operation Centre (2022)

However, in relation to RQ2, Jacobsen et al. (2021) argued the opposite, emphasizing that there is also a shortage of sophisticated fighting equipment and training in comparison to the firepower of the pirates and their willingness to be in direct arms.
confrontation with the security forces in the riverine areas and the creeks. In order to dissect the readiness of the security forces (RQ1) specifically the Nigerian Navy, government initiatives such as the NIMASA Deep Blue Project, the Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye Project as well as the Nigerian anti-piracy legislation known as the SPOMO Act, 2019 were examined in the subsequent topics.

Is the Nigerian Navy involved in corruption and collusion with pirates RQ2? Corruption and collusion are significant factors in aiding organized crime, such as piracy and the oil theft industry. This is particularly true among powerful individuals like former militants, and sponsors of piracy. According to a study by UNODC, pirate groups in the Niger Delta are bribing members of official security forces to ignore their criminal activities (Jacobsen et al., 2021). This may explain the reason for the inconclusive investigations and the delay in response time to certain piracy incidents (Chart 8). In fact, according to the statement made by the Nigerian former Chief of Naval Staff in February 2021, the high command of the Nigerian Navy is seriously concerned about the allegations raised against the Nigerian Navy of corruption practices and collusion with pirates and shall deal decisively with any Naval officer found guilty of such act. Additionally, a specialist in an interview during the creation of the UNODC report mentioned that; “we had a case of a hostage release where they [abductors] told us that the waterways were safe because a high-ranking law enforcement officer had been paid off to do no checks for the next 24 hours – and if anyone stopped us [the release team], we should just tell them to call him” (Jacobsen et al., 2021). Indeed, this is a very serious concern that must be dealt with, or else no matter the resources allocated to fight maritime crimes, it will always prevail.

4.2.3 Complementary agencies
The NCS, the NDLEA, the NIS, the Marine Police, and the NPA are the agencies of government that complement NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy in the fight against piracy and other maritime offenses. NCS and NDLEA both complement each other in the mandate of preventing the smuggling of arms and illicit drugs by land sea and air into the Nigerian territory. The NIS is inclined toward human trafficking prevention and control. The Marine Police Complement the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA with
their authority to arrest, detain, and prosecute maritime offenders. NPA and NCS complement NIMASA in the implementation of the ISPS Code. In relation to RQ1, all the aforementioned complementary agencies with probably the exception of the NPA participate in marine patrol and surveillance either in isolation or in the Joint Task Force which is intended to serve as a deterrent to maritime criminals.

4.3 Government policies and initiatives
There are several policies and initiatives implemented by the Nigerian government with the sole purpose of managing the security challenges in the Nigerian waters and the GoG at large such as SPOMO Act, NIMASA-DBP, and the Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye Project.

4.3.1 Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offenses (SPOMO) Act
A key step in Nigeria's counterpiracy efforts was the adoption of the SPOMO Act in 2019 (Anele, 2023). The SPOMO Act is derived from the provisions of UNCLOS,1982, and the SUA, 1988 Convention and its protocols. Before the law was passed, it was difficult to prosecute anyone in Nigeria accused of engaging in sea piracy since it looked like no domestic law specified the offense. In relation to RQ1, it ended the debate over whether sea piracy is a crime covered by any municipal statute and granted the Federal High Court full authority over cases involving armed robbery and other illegal activities at sea.

According to NIMASA (2022), a list of 18 maritime offenses and illegal acts at sea, including armed robbery at sea and crimes besides piracy perpetrated within Nigerian waters, is provided in Section 4 of the SPOMO Act. Such crimes include hijacking a ship, an aircraft, or a fixed or floating platform; damaging or vandalizing a ship, an installation, or a navigation facility; or interfering with the operation of a ship, an installation, or a navigation facility. The Federal High Court is the only court with jurisdiction to hear and decide any case involving the SPOMO Act, according to Section 5(2) of the Act. In addition, Section 10 stipulates that, despite the terms of any other act, anyone who engages in, or attempts to engage in, an act of piracy or any other maritime offence or unlawful act in violation of the act will be subject to any penalties or punishments stipulated by the act upon conviction.
4.3.2 NIMASA Deep Blue Project (DBP)

According to NIMASA (2021), the DBP, launched by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Transportation and the Federal Ministry of Defence, is being effectively carried out by NIMASA. Its purpose is to safeguard Nigerian waters and the GoG by utilizing multiple platforms to tackle maritime security on land, sea, and air. The ground assets are made up of a highly trained Maritime Security Unit of 600 personnel, 16 armoured vehicles for coastal areas patrol, and the Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence Centre (C4i) for data collection and intelligence gathering. The marine assets consist of two Special Mission Vessels and 17 Fast Interceptor Boats. The air assets comprise three Special Mission Helicopters for search and rescue missions, two Special Mission Aircraft for surveillance of the nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and four Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Moreover, the Deep Blue Project is the first integrated maritime security policy in West and Central Africa, aimed at combating piracy, sea robbery, and other maritime crimes.

![Figure 13: NIMASA C4i Centre. Source: NIMASA (2021)](image)

The DBP C4i Centre is said to be highly effective in enforcing maritime security and safety measures. By prioritizing MDA, intelligence gathering, and reconnaissance, the
Centre guarantees successful outcomes. It serves as the primary source of data for
other aspects of the DBP, including situational awareness and intelligence. The Centre
boasts several components, such as the C4i System Stations, Maritime Intelligence
System, Aerial Mission Management System with Multi-Sensor Integrated System
(MSIS), Communication Systems, and Satellite Communication System, all of which
contribute to its high efficacy. Furthermore, these systems are seamlessly integrated
into the Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network's Maritime Multinational Coordination
Centre, Zone E, providing security and assistance in SAR operations. Moreover, they
are externally connected with Lloyd's List and the NAVY Falcon Eye systems,
ensuring top-notch performance and reliability. The DBP further answers RQ1.

4.3.3 Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye Centre
According to Akpan (2021), the Falcon Eye Project provides a reliable and secure
solution for monitoring Nigeria's EEZ. It aims to streamline operations for naval and
aviation maritime forces, from identifying potential threats to responding quickly. In
relation to RQ1, the project achieves this goal by integrating advanced intelligence
tools, a sophisticated Command and Control System, cutting-edge detection and
classification sensors, and a team of highly trained operators and commanders. While
not directly affiliated with the DBP, the Falcon Eye Project collaborates and shares
information with it. Nte et al. (2022) further explained that the Falcon Eye, developed
by Asia Global Technology in Israel, was successfully manufactured by Falcon Eye
Technology in the UAE. Thanks to its high-frequency AIS and satellite AIS, it is
capable of identifying ships that are transmitting incorrect voyage and AIS
information, engaging in ship-to-ship activities, deviating from their course,
approaching other vessels rapidly, stopping abruptly, and conducting ship-to-ship
operations while in Nigerian waters. It is apparent that the drop-down in attacks is an
indication of success for both NIMASA DBP and the Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye. The
operations of the Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye are illustrated in Figure 14.
Modern piracy is mainly considered an economic crime that results in losses for the state, public, and shipowner or benefits for the pirates. The expenses are borne by ship owners who attempt to lessen the effects of piracy incidents by rerouting ships, hiring more security personnel, installing specialized security equipment, or paying the ransom to pirates who kidnap ships or crew (Marlow, 2010). Syed et al. (2013) explained that, since the escalation of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, shippers have been using private security firms to guard their ships in order to navigate the seas, in addition to the provision of security personnel appointed to enforce laws along with monitoring the high seas by various governments of coastal states. Private security firms frequently provide shippers with services including protecting the vessels and crew, tracking ships, recovering hijacked ships, negotiating on behalf of shippers in hostage situations, etc.

The Nigerian government employs the services of a security firm that is privately owned for reasons related to maritime enforcement and surveillance, an initiative that is contrary to the essence of the establishment of the navy. This is done in an ostensible
effort to follow the practice that is primarily adopted by shippers. Chief Government Ekpemukpolo's private security agency, Global West Vessel Specialist Agency (GWVSA), was the company contracted by the Nigerian government to handle maritime surveillance and enforcement as Syed et al. (2013) elaborated. With the allegation against the CEO of GWVSA of being an ex-militant himself and the consideration that the entire idea is a threat to national security and the sovereignty of the Nigerian state, the government under President Muhammadu Buhari ultimately dissolved the provisions of the contract in 2015. With regard to RQ1, there are still private security companies such as Ocean Marine Security Ltd, OMLS Integrated Services Ltd, Kings Guards Nigeria Limited (KGNL), OCEA S.A Nigeria, and Jeftech Ltd among others. They provide escort on demand to ships navigating major insecurity hotspots within the Nigerian waters, in absolute cooperation and collaboration with the Marine Police as well as the Nigerian Navy.

4.5 Elaboration on Nigerian Maritime Security Strategies Summary
This chapter critically discussed the condition of the Nigerian state in terms of its readiness in combating Piracy and other maritime crimes. In relation to the RQs, it discusses the agencies of government responsible for maritime security and their strategies; the legal framework for prosecuting maritime offenders; and the surveillance and enforcement assets at the disposal of the government for detection and response to maritime offenses. The decline in piracy is an indication of the success of the employed strategies. However, piracy and other crimes cannot be completely defeated without solving the root cause and the atmosphere that allows it to thrive. The subsequent chapter provides additional recommendations of measures that are required to ultimately solve the security problem in the GoG.
Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1 Conclusion

The differentiation between piracy incidents in Nigerian waters and Somali waters hinges on the motivations and operational methods of the respective pirate groups. While both regions experience maritime piracy, the core objectives and tactics employed by Somali pirates and Nigerian pirates exhibit distinctive characteristics.

In Somali waters, piracy often involves the hijacking of ships with the primary intent of holding the crew members hostage for ransom. Somali pirates have gained notoriety for employing kidnapping-for-ransom tactics. They target vessels traversing the waters off the coast of Somalia, a region known for its strategic location along key international shipping routes, particularly in the Gulf of Aden. Upon capturing a vessel, Somali pirates typically detain the crewmembers and demand substantial ransoms for their release.

Conversely, piracy incidents in Nigerian waters focus on the theft of crude oil. Nigerian pirates are primarily driven by economic motivations, seeking to hijack vessels transporting crude oil cargo. Once in control of a vessel, they siphon off the valuable crude oil and subsequently sell it in local black markets, which are part of a thriving illegal oil trade network. This illicit trade not only provides a lucrative source of revenue for the pirate groups but also contributes to the larger issue of oil theft and illegal bunkering in Nigeria, which has profound economic and environmental consequences. It is also true that the differing objectives of these pirate groups reflect the unique economic and geopolitical contexts of their respective regions. Somali piracy emerged in response to a volatile political landscape, the absence of effective governance, and economic deprivation in Somalia. In contrast, Nigerian piracy is closely linked to the country's oil-rich resources, and the theft of crude oil is intertwined with broader issues of economic inequality, corruption, and criminal networks.
In relation to the first research question (**RQ1**), from the results obtained during this research, it is apparent that piracy has drastically declined in Nigerian waters. This is due to the intensive measures taken by the Nigerian government such as the deployment of high-grade technology for onshore and offshore surveillance, patrol, and enforcement. Capacity-building strategies such as domestic/foreign training and drills by NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy for the purpose of the fight against piracy and other maritime offenses have proven to be effective. Our research also revealed that the same method of overwhelming patrols by international forces in the Gulf of Aden has been deployed by the members of the G7++ FoGG such as the UK and the French Navy which has clearly contributed to the decline in the number of incidents especially in Nigerian Waters. Additionally, the success in the prosecution of maritime offenders by the Nigerian Federal High Court through the implementation of the SPOMO Act is due to the Nigerian Navy's active participation in the provision of witnesses and evidence for the judicial proceedings.

However, this research also led to the conclusion that as the piracy incidents in Nigerian waters declined, the Incidents in other Gulf of Guinea member states like Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe have risen. This is because of the pirates` efforts to avoid the heavy Nigerian Navy patrol assets in the Nigerian waters and prosecution under the SPOMO Act.

During the research process, it was evident that there is a significant issue with the implementation of maritime security regulations in Nigerian waters, which aligns with the second research question (**RQ2**). The literature review highlights concerns related to corruption and collusion within certain segments of the Nigerian maritime security forces. These issues are particularly worrying as they may contribute to the persistence of piracy and other maritime crimes in the region. This is because corrupt practices and collusive behaviours can potentially compromise the enforcement of regulatory measures and hamper efforts to curb piratical activities.

It is also true that this research highlights a significant issue surrounding the socio-economic circumstances within the Gulf of Guinea's coastal communities. It has been
established that these communities are facing severe socio-economic hardships, such as extreme poverty and extensive unemployment. Unfortunately, this predicament creates an appealing and financially viable option for many individuals in the region to engage in piracy and other maritime criminal activities. The continuation of these unfavourable socio-economic conditions perpetuates the attraction to such illicit actions, which could potentially undermine the intended effects of regulatory measures. Additionally, a noteworthy observation from the research is the absence of a level playing field within the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region. This inequity arises from disparities in the resource endowments and capabilities of the various countries within the region to actively participate in the implementation of regional maritime security strategies. Such imbalances may provide opportunistic pirates with safe havens or areas of refuge within the GoG region, consequently impeding the comprehensive effectiveness of security measures.

How to improve the current state of affairs (RQ3)? To answer this query, several measures are highlighted in the subsequent topic of recommendations.

5.2 Recommendations and Possible Areas of Future Research

*Strategy and Policy Related*

The Nigerian maritime industry has been adversely impacted by a number of contradictory policies and regulatory frameworks that limit its productivity and effectiveness. For example, in 2001, the Nigerian government initially allowed unrestricted importation of used vehicles to boost the economy but later reversed this policy, banning the importation of vehicles older than five years. This decision was made without considering the revenue generated from these imports. Consequently, in 2001, it resulted in severe port congestion and provided neighbouring countries like Togo, Cotonou, and Ghana with an opportunity to import vehicles without age limits through their ports. This policy caused a significant loss of revenue for the Nigerian government and increased vehicle smuggling across porous borders (Magaji, 2022). Therefore, the Nigerian government should be careful in establishing policies that may have potential to compromise national security or maritime security in this case.
It is also necessary to underline the need to refrain from imposing solutions and imitating policies from other countries when they may not always be appropriate. Working closely together to strengthen and employ recognized regional and global frameworks like the YCC and the G7++ FoGG Should be highly encouraged.

The issue of corruption practices and collusion with maritime offenders by security forces must be of great concern. The governments of Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea countries must take drastic measures to deter corruption practices, especially within their security architectures. This can be done through the application of the highest punishment possible for violators. Awareness training on the detrimental impact of corruption and collusion should also be a major part of the security agencies` academic syllabuses. It is also essential for the government to hold accountable any politicians and civil servants who are implicated in corruption or collusion with criminal groups in the region. Future research must include a thorough investigation into the issue at all levels of government.

While piracy in Nigerian waters is decreasing, the ongoing poor economic conditions of coastal communities remain a pressing concern. To address this issue, the Nigerian government should intensify its efforts to enhance the livelihoods and living conditions of the Niger Delta region's residents. This can be done through infrastructural development such as roads and hospitals, technical skills acquisition programs, investment in agriculture and fisheries and employment of capable members at all levels of the oil industry. This approach will not only foster economic development but also promote stability and deter piratical activities.

By being open and answerable to the Nigerian people, the Federal Government and the National Assembly have a critical role to play in this. Not only is the currently ongoing NDDC contracts fraud issue outrageous, but it also undermines all of the Federal Government's development projects in the Niger Delta area and indicts Federal Government officials and certain members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly should immediately pass a new law that forbids politicians and public employees from directly or indirectly competing for government contracts in order to prevent future corruption scandals like this one (Nwalozie, 2020).
In 2023, the Nigerian government took a significant step by creating the Ministry of Blue Economy, which is entrusted with overseeing the operations of NIMASA, the Nigerian Shippers Council NSC, and the NPA. This innovative move has granted the Nigerian maritime sector a distinct presence in the Federal Executive Council, promoting greater awareness among the public and the federal government about maritime security issues. Consequently, it will facilitate quicker responses to challenges within the sector. It's crucial to share this initiative with other Gulf of Guinea nations to encourage a more unified regional approach, ultimately enhancing maritime security and economic opportunities across the region.

It is highly advisable for larger economies in the region, like Nigeria, Ghana, and Angola, to take the initiative in providing substantial technical and financial support to smaller economies. This assistance can help these nations develop the necessary capabilities to actively participate in combating piracy and other maritime crimes. Such collaborative efforts will serve the collective interest of all countries involved.

The countries of the Gulf of Guinea with strong judicial systems should establish a legal framework for the prosecution of maritime offenders in the similitude of Nigeria’s SPOMO Act to bridge the gap in implementation.

The literature review conducted in this research revealed that Armed Forces Act of 1993 designated the navy as the only agency responsible for Nigeria's maritime security. In contrast, Section 17(1-2) of the SPOMO Act charged NIMASA with coordinating all maritime security measures, including the fight against piracy, maritime offenses, and any other unlawful acts. such lack of clarity must be resolved as it interferes with the effectiveness of implementation and degree of collaboration (Msheliza et al., 2023).

**Operations and Training Related**

Fish stocks in Nigerian waters has been on a decline due to oil spill pollution and IUU fishing thereby increasing the poverty level of the coastal communities. The protection of the Nigerian and the GoG marine ecosystem must be on the agenda of the regional governments. These include through effective MARPOL enforcement, hi-tech
surveillance, massive coastline clean-ups, and the establishment of marine aquacultures as well as Marine Spatial Planning and Marine Protected Areas. In addition, Nigerian government must ensure that oil companies operating in the country adhere strictly to global best practices in oil exploration and avoid any activities that could lead to environmental degradation. In order to achieve this, highest fines possible and in extreme cases revoking of license should be administered to violators.

All the member states of the GoG should invest in advanced maritime domain awareness technologies. These include radar systems, the AIS, and satellite surveillance, which enhance vessel tracking and enable early detection of potentially suspicious activities. Furthermore, the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) by all the states for maritime patrols and surveillance can significantly bolster monitoring capabilities which would consequently deter piratical activities.

Creating a regional piracy reporting centre is a viable option that could greatly benefit the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region. The centre should be equipped with state-of-the-art technologies for monitoring and tracking activities throughout the entire region. To ensure wide participation, its personnel should include experts and staff from all over the region. This initiative would enable effective coordination and information sharing among members as well as enhance surveillance, armed patrols and operations.

In addition to this, it would be advisable to increase the frequency of joint regional security forces drills and training, such as the Obangame Express Exercise, from once to at least three times per year. This should involve the participation of all GoG countries, with each country able to host the event. Such initiatives would foster collaboration, enhance capacity building, and create a level playing field within the region.

5.3 Area of future Research and Closing Statement

As piracy incidents have decreased in Nigerian waters and the Gulf of Guinea region, it is essential to remain vigilant, and conduct further research on how to improve the situation. Therefore, the future research should explore the possibility of collusion and conspiracy involving high-ranking government officials and multinational companies. Such collusion may enable maritime crimes and even grant control over the frequency
and location of incidents. Investigating the core reasons behind the shift of piracy from Nigerian waters to other GoG countries is critical to understanding and addressing this complex issue. By uncovering these factors, we can work toward a more secure and transparent maritime environment in the region.

Before the establishment of the DBP, Nigeria have suffered the severe consequences of piratical activities. However, it is now true that the country has reached a milestone of achievement in its fight against the problem considering the trend of decline in incidents from 2021 to 2023. Going forward, there in a need for the government of Nigeria in collaboration with the GoG countries to sustain the effort and continuously improve the momentum of the employed measures.
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## Appendix A

### Ethics Committee Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of principal researcher:</th>
<th>Lamir Abd Mohammed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name(s) of any co-researcher(s):</td>
<td>Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Dimitrios Dakakis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title of project:</td>
<td>Dissecting the relentless security challenges in Nigerian waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the research funded externally?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, by which agency?</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where will the research be carried out?</td>
<td>Through a trusted colleague and friend at the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the participants be recruited?</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many participants will take part?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will they be paid?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, please supply details:</td>
<td>Questionnaires &amp; Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the research data be collected (by interview, by questionnaires, etc.)?</td>
<td>In an encrypted folder on my computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the research data be stored?</td>
<td>It will be completely deleted immediately after the result of the dissertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How and when will the research data be disposed of?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a risk assessment necessary?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, please attach:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Signature(s) of researcher(s):

Signature of Supervisor:

Date: 28/04/23

Date: 28/04/2023

Please attach:
- A copy of the research proposal
- A copy of any risk assessment
- A copy of the consent form to be given to participants
- A copy of the information sheet to be given to participants
- A copy of any item used to recruit participants
Appendix B

Consent Form

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in connection with a Dissertation that will be written by the Interviewer, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime Affairs at the World Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden.

The topic of the Dissertation is: Dissecting the relentless security challenges in Nigerian waters.

The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will later be published online in WMMU’s digital repository (maritime commons) subject to final approval of the University and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data will be immediately deleted.

Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree is awarded.

Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.

Student’s name: Lamir Ado Mohammed
Specialization: Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration
Email address: w1012399@wmu.se

---

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________________________

Date: _______________________________________
Appendix C

Survey Questionnaire
Nigerian Maritime Security Situation Survey Questionnaire

I. Questions

Directions: Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of these statements regarding the Nigerian Maritime Security Situation. Place an "X" mark in the box of your answer.

Section 1: Demographic Information

What is your gender? □ Male □ Female

What is your age range? □ 16 – 29 □ 30-49 □ 50 & Above

What is your educational qualification? □ Bachelors □ Msc/PhD □ others

What is your profession? □ Unemployed □ Self-employed □ Private (Maritime) □ Public (Maritime) □ Armed Forces □ others

Section 2: Knowledge/Awareness/Attitudes/Opinions with Regard to Maritime Security in Nigerian Waters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. You are aware of the current Maritime Security Situation in Nigerian waters.
2. You are familiar with piracy and other security issues in Nigerian waters.

3. Nigerian government is doing enough to tackle maritime security challenges.

4. Nigerian waters is safe and secure for maritime activities.

5. Nigerian Maritime Security situation is under-reported.

6. The Nigerian public is concerned about the Maritime Security situation.

7. The Nigerian Public are satisfied with the government’s effort on Maritime Security.

8. Much effort is needed to address the maritime security situation in Nigerian waters.

9. Maritime Insecurity has a serious impact on Nigeria’s economy.

10. Private sector can play a role in improving maritime security in Nigerian waters.
Section 3: Experience with Maritime Security in Nigerian Waters

Q11: How do you rate the Nigerian security forces’ capacity to protect maritime activities in Nigerian waters?

☐ Highly satisfactory
☐ Satisfactory
☐ Neutral
☐ Unsatisfactory
☐ Highly Unsatisfactory

Q12: Have you or anyone you know ever been a victim of piracy or other maritime security issues in Nigerian waters? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Q13: If yes, how was the situation resolved?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

Email Address (optional): _______________________________

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with us.
### Appendix D

**Survey Questionnaire Results**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 &amp; Above</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Msc/Phd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. You are aware of the current maritime situation in Nigerian waters.

2. You are familiar with piracy and other security issues in Nigerian waters.
3. Nigerian government is doing enough to tackle maritime security challenges.

4. Nigerian waters is safe and secure for maritime activities.

5. Nigerian Maritime Security situation is under-reported.
6. The Nigerian public is concerned about the Maritime Security situation.

7. The Nigerian Public are satisfied with the government’s effort on Maritime Security.

8. Much effort is needed to address the maritime security situation in Nigerian waters.
9. Maritime Insecurity has a serious impact on Nigeria’s economy.

10. Private sector can play a role in improving maritime security in Nigerian waters.

11. How do you rate the Nigerian security forces’ capacity to protect maritime activities in Nigerian waters?
12. Have you or anyone you know ever been a victim of piracy or other maritime security issues in Nigerian waters?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. If yes, how was the situation resolved? (Refer to 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolved</th>
<th>Unresolved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Unpublished Secondary Data

**Table 2: 2021 Piracy Attacks in Nigerian Waters. Source: NIMASA, C4i**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sn</th>
<th>Vessel's name</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Vessel's class</th>
<th>Date Of Event</th>
<th>Locati on</th>
<th>Nature of the attack</th>
<th>Natur e of Event</th>
<th>Successful/Unsuccessful</th>
<th>Crew kidnap ed</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PASSENGER BOATS</td>
<td>05/01/2021</td>
<td>04 30N – 007 16E</td>
<td>BOARDED/ HIJACK</td>
<td>SEA ROBB ERY</td>
<td>SUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>IMB</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>MARSHA LL ISLANDS</td>
<td>BULK CARRIE R</td>
<td>08/01/2021</td>
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### Published Secondary Data

**Table 1: January – June 2023 Piracy Activities in the Gulf of Guinea (ICC-IMB, 2023)**

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## Appendix G

### Dark Activities, January 2023

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