Assessing the effectiveness of maritime centres in the context of the implementation of the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (Yaounde Code Of Conduct)

Richardis Kali Anabia-Tiah

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WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY
Malmö, Sweden

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARITIME CENTRES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT CONCERNING THE REPRESSION OF PIRACY, ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS AND ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITY IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (YAOUNDE CODE OF CONDUCT)

RICHARDIS KALI ANABIA-TIAH
Ghana

A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the reward of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
MARITIME AFFAIRS
(MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION)

2022

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Declaration

I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my work has been identified and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the University.

Signature: 

Date: 20th September 2022

Supervised by: Professor Aref Fakhry

Supervisor’s affiliation: MLP
Acknowledgement

See what the Lord has done, what we waited for has come to pass.
God’s goodness has abounded once again in my life. He is indeed the God of impossibilities. For His mercies, grace and favour upon my life and making me complete another milestone, I say glory be unto his name. I am grateful to him and words cannot express my gratitude to him.

To the Chief of the Naval Staff of Ghana, Rear Admiral Issah Yakubu, I say a big thank you for permitting me to further my studies at the World Maritime University, I am grateful. I am also thankful to Naval Captain Ben Baba Abdul, Naval Captain Ramsey Bamba, Commander Victor Fianko, Commander Keith Nkrumah and Commander Joshua MacSimpiney for their words of encouragement to pursue this professional studies. I extend my gratitude to Lieutenant Commander Abraham Akwetye Teye for his encouragement and support in the application process for this programme and during my studies. I say God bless you all.

My Profound gratitude goes to Stena Rederi AB for their generosity towards me and for providing me with this wonderful opportunity. I will forever be grateful to you.

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My buddy Choilio Sanogo, Kweku Ananse Manso and Kiki Lumumba, you have been of great support and provided me with guidance and advice in my assignments and dissertation. May God bless you all, I am grateful.

To my Family, I say “Mpusiya” for all your prayers. Dada and Mama, your daily motivation kept me during this journey. My lovely sister Frances Jemimah (Jollof) and her daughter Jazmina Nefertiti (Fried Chicken), you held me down with your prayers and encouraged me when I needed it, I cannot thank you enough, I am extremely grateful. How can I forget COP Vincent Redeemer Dedjoe (Savanna)? You have been there from the beginning of this journey to its end, I bless God for you. To all my friends who supported me with prayers during my stay, God bless you.

I am thankful to all my S-22 mates and all the wonderful friends I made at WMU, you are special to me. May God continue to bless and keep us.
Abstract


Degree: Master of Science

The dissertation is a study conducted to assess the capability level of Maritime Centres in the Gulf of Guinea in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The literature attained in this study indicates the Yaoundé Code of Conduct is being implemented with several achievements attained, however, limitations exist in the capabilities of signatories and Maritime Centres of the Gulf of Guinea region.

To obtain a deeper understanding of the study, a qualitative research approach was employed through interviews of naval officers and other staff in the Maritime Centres to explore the capabilities of Maritime Centres and how the Yaoundé Code of Conduct is being implemented with these capabilities.

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Yaoundé Architecture were examined by analysing some articles and the structure to realize how effective and smooth the Code for suppressing maritime insecurity is being employed. The information on capabilities and level of implementation obtained, identified limited resources in logistics, finance and humans for Maritime Centres to effectively implement the Code of Conduct.

Stakeholders both at the regional and international level are greatly supporting Maritime Centres with resources, training for capacity building and joint operations which is boosting the level of security in the region.

The study concludes by establishing the existence of limited capabilities in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct by Maritime Centres and recommends signatories and the regional economic communities to build the capabilities of Maritime Centres for effective response to maritime insecurity in the region.

KEYWORDS: Yaoundé Code of Conduct, Djibouti Code of Conduct, Capabilities, Implementation, Challenges, Efficiency
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIMCO</td>
<td>Baltic and International Maritime Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRESMAC</td>
<td>Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRESMAO</td>
<td>Regional Centre for Maritime Security in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCC</td>
<td>Djibouti Code of Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIMS</td>
<td>ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGC</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoG</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Interregional Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPO-INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMB</td>
<td>International Maritime Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMB PRC</td>
<td>International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Information Sharing Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUU</td>
<td>Illegal Unreported Unregulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAT-GoG</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade- Gulf of Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMCC</td>
<td>Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Maritime Operation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMU</td>
<td>World Maritime University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMSS</td>
<td>Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARIS</td>
<td>Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCC</td>
<td>Yaoundé Code of Conduct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is an issue of concern to states in the region. The region is located in the Atlantic Ocean, on the western coast of Africa, and is known as the Earth’s Centre geographically. The region consists of 19 coastal states, namely Angola, Benin, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo (Mbekeani & Ncube, 2011). It is rich in natural resources such as oil and fish, attracting many maritime stakeholders, especially fishing vessels, shipping companies, and offshore companies. The absence of some of these resources in other regions has brought about illegal activities such as illegal unreported unregulated fishing, illegal bunkering, piracy, and illegal trafficking in the region (Abudu, 2021).

Essentially, the lofty development potential of oil and gas in the ocean of coastal states in the region, the region’s nearness to European and North American markets, the continuous pressures between the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) member-states, the political precariousness within the Middle East and the growing demand for fossil fuels in developing nations contribute to the heightened geostrategic significance of the GoG's maritime space (Nwangwu, 2015). It is opined that stopping criminals in the open water, starts with looking along the maritime borders (Africa Defense Forum, 2020). Criminals could flee into another country’s waters if confronted. Historically, this has been the space where traffickers, pirates, and illegal fishermen felt safe. As quoted by Senior Capt. Boniface Konan of the Cote d’Ivoire Navy, “that is the whole business of the bad guys. Even if you look on the Automatic Identification System, you will see these groupings right there on the borderline of each country”. Even though these acts occur often at sea, their beginnings are land-based (Africa Defense Forum, 2020).
Seemingly, the GoG region has become Africa’s foremost perilous maritime zone. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recognizes the GoG as one of the major regions that endure robbery; the others are the Gulf of Aden and South East Asia (Abdel Fattah, 2017).

The state of maritime insecurity in the region caused the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to assemble in June 2013 at a summit to discuss the issues of maritime insecurity in the region. The summit lead to the signing of some key documents which includes the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, which is referred to as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC). After the adoption of the Code, it has since been in use to suppress armed robbery, piracy, and all illicit maritime activities in West and Central Africa against ships (International Crisis Group, 2014). Further discussions will be made about the Code in subsequent chapters.

Ensuring maritime security by implementing the Code as stated in the previous paragraph cannot be done in isolation; hence, the signing of the Code laid out an Architecture for maritime safety and security in the GoG. The Architecture is known as the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security (YAMSS). Chapter 4 describes the Architecture in detail. The Architecture is illustrated in figure 1.
The Architecture strives for information sharing, coordination of action, strengthening laws, and eliminating areas of vulnerability which would aid in disseminating information between all stakeholders. The Architecture includes one
Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), two Regional Centres, and five Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC) coordinating the activities of the respective Maritime Zones and the respective Maritime Operational Centres (MOC) of navies in various states. The Yaoundé Architecture watches over 6000 km of coastline and twelve significant ports of signatories to ensure the successful implementation of the Code (Africa Defense Forum, 2020).

The ICC was created by the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC to oversee the implementation of the Code. The ICC coordinates the interregional efforts of the two Regional Maritime Security Centres, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) based in Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo, and the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in West Africa (CRESMAO) based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The ICC is in charge of the international coordination for maritime security in the GoG (Bell, 2020).

The coastal space of the Regional Centres has been further divided into operational Maritime Zones which have been designated by letters. The activities of these Maritime Zones are coordinated by Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs). The Architecture has ensured a strong connection between the various Maritime Centres encouraging collective working to ensure maritime safety and security in the GoG (Africa Defense Forum, 2020). Further details of the Yaoundé Architecture would be made in chapter four.

For effective implementation of the Code, a strong Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is required. Maritime Domain Awareness is the ability of signatories and Maritime Centres to gather, process, analyse and effectively share information in real-time about issues happening at sea (Bell, 2020).

Several authors such as Nwangwu (2015), Africa Defense Forum (2020), and Yücel (2021) have discussed the implementation of the Code by its signatories especially in combating piracy with several successes being achieved. However, the capabilities of the interregional, regional and multinational Maritime Centres in the implementation
of the Code have not been researched. Siebels (2020) indicates that the number of recorded piracy occurrences faces underreporting implying that official measurements may not reflect realities. As the issue of underreporting is being decreased, an increment within the factual occurrence rate may not reflect a genuine or unrestrained increment in assaults. Altogether, current patterns suggest that assaults are getting to be more advanced.

1.2 Problem Statement

The predominance of robbery and maritime theft against ships within the GoG is a major issue for coastal states. The danger has threatened sea trade within the brief term and the stability of coastal states’ security within the long term, compromising the advancement of the geostrategic financial assets of the region. The Yaoundé Architecture consists of autonomous states that are reluctant to delegate sovereignty but are obliged to collaborate because blue crime is innately transnational and thus requires coordinated responses (Hamad, 2021).

The challenge that comes with the repressive measures adopted in the Code of June 2013 relative to piracy and troubles at sea is that specific literature is fragmentary. No systematic effort has been committed to assessing how the Maritime Centres across the region function as a unit in the implementation of the Code.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives

The establishment of Maritime Centres is to aid in the operationalization of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to combat maritime insecurity in the GoG region. Unfortunately, the capabilities of Maritime Centres are not adequate in the implementation of the Code.

In this regard, the research would explore the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to reveal its expected outcome. The study further aims to present and evaluate the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code.
1.4 Research Questions

To achieve the aim and objectives of the research, the following questions would be looked at;

1. How does the Code intend to deal with the issue of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea?
2. What is the current state of capabilities of the Yaoundé Architecture Maritime Centres?
3. How efficient are these capabilities in the implementation of the Code?

1.5 Ethical Considerations

The researcher upheld ethical considerations in the study. All external information required from interviews during the research was approved by the World Maritime University (WMU) Research Ethics Committee before seeking them.

The process for the selection of participants for the study and how the data was collected is described in detail in chapter 5. Also, appendix A contains the guided questions used for the interview. Such information would be kept under a strong password and will be discarded properly after the research, with all confidentiality maintained. After considering the ethical requirements for the research, let’s take a look at the limitations the researcher encountered.

1.6 Limitations

A limitation in literature and statistics exit in the area of research. Also, confidential information exists and attaining such data might be a challenge. This is due to the level of security involved in the study.

The information used for the research was mainly based on primary data collected through interviews. The researcher intended to interview a minimum of twenty staff from the various Maritime Centres, however, due to the lack of required staff and the
fact that some Maritime Centres were not in operation, the researcher was limited in the number of respondents. Despite the limitations, the structure of the research is explained below.

1.7 Structure of Dissertation

The research is in nine chapters. Chapter one gives a background of maritime insecurity in the GoG region. It provides measures taken by stakeholders of the region in combating the insecurity and further reviews the Yaoundé Architecture’s adoption of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. This chapter established research questions to achieve the research aim and objectives. The chapter addresses ethical considerations and limitations of the research and ends with the structure of the study.

Chapters two, three and four reviewed some literature on maritime insecurity in the GoG. Causes of insecurity in the region were stated with international and regional actions taken to address the situation. A further overview was conducted on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the structure of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security.

Chapter five gives details of the research methodology used by the researcher to achieve the desired aim of the research. Reasons for the choice of the method were provided and the process of data collection was described in detail.

Chapter six deals with the capabilities of Maritime Centres in Yaoundé Architecture and how the capabilities are being used for effective implementation. Details of the current capabilities of Maritime Centres are provided in the chapter.

Chapter seven concentrates on the efficiency of Maritime Centres in implementing the Code. It states the level of implementation and how effective the Code is being employed.
Chapter eight provides a comparison of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCC), stating the similarities and differences that exist between them and chapter nine gives a summary of the study conducted, conclusion and recommendations to better Maritime Centres in implementing the Code. The structure of the study aims at the results in the next paragraph.

1.8 Expected Results

At the end of this research, the following results are expected:

1. A detailed analysis and understanding of the Yaoundé Code, stating how Maritime Centres are helping to implement it.
2. Recommend measures for the implementation of the Code by Maritime Centres considering capabilities, communication, and interconnection.
Chapter 2. Maritime Insecurity in the GoG

2.1 Background

It has been more than a couple of decades since the problem of transnational organised crimes at sea has received some form of attention (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020). These crimes, referred to as “blue crimes” in some corridors transcend maritime domains into terrestrial spaces. Their ripple effects are not just affecting the ships, companies that own them, or even nations in whose waters these happen but also affecting national and regional security.

These crimes include environmental crimes, human, narcotics, arms and light weapons trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea coupled with territorial crimes that breach rules and laws governing territories and jurisdictions of states in the GoG. These crimes are committed by persons and organized networks that often cross borders of one state’s territory and in this sense, are transnational (Hastings, 2012). As the GoG reigns at the top of transnational organized crime and piracy, a detailed understanding of the dynamics in the mix of activities that borders on maritime security is key to the success of the Yaoundé Code.

The GoG has remained in the most important regions in global commerce. This can be linked to the availability of high-profile resources like gold, diamonds, and the palpable potential of oil and gas (Ezeozue, 2019). The region’s proximity to North America and Europe and the growing demand for fossil fuels in developing countries contribute to the increased importance of the regional maritime territories of the GoG. However, there is growing concern about the undermining of the realisation of the full potential of the GoG due to international, regional, and domestic threats and vulnerabilities (Makarenko, 2004). Instead of the countries in this region prospering from the resources they possess collectively, the pervasive incidence of insecurity significantly constrains investments and economic prospects. This has partly resulted
in the expansion of organized crimes and terrorism with potential adverse political effects leading to more than US$2 billion in annual losses (Gilpin, 2007).

Some of the crimes in the GoG maritime domain are highlighted in Article 1 (5) of the Yaoundé Code. One can correlate the increase in crimes in the GoG to the decrease in piracy off the coast of Somalia which used to top the charts but has seen a decline in the presence of massive deployment of international naval forces (Ezeozue, 2019).

### 2.2 Maritime Insecurity Incidents in the GoG

Maritime insecurity according to Bueger (2015) are threats such as maritime inter-state disputes, trafficking of narcotics, people, and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, piracy or maritime accidents, environmental crimes and disasters. Overall, maritime safety covers the protection of ports, ships, and their communities against accidental dangers and harms (e.g. sea storms) whereas per Bueger’s definition, maritime security deals with the protection of the same but this time against deliberate dangers and harms (e.g. piracy). This clarifies what is qualified as an insecurity incident. With a focus on the GoG, reports of armed robbery among other crimes occur and are readily reported and documented.

Generally, blue crimes appear to be on the rise judging by recent headlines with regards to piracy especially. But these interpretations and the data they depend on must be looked at with care. Figures on piracy and armed robbery at sea are prone to over and underreporting and also have challenges with their definition (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020). According to the IMB, various attacks were documented in 15 littoral states in the GoG in the past three years. The IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) recorded 84 attempted and successful attacks in 2020. In 2019, they recorded 64 incidents relative to 82 incidents in 2018 which are close to the 2020 figure. Most of these attacks were reported to have targeted crew members for
ransom. Reportedly, the region is said to be a site for over 90% of the world’s kidnappings at sea (IMB, 2022).

The number of crew members seized within the GoG expanded more than 50% from 78 in 2018 to 121 in 2019. This compares to over 90% of worldwide kidnappings reported at sea with 64 kidnapped crew members across six isolated incidents within the final quarter of 2019 alone. The region accounted for 64 cases counting all four vessel hijackings that happened in 2019, as well as 10 out of 11 vessels that came under fire (IMB, 2020).

The IMB PRC follows the definitions of Piracy as defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Armed Robbery as defined by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in its 26th Assembly session as Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” (IMB, 2020).

Article 101 of UNCLOS defines Piracy as:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed-

   (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

   (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” defines Armed Robbery as

1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;

2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above (IMO, 2005).

Reports from the IMB, as well as the ICC in Yaoundé greatly influence public and policy discourse. In West and Central Africa, this discourse on the state of maritime security relying on these numbers alone may be disputed and thus must be carefully examined to avoid gaps and pitfalls.

For instance, the Nigerian Navy reports 339 incidents of piratical attacks in 2020. But subjecting these to the definitions under international law, 214 of the 339 representing 63.13% of the reported figure would qualify as a pirate attack. The rest are acts of robbery since they took place in Nigerian territorial waters and not on the high seas (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2021). Within 12 nautical miles of a state’s waters, the responsibility lies on the littoral state to respond. The location of attacks is significant for both interpreting the data and making responses referencing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (IMB, 2020).

The tables and figures below represent the data presented by the International Maritime Bureau.
Table 1: Locations of actual and attempted incidents, January - March 2018-2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations - West and Central Africa</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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2.3 Causes and Effects of Maritime Insecurity in the GoG

Transcribed into the original Latin form, “pirates” literally mean “enemies of mankind”. By this, pirates are not enemies of one state but all states and become an unparalleled, participatory security risk at the global level (Broohm, 2021). Maritime crime off the coast of West and Central Africa has risen to a security threat level that makes the region Africa’s current piracy hotspot (Teixeira & Pinto, 2022).

Nonetheless, there are underlying causes of these crimes. Their resultant effects, some of which are not just felt by coastal communities but the globe over makes it worth noting. Some of the root causes of blue crimes in the GoG are; Sea blindness, governmental structuring, youth unemployment, political violence and electoral uncertainty, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and corruption which would be explained in subsequent paragraphs. Poor governance, lack of significant economic prospects, and high depravity in the region obstruct the effectiveness of trying to fight the menace allowing piracy to thrive. These adverse activities result in increased maritime insurance costs, growth of regional ‘black markets’, and higher global oil prices (Fiorelli, 2014).

Sea blindness as a concept is essential to the novelty of the study of maritime security and is used to describe the general neglect of the importance of the sea. This extends mainly to the political and scholarly class, as it manifests in ways where even North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are guilty of not modernising their navy and the general population is largely ignorant of their dependence on the sea. This phenomenon indicates a much broader overview of the importance of the sea at regional levels, from academics to policymakers, which in turn allows blue crimes such as environmental degradation and fishery crimes to thrive unbridled (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017).

The government structures that support institutions mandated to check these crimes have a significant impact on the prevalence of piratical activity. Weakness in state
institutions represents the most common explanation for maritime piracy. There are some forms of disagreement as to the exact level at which this weakness leads to the rate at which these crimes are committed. A simple regional analysis has shown that fiscal decentralisation at a national level lowers the number of crimes. This is because regions have larger stakes in the revenue streams that are realised from peaceful settings. Weak states combine inadequate coastal security personnel, house corrupt elites and ineffective courts. When this is allied to substantial unemployment and inequality, a significant grievance is caused in the populace and facilitates the creation of sanctuaries for criminal activity (Ofosu-Boateng, 2018).

Thirdly, youth joblessness is a well-known underlying factor of robbery in the GoG. The connection of African youth joblessness to theft in Nigeria for example is especially emphasised. While the adherence of aggrieved youth to robbery is having an overflow impact on the overall space of the GoG and stays challenged, research from Somalia shows that state-building isn't sufficient to deal with blue crimes in the GoG. State-building alongside handling youth joblessness would assist to battle the more extensive development of maritime crimes in the GoG (Kamal-Deen, 2017).

Political violence and piracy, by extrapolation and relating them to weakened states share multiple similarities. Elections threaten to disrupt already cemented deals between organised criminal enterprises and corrupt incumbent authorities. Hence, in the heat of elections, albeit highly competitive ones, piratical attacks see an increase. One may be due to the uncertainty caused by a potential change in regime, giving an increased incentive to engage in crime before the instability caused by new incumbents. The other may also be that these attacks are to display their influence on the political elites, whose support they need to stabilise the environments in which they operate (Allen, 2017).

A state's ineptitude to keep up with command over its regional waters can prompt Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, which sidesteps local fishermen
who may thus turn to crime, including theft. In the Somalian case study, after the breakdown of its government foundations in the mid-1990s, unfamiliar commercial fishing vessels started fishing off the Somalia shore, attacking its regional waters and getting about three times as much fish stock as possible, an endeavour that has demonstrated to be a liberally productive option in contrast to legitimate fishing. This unrestrained double-dealing harms biological systems and local fishermen and, as displayed in Somalia, causes financial hardships that drive numerous Somalis into the positions of Piracy organizations (Mansaray, 2017). This way, fisher folks stand a chance to procure a few thousand US dollars from a solitary privateer assault, a significantly higher sum than would be conceivable by working hard for quite a long time in the lawful economy.

Lastly, on the issue of corruption, a threat to democracy itself when powerful individuals and organisations, particularly those allied to the security sectors utilise positions to serve their benefits. Corrupt acts benefit a few at the cost of the integrity of institutions and authorities or individuals in charge of protecting assets and properties within the nation. These pervasive vices manifest in the matters of the sea where records point to instances where the Nigerian navy is accused of oil bunkering (Broohm, 2021).

2.4 Response to Maritime Insecurity in the GoG

Strategies to address insecurity in the GoG can be broken into three levels of planning and/or implementation: national, regional, and international. Hasty reactions could lead to narrow results that fail to solve the underlying causes of maritime insecurity. Laws that will be effective far out at sea will be beyond the capacity of most regional states alone. A solution will therefore have to be a collective one requiring multinational support as prioritised in the Yaoundé Code (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2021). For example, in the Maritime Post, MV Rowayton Eagle was attacked 200 nm off the coast of Accra, Ghana. On January 30th 2021, this incident occurred around 0430 UTC and similar incidents further out at sea may
not be uncommon (The Maritime Post, 2021). There is a possibility that ships on the High Seas are the latest targets because coastal law enforcement is gaining ground among the GoG states.

According to various authors, including Barrios (2013), Mandanda & Guo (2016), Ofosu-Boateng (2018), and Vrey (2009) certain comparisons have been drawn between piracy in the GoG and that of the coast of Somalia. There is a global debate on solutions to maritime insecurity in the GoG as some shipping companies operating in the GoG worry about their security provisions. Some even call for greater international naval visibility and others demand armed private security personnel on board. Even though the two areas of comparison, the Somalia region and the GoG suffer piracy issues, they are distinct and policy responses needed for impactful solutions must also be different. A clear case here is the consensus that needs to be reached considering the littoral states in the GoG. Each member state will need to accept and authorise the presence of a foreign naval vessel even if it is for protection. However, the horn of Africa, having an enormous peninsula with Somalia for example will not need the same requirements.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted anti-piracy resolutions for both the Horn of Africa and the GoG in 2008 (Kamal-Deen, 2017; Anyimadu, 2013; Fiorelli, 2014). These measures in the case of Somalia established links with the recognised government to allow for foreign naval patrols. The latter prioritised capacity building against those envisioned by ECOWAS and ECCAS under the umbrella of the Yaoundé agreement.

Members proposed several activities which could be implemented by individual nations to address the challenges posed by maritime insecurity. Such activities incorporate endeavours to extend national attention to the sea space, as well as to improve the training and equipment of the relevant security workforce. Battling blue crimes requires reinforcing good governance and straightforwardness, especially
concerning oil exploitation. Straightforward administration and impartial sharing of oil reserves can help alleviate destitution. In addition, awareness-raising and the approval and taming of international instruments on maritime security, counting the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, can help reduce oceanic insecurity. In the local context, an example is given in Nigeria where a task force brought together the army, navy, air force, and mobile police in the Niger Delta in 2004 (Ezeozue, 2019). This was to restore order and help guard against oil theft and illegal refineries. A campaign was launched to sensitise the populace on the risk of using “blood” oil as they termed it. A process that was costing Nigeria about 10% of its daily production and billions of dollars yearly to the benefit of local and international syndicates (Asuni, 2009).

Delving into the main context of this paper which focuses on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the West and Central African Sub-region, it becomes clear the steps to be taken in advancing the successful implementation of the Code. The vulnerability of vessels around the port is cited in the guidelines for shipping in the GoG, which states: “The risk of falling victim of a pirate attack is particularly high when the ship is at anchor or is drifting off a port”. While efforts are made to harden vessels to reduce pirate attacks, preventing the vessels from being detected in the first place will demand focusing on tackling criminals’ access to vital information about their locations and cargoes. To the extent that some networks may even have information on the type of security measures being undertaken on board a vessel. Thus it suggests that stringent anti-corruption measures on land will be the best method to counter this (Kamal-Deen & Benning, 2020).

ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC have cognisance of the policy lessons that can be drawn from the counter-piracy efforts in Eastern Africa, the Djibouti Code (IMO, 2009). This can be said to be an influence behind the West Africa - focused code that has been adopted by 25 states; the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
Maritime security is important for economic growth, food security and reduction in international crime. Those who take to illegalities at sea are very adaptive, sharply sophisticated in their methods and often with good connections that give them vital information (Anyimadu, 2013). Thus, local, regional and global efforts must be proactive and flexible too. In a region where armies are generally prioritized over its naval force, and where fisheries and aquatic ministers do not hold much political power, the challenge for those in the maritime area is to ensure that international partners and regional policymakers identify that greater security at sea in the GoG brings prosperity to the region.
Chapter 3. Overview of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct

3.1 Background

This chapter delves into the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as mentioned in chapter two. The GoG region is one of the vital shipping routes for global trade. It is now a hot spot for maritime insecurity. The region has seen a sharp rise in maritime insecurity, especially piracy in the past few years. International trade on the sea has been disrupted largely by the increase of piracy in the region (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

Maritime insecurity in the GoG has been declared a major threat to security and economic stability in the region (Luntumbue, 2016). The issue of piracy worries the global community and costs humans, the environment, politics and the economy. It affects the peace and security of states and their economic development. This has affected global interests and is now of concern to the international community. To deal with the up rise of maritime insecurity in the region, an integrated approach was considered to strengthen maritime security and address the primary causes which are mostly economic, social and political factors. The urgent need for cooperation and coordination in the region was required to help tackle maritime insecurity (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). The West and Central Africa adopted an agreement known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as mentioned earlier in chapter one on 19 March 2013 in Cotonou (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Two other documents were adopted in addition to this Code of Conduct. They are the ECCAS /ECOWAS Declaration of Heads of State and Government of Central and West Africa States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC on Maritime Security in West and Central Africa. These three documents were endorsed on 25 June 2013 by all Heads of State and Government of ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC in Yaoundé, Cameroon at the GoG Maritime Safety and Security Summit (Egede, 2021). All three instruments constitute the foundations
of a regional maritime security regime in the GoG and are known as the Yaoundé Process (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The Yaoundé Process emanated after the West and Central African countries desired to counter maritime crimes. The Code was established in agreement with the UNSC Resolutions 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February 2012) which recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to counter maritime insecurity; piracy and armed robbery at sea in the GoG. The resolutions also highlight the need to build on existing national, regional and extra-regional initiatives for maritime security in the GoG since it would create opportunities for legally binding instruments (Sartre, 2014; Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

The June 2013 meeting in Yaoundé led to a strategy common to both the ECOWAS and ECCAS regions which would be discussed in the next chapter. The Yaoundé Code was greatly inspired by the Djibouti Code and forms the legal basis for the cooperation of states in both the West and Central African regions. Details on sharing of responsibilities, intervention and practical organization of the fight against all maritime crimes in both regions are provided by the Code (Luntumbue, 2016). The Code describes the intent of signatories to cooperate in curbing transnational organized crime to their fullest capability (Yücel, 2021).

The Code does not only deal with piracy and armed robbery against ships but adopts a multidimensional approach to maritime security by dealing with a wide range of transnational organized crimes committed in the maritime domain (Egede, 2021). After stating the approach adopted to ensure maritime security by the Code, some principal features of the Code would be discussed.

### 3.2 Principal Features of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct

The Yaoundé Code incorporates several aspects of the Djibouti Code (Hassan &
Hasan, 2017). The Yaoundé Code may be considered a relaxed international instrument and not a treaty because the parties to the Code do not intend to make it binding (Egede, 2021). Some of its features would be discussed in this section.

3.2.1 Non-binding Legal Instrument

The Yaoundé Code like the Djibouti Code is not a legally binding instrument. The non-binding nature of the Yaoundé Code is confirmed in Article 17(a) which states that, within three years of the Code being implemented, the Signatories would enter into a binding multilateral treaty, at the invitation of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre but that has not been done.

The Code was not intended to be binding until a subsequent conversion. Also, Article 19 (a) of the Code states that nothing in the code of conduct is intended to create or establish a binding agreement.

3.2.2 Crimes

Additional to the non-binding nature, the Code does not only deal with piracy and armed robbery at sea but includes all illicit maritime activities in its area of application. The list of transnational organized crimes in the maritime domain is provided in Article 1(5) of the Code.

The Code’s definition of piracy was adopted from UNCLOS and the Djibouti Code while the definition of armed robbery against ships was derived from the IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.

3.2.3 Cooperation of Signatories

Dealing with maritime crimes stated above requires cooperation. Signatories to the Code have declared their intention to cooperate in all aspects to deal with the
repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships, transnational crimes in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea stated in Article 2 of the Code.

To succeed, the Yaoundé Code adopted the principles of sharing and reporting relevant information, interdicting ships engaged in transnational organized crime, arresting and prosecuting those committing the crimes and care and treatment of the victims from the Djibouti Code

3.2.4 Information Sharing Network

Cooperation goes with information sharing. Information sharing is encouraged by the Yaoundé Code. Signatories to the Code are required to share information about any maritime insecurity incident in the region; hence, the establishment of an information-sharing network by the Yaoundé Architecture. The network focuses on national focal points and piracy Information Sharing Centres (ISCs).

Focal points are to be declared by signatory states at the time of signing the Code or as soon as possible as depicted in Article 11 of the Code. The ICC serves as the ISC since no ISC was established under the Architecture. Uniform reporting criteria ensure an accurate assessment of the threats of maritime insecurity in the region as stated in Article 12 of the Code.

3.2.5 Prosecution and Conviction

Similar to information sharing, signatories to the Code are being encouraged in Article 15 of the Code to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea in their national laws to help in the effective interdiction, prosecution and conviction of persons committing or attempting to commit any transnational crime.

The Code seeks to apprehend and prosecute such crimes in domestic courts.
Furthermore, the Code requests countries to develop guidelines to enable them to exercise jurisdiction, conduct investigations and prosecute alleged offenders.

3.2.6 Maritime Security Cooperation

Aside from prosecution and conviction, the development and promotion of training and educational programs for the maintenance of safety and order at sea are addressed in Article 14(1) of the Code. Signatories intend to foster cooperation among maritime training institutions and research centres.

The exchange of naval and law enforcement personnel together with other experts is required to acquire views on maritime insecurity issues. Additionally, Article 14(2) of the Code encourages regular meetings to enhance cooperation and coordination in maritime enforcement activities.

3.2.7 National Strategies

In addition to security cooperation discussed earlier, signatories to the Code are urged to establish and implement appropriate national maritime security policies as stated in Article 4(1) of the Code.

By doing this, sea trade would be safeguarded from all unlawful acts and also provide security for port facilities and ships. Additionally, a maritime security committee to coordinate activities is required and Article 4(2) of the Code encourages it. Let us draw our attention to the provision made for the seizure of pirate ships.

3.2.8 Seizure of Pirate Ships

Any pirate ship can be seized by any signatory of the Code outside the territorial sea of another signatory. Also, persons and property on board may be seized according to Article 6(1) of the Code. The provision in Article 3 gives seizing rights to
warships or other ships that are clearly marked and easily identifiable as government vessels.

The court of the seizing signatory may judge the pirates as well as decide what is to be done with the property and ship as provided in Article 6(4) of the Code. The Article continues to state that, the right may be granted to another signatory to the Code to exercise jurisdiction. It is usually better to allow the state close to the location of the incident to apply its national laws, however when it happens in the territorial waters of a signatory, the signatory automatically exercises jurisdiction. After considering the relevant features of the Code, it is appropriate to now examine its effectiveness as a whole.

3.3 Effectiveness of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to Date

The principal features of the Yaoundé Code discussed earlier gives more attention to aspects of national security and less to development and human security (Brits & Nel, 2018). The Code serves as a step to ensuring regional maritime governance and provides an effective model for regional cooperation. Additional elaboration is done on the maritime security strategy that is common to the maritime domain of West and Central Africa (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). Nonetheless, the restrictive focus of the Code on national security does not provide a permanent solution to maritime insecurity in the region (Brits & Nel, 2018). The possibilities of the use of the Code are limited as it is not legally binding. The Code does not impose obligations to signatories; hence, compliance with the code is based on the signatory’s will (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

Extensive assistance has been granted to the Code, however, the Code has had limited impact on the prevention of transnational crimes. The naval patrols and bilateral and multilateral operations that were intensified as a result of the Code were effective in decreasing the severity but the issues persist (Brits & Nel, 2018). Additionally, the Code says nothing about merchant ships’ protection at sea, for
example, the use of armed guards. Security companies are dissatisfied as they had expectations that the Code would state a provision for private guards in the territorial sea of states (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

Despite the limitations of the Yaoundé Code, the Code has the potential to tackle the issues of maritime insecurity in the GoG if countries of the region cooperate and coordinate their actions to implement it thoroughly. However, further analysis would be carried out in the following chapters to assess if its intended purpose is being achieved through its implementation and enforcement.
Chapter 4. The Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security

4.1 Rationale behind the Yaoundé Architecture

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct explained in the previous chapter cannot be implemented without the Yaoundé Architecture. The idea of the Yaoundé Process which includes the Yaoundé Code started after a former President of Benin, President Yayi Boni requested from the United Nations (UN) assistance to fight piracy in the region in 2011. The UNSC in response adopted the UNSC Resolution 2018. The resolution states the threat piracy and armed robbery at sea have posed to security, international navigation and economic development in the region. Also, the UNSC Resolution 2036 was adopted which urged states to develop frameworks for effective cooperation and information (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

These UNSC resolutions were followed by the summit that led to the adoption of the Yaoundé Process. After the summit, actions were taken by regional organizations to aid in the implementation of the Yaoundé Process (Sartre, 2014). The ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC adopted an MoU and Political declaration aimed at organizing the relationship between the regional maritime safety and security centres and also confirming their political support (Luntumbue, 2016). Additionally, the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) was adopted and the ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC determined the roles of Maritime Centres (Sartre, 2014).

The ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC noticed the need for transnational cooperation as it was the key to fighting transnational maritime crime in a communal sea (Yücel, 2021). The Yaoundé Code was the most comprehensive and led to the establishment of a regional maritime-related security regime and corresponding architecture (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). It is now appropriate to study the structure of the Architecture.
4.2 The Structure of the Yaoundé Architecture

The Yaoundé Code recognizes the need for global, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels of cooperation to tackle the issue of maritime insecurity in the region. Information sharing and communication between focal points of states and other stakeholders in the maritime domain was acknowledged as an effective tool to resort to. The implementation of the Code required an Architecture to ensure joint actions at different levels to intervene in the maritime space of the region. The comprehensive Architecture established for the Yaoundé Code consists of 4 levels of actors; the strategic or political level, the regional level, the multinational level and the national level with the political level being the highest (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The political level consists of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); the ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC (ICC, 2022). An Interregional Coordination Centre on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West Africa was created after the Code was adopted. Its headquarters is in Yaoundé (Sartre, 2014). The ICC in Yaoundé is at the strategic level. The Regional level constitutes the CRESMAC and CRESMAO (ICC, 2022).

A Maritime Security Protocol was adopted by ECCAS in October 2009 and got member states working together to enhance information sharing. The Protocol also encouraged joint surveillance and patrols and ensured harmonization of the legal frameworks. All member states ratified the Protocol giving political and legal backing for implementation. A Maritime Security Structure was established for ECCAS based on the Protocol. The structure includes the regional, zonal and national Maritime Coordination Centres. The Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) was established after a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between ECCAS Heads of States (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).
The Maritime space of Central Africa was further divided into zones: Zone A, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zone D, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The Maritime Coordination Centres for these Zones are in Luanda and Douala respectively (Bell, 2020).

To ensure better coordination to deal with maritime insecurity in the West Africa region, ECOWAS adopted the EIMS after the Yaoundé Code was adopted. This was to aid in the establishment of maritime security structures for easy coordination and cooperation. Like the ECCAS, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security of West Africa (CRESMAO) was instituted to effectively coordinate the Multinational Maritime Coordinating Centres (MMCC) in the region. The coastal space was also divided into three Maritime Zones. They are Zone E (Benin, Nigeria, Niger and Togo), Zone F (Ghana, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Burkina Faso) and Zone G (Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mali and Senegal). The respective MMCCs are Cotonou, Accra and Praia (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

At the national level of the Architecture are Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). Maritime Operation Centres exist below the MMCCs. MOCs represent the Yaoundé Architecture at the national level. They operate in signatory states and unite with the navy to ensure coordination of the major stakeholders of the State’s action at sea (Luntumbue, 2016). Figure 2 shows the structure of the Yaoundé Architecture.
4.3 Differentiation between Maritime Zones in the Yaoundé Architecture and Maritime Zones of UNCLOS

The maritime zones of UNCLOS differ from that of the Yaoundé Architecture and this chapter clarifies the difference. The maritime space of coastal states has been divided into zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is to allow the sovereignty of states with the legal order which would facilitate international communication and promote peace in the use of the seas and the oceans. It will also help in the efficient utilization of maritime resources, their conservation and protection. These zones under the UNCLOS are the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (UNCLOS, 1982).

According to UNCLOS, the territorial sea of coastal states extends to 12 nautical miles from its baselines. The sovereignty of the state covers the territorial sea as well as the air space, sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea. In the territorial sea, ships of all states have the right to enjoy an innocent passage without any permission. The passage shall be continuous and expeditious and may include stopping and anchoring. This is possible when it pertains to ordinary navigation, when in distress
or assisting persons, ships or aircraft in danger. Any foreign ship exercising this right is to comply with all laws and regulations regarding the innocent passage and coastal states shall not hinder the innocent passage of these vessels. However, if any warship refuses to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state in its territorial sea and disregards its request for compliance, the coastal state may require it to leave its territorial sea with immediate effect.

The contiguous zone is the area 24 nautical miles from the baseline. In this zone, the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of a coastal state apply. Violations of these laws would require punishment by the coastal state.

UNCLOS states the areas beyond and adjacent to the territorial seas as the Exclusive Economic Zone. In this zone, the rights of coastal and other states are governed by the provisions of the Convention. The EEZ is not to exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Also, in this zone, the coastal state has the sovereign right to exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the water. The economic exploitation and exploration of the zone are also allowed. Other states may enjoy the use of the zone for navigation, overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea.

The Maritime Zones of the Code are different from that of the UNCLOS with some similarities. The Yaoundé Architecture consist of two Regional Maritime Centres, CRESMAO and CRESMAC. To ensure effective oversight of the maritime space of these regions their maritime space has been divided into zones. These zones are known as the Maritime Zones of the Architecture. The Maritime Zones of the Yaoundé Architecture are made up of the maritime space of several coastal states that are signatories to the Code. This includes the territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZs of all the coastal states. Implementation of the Code does not require the coastal states and other states from going contrary to the provisions made in
UNCLOS as stated in several articles of the Code. It can therefore be stated that the Maritime Zones in UNCLOS are embedded in or a subset of that of the Architecture, and the laws that govern the Maritime Zones of UNCLOS are also adhered to by Maritime Zones of the Architecture.

After establishing the difference, the responsibilities of Maritime Centres cannot be overlooked.

4.4 Responsibilities and Objectives of Maritime Centres

Through the Architecture several organizations have been created to network and coordinate. The various levels of the Architecture have roles to play to ensure the effective implementation of the Code (Yücel, 2021). The duties of the various organizations are as elaborated below.

The role of the ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC at the political level is to provide political oversight of the Regional Maritime Centres in the GoG region (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The maritime safety and security structure which was inspired by the Code includes the ICC (Luntumbue, 2016). The ICC upon its establishment had the mandate to enhance coordination, cooperation and systems interoperability between the Central and West Africa maritime space. This means the ICC is an intersection for the political, strategic and operational levels of maritime safety and security in the GoG (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The ICC is the body responsible for the coordination and acts as a junction for the CRESMAC and CRESMAO in Pointe-Noire and Abidjan respectively (Luntumbue, 2016). The work of Maritime Zones and signatory states are supported and coordinated by the ICC. In addition to these, the body is in charge of ensuring GoG’s
momentum by engaging international and national governments to build political will to support the course (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The ICC’s role in the coordination and cooperation of CRESMAC and CRESMAO is by standardization and harmonization through education, training and standard operating procedures (Yücel, 2021).

The duties of the two Regional Centres, CRESMAC and CRESMAO include the political oversight of the economic communities by creating and maintaining standard operating procedures (Yücel, 2021). Overseeing and coordinating the activities and operations of the MMCCs at the multinational level in their respective regions form part of their responsibility (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The MMCCs coordinate the activities and operations of the focal points. The day-to-day operations of focal points and their undertakings with the rest of the Yaoundé Architecture are also the responsibility of the MMCCs (Yücel, 2021).

The duties of the MOCs include the mobilization of main governmental stakeholders of the state action at sea. These include the national navies, customs, fisheries, maritime police and environmental protection agency. The MOCs communicate whatever is received and effectively respond to any alert from other Maritime Centres, hence the need to establish focal points with the necessary capacity designated for such duty (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The focal points are for effective and timely information sharing and flow among states. The Architecture is linked to nations through the focal points which are mostly the MOCs (Yücel, 2021).

From the above-mentioned roles, it can be said that the Maritime Centres have unclear responsibilities. Their roles are not properly defined and also overlap. The structure of the Yaoundé Architecture is a network of independent actors with common problems. Strengthening the Architecture means organizational and individual bonds should be increased and intensified. The Yaoundé Architecture
when considered as a network of signatory states fighting a common goal, would help to improve the Yaoundé Architecture structure and realize the need for an expansion of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct mandate. The review of the Yaoundé Architecture would be followed with the methodology used to conduct the entire research.
Chapter 5. Research Methodology

The nature of a problem will determine a justifiable methodology that a researcher must adopt. To draw meaningful deductions from research, the data collected, usually in its raw state, is a determining factor in the conclusions made after a thorough analysis (Opoku et al, 2016). This chapter presents the research design, methods adopted, data collection and analysis process, sampling participant selection process and the ethical principles that needed to be adhered to.

5.1 Research Design and Method

The study employed a qualitative research methodology. The qualitative research method receives first-hand information which is centred on the views of participants. The use of this method permits the ability to hunt for numerous realities and provide a complete understanding of the study (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). The qualitative method used was specifically semi-structured interviews.

A semi-structured interview allows the question ‘Why?’ to be asked, making it a suitable method (Miles & Gilbert, 2005). The researcher can probe participants for more information. The questions can be modified to address important areas of the study and allow participants to provide a better understanding of the topic (Gray, 2013). The method permits the researcher to participate in a dialogue with the participant since a specific pattern is not followed (May, 2011).

The interview was designed to comprise naval officers, shipping agents, and the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) officers, but the Maritime Centres currently are manned by naval officers who are the main players in the implementation of the Code. A total of ten naval officers from the different Maritime Centres across the region were presented with guided questions about the maritime capabilities of Maritime Centres in the GoG. The other possible
participants as stated above were difficult to reach hence resorting to only naval officers. How the researcher selected participants are discussed next.

5.2 Sampling and Selection of Participant

The right participants for qualitative research include persons with experience in the field under study (Morse, 2010). In selecting participants, the researcher located participants with the potential to provide information in the area of study. For example, naval officers who have worked in the Maritime Centres since they were established.

The researcher approached participants from diverse countries in the GoG using her contacts. These participants provided valuable insight regarding all the progressive implementations made by the Yaoundé Architecture during the data collection stage.

5.3 Data Collection

The data collection process which was mainly through interviews started in May 2022 and ended in August 2022 with ten participants from twenty expected respondents. The interview sessions took approximately one hour for each participant. The researcher conducted these interviews using online platforms such as zoom and WhatsApp video calls. Each interview was conducted between the researcher and the participant alone without any other person present.

The interview consists of questions on the incorporation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct into national legislation, the contribution of Maritime Centres to the implementation of the Code, the resources and capabilities of Maritime Centres, the achievements of the Code and the Architecture and the challenges encountered in the implementation of the Code. Participants discussed the topics extensively.
Further questions got participants to discuss the external support provided by stakeholders, the achievements made by the Code and the challenges faced in its implementation. Respondents also provided some recommendations to help improve the level of implementation of the Code of Conduct and the Architecture. Appendix A provides a sample of the semi-structured interview questions.

The researcher made a conscious effort to follow the order of questions and only deviated when it was needed to help the flow of the discussion. Follow-up questions were also asked to get more clarification on the issues and get more data about the study. The semi-structured interview questions were appropriate for this study. The choice of approach allowed the researcher to overcome the challenges posed by the lack of scholarly peer-reviewed articles on the topic and the culture of secrecy surrounding the topic. The data analysis process would be considered after the collection phase as appropriate.

5.4 Data Analysis

The data used for the research is purely qualitative as mentioned earlier. Qualitative data analysis deals with gathering, structuring and interpreting qualitative data to comprehend its broad representation (Aspers & Corte, 2019). Generally, text, such as open-ended responses to surveys, in this case, semi-structured interview questions formed the qualitative data. When a researcher conducts a study, the need to understand people’s opinion or explain changes in metrics rely on qualitative data (Collins & Stockton, 2018). Compared to quantitative data which captures structured information, qualitative data is unstructured and has more depth to formulate hypotheses, answer critical questions and build understanding.

Because of the relatively small number of interviews and the researcher wanting to get more familiar with the data gathered, manual analysis was chosen. Even though it was time-consuming, it facilitated the researcher to grasp and get a deeper insight
into the collected data. The data analysis process happened according to the following steps:

1. Gathering and collecting qualitative data
2. Organising qualitative data
3. Coding
4. Analysing the qualitative data for insights
5. Reporting on the insights derived from the analysis

The codes generated for the analysis were; logistics, financial resources, human resources, political willingness, implementation, coordination and cooperation. Narrative analysis of qualitative data was employed and deep insight into specific issues was achieved.

Ethical considerations for data collection and analysis were considered as explained below.

5.5 Research Ethics

Ethical clearance was sought from the research ethics committee at the World Maritime University to involve human subjects in the research. A mail was sent and the appropriate response was given in April 2022. Appendix B provides copies of the WMU REC protocol form, participant consent form and the approval mail received.

The information obtained came under strict adherence to confidentiality because of the level of security. No identifying information on the participants was made except in cases where the participants allowed it and the analysis posed no adverse effect on any entity. The data collected was solely used for the research and after grading the research, the data would be deleted. Limitations existed during the research. An elaboration is done on it since it is essential for the study.
5.6 Limitations

A major limitation to obtaining data in this research was the availability of sensitive personnel to respond to the questions. The number of participants got smaller and smaller because the Maritime Centres currently do not have a centralised system that could point a researcher in the direction of the people who are known to answer directly what the researcher sort.

Therefore, the obtained data originated from the few who first agreed to respond and followed through on their promise. This makes the data look scanty especially when the researcher would have wished the same questions could be responded to by officials from all levels of the Yaoundé Architecture. However, this did not discredit the data obtained as valuable deductions and analyses were made from it.

Discussion of the analysis made using the method employed follows next in chapters six and seven.
Chapter 6. Capabilities of Maritime Centres in the Yaoundé Architecture

After the discussion of the method for collecting data in the previous chapter, this chapter looks at the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the Yaoundé Architecture for implementing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The discussion would be done using articles and supported by interview outcomes.

Dealing with maritime insecurity is essentially enforcing the laws at sea. The naval forces of most coastal states in the GoG intervene to defend the sea against maritime crimes (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). The operation of Maritime Centres in the GoG is an important initiative for maritime security in the region. Maritime Centres are important developments because, over the years, it has been a challenge for states in the GoG to prevent, monitor, track and respond to maritime insecurity issues collectively. Equipping the Maritime Centres would get them to easily develop their maritime situational or domain awareness and be able to effectively monitor and interdict maritime crimes in the waters (Walker, 2015).

The Yaoundé Architecture does not deal with the capacity and capabilities of the states. Signatory states are responsible for enforcing their maritime capabilities (Yücel, 2021). Generally, states lack the assets and requisite capabilities to secure their long coastlines and vast waters and this has hampered their ability to keep pace with maritime crime. This challenge and the rate of growth and complexity of maritime crimes have attracted national and international stakeholders to take up some responsibilities at various levels to help in the response to maritime insecurity in the region. The cooperation among these stakeholders and states is mostly through the Yaoundé Protocol framework (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The following sections will discuss the logistics, financial, and human resources available in the Maritime Centers and the willingness of state parties to the Yaoundé Code to build the capacity of the Maritime Centres.
6.1 Logistics

Logistics are part of the main resources required for an organization to effectively achieve results. The need for the required resources in an organization cannot be ruled out when success needs to be achieved. Maritime Centres of the Yaoundé Architecture are considered organizations and for their success in operations, there is a need for them to be equipped with the necessary resources.

The ECCAS ensured operations by establishing structures based in Pointe-Noire (Republic of the Congo). ECOWAS equally provided structures aside from the CRESMAO headquarters which was delayed but has been officially made available since March 2022. Other Maritime Centres are faced with delays in structures and logistics. The delays are mainly due to a lack of sufficient resources and a lack of long-term funding mechanisms (Luntumbue, 2016).

Coastguards and navies in the region are the main stakeholders in the implementation of the Code, however, most of them lack the necessary platforms due to financial constraints. Their lack of intervention capabilities is a resource problem that needs attention (Günther, 2015).

Member States are the main source for the provision of platforms to Maritime Centres in operations related to the implementation of the Code. The provision of utilities is also done by the same signatories, especially the host country. However, the Code does not state the exact quantum that is to be provided by signatories. The Maritime Centres are also not equipped with resources for them to take up operations without consulting signatories. An officer expressed,

“Host countries contribute to the Centres by providing the needed utilities. All signatories are required to support with logistics but there is no clarity on who is to provide what for the Centres. The Centres do not also have a pool of resources from
various states for operations, they rely on signatories to make available platforms for operations.”

It is noticeable that, after the establishment of the Maritime Centres, some as far as 2018, the equipment provided by either ECOWAS and ECCAS, is the only equipment provided officially to the Centres to date. However, some institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Korean Embassy and others support Maritime Centres with logistics for their operations. A respondent lamented,

“Since the establishment of the Maritime Centre in 2018, the logistics provided by ECOWAS have been the only logistics provided by them. The Centre is challenged with logistics. Some organizations and country embassies such as UNODC, US and Denmark have supported the Centre with some logistics and that has aided in operations”

6.2 Financial Resources

Funding for capabilities and platforms is very necessary when it comes to offering a credible response to maritime insecurity issues. Even with having sufficient knowledge about the situation in the maritime space and not having the needed resources and funds to respond to the situation, there would not be an advantage for the maritime domain or situational awareness developed (Walker, 2015). Financial burden required to make the Code a success should not be underestimated, if possible, international support needs to be attained (Günther, 2015).

The Maritime Centres are ECOWAS and ECCAS- funded Centres; hence, the provision of grants for their daily upkeep and operations is their responsibility to ensure smooth operation. Most of the respondents believe finance is an issue for the Centres because nothing is stated in the Code about the financing and allowance of
staff. The responsibility has since been with the signatories and they decide what to do about the situation. A staff asserts;

“The Centre is facing financial problems. The Code states nothing about the finance of the Centres and the allowance of staff. The allowances for the local staff seconded to the Centre are to be provided by the signatory, but since the establishment of the Centre, nothing has been done in that regard”

The resources provided to the Maritime Centres require financial ability to manage them. The ECOWAS and ECCAS provide grants to the Centres for daily operations, however, these grants are not consistent. Some partners and institutions have been supportive in the provision of financial assistance knowing that the Maritime Centres do not have a laid down budget, however, the support from others is no more forthcoming. As stated by an officer;

“Grants are provided to the Centres by either ECOWAS or ECCAS for daily operations. These grants are mostly either delayed or not granted at all. This problem is mainly an ECOWAS issue. The ECCAS region has found a way around the issue. Some institutions supported the Centre initially, but for some time now, it has seized since they felt it was not their responsibility”

6.3 Human Resources

Humans are a major resource for every organization. The human element has several complexities due to human-related activities, nonetheless, their involvement in institutions facilitates operations and gets things done. The Maritime Centres require staff to manage the day-to-day activities of the Centres and ensure better coordination and cooperation as required in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Centres require multinational staff as the Centres oversee the maritime domain of several signatories of the Code.
Multinational staff help to enhance transnational cooperation, since officers from different countries would be working together, and understand the network. A social bond would be created and that would be helpful in information sharing. The lack of multinational staff means fewer human resources and national representatives are limited (Yücel, 2021).

Signatories to the Code have a commitment of human resources to the Centres. The staff to the Centres are agreed upon among signatories and each signatory has appointment positions for staff. The Centre after its establishment is to be staffed by the host nation until foreign staff occupy various appointments in the Centres. This has been a challenge since some Centres still have only staff from the host country.

The multinational staff required for most of the Maritime Centres are not available. This is likely due to a lack of finance. ICC is not fully staffed due to political issues with the regional economic communities (Yücel, 2021). A respondent relates;

“Signatories have an agreed number of personnel to contribute to the Centres with an assigned position. Contribution to staffing the Centre is not the same for all signatories. It is assigned considering the size of the country, the size of its navy or coastguard and also based on the resources of the country. At least two personnel are expected to report to various Maritime Centres from various countries. As it stands now, MMCC Zone E has all personnel reporting to the Centre but MMCC Zone F has only personnel from the host country operating the Centre”

The non-availability of multinational staff in the various Centres may be attributed to the lack of financial capability of host countries. The allowances that are to be paid to these staff and what to make their stay comfortable to ensure efficiency is not properly defined. This is challenging for several states and has caused Centres to be operated by only one state denying the benefits of having multinational staff in the Centres. This was explained by an officer;
“The staff of the Centres are to move from diverse countries to the various Maritime Centres. They are to be provided with allowances and good living conditions, however, this is difficult for some countries because they do not have the financial capability to take up the cost. This is one of the reasons why staff from other states have not reported to their Centres. They need the allowances to motivate them to work better to achieve results”

6.4 Willingness of Signatories in Building Capacities for Maritime Centres

Signatories are the major stakeholders of the Yaoundé Architecture and the Architecture can succeed when the signatories support it greatly. According to Danso & Allotey-Pappoe (2021), Signatories have the maritime space and capacity to achieve the objectives of the Yaoundé Architecture, however, the capabilities of these signatories differ. Some are endowed with platforms while others lack them woefully (Yücel, 2021). Some coastal states in the GoG lack the willingness to fight maritime insecurity. This may be due to the lack of political will or the low number of insecurity issues in their territorial waters and offshore assets (Günther, 2015).

Additionally, Signatories are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty and that limits the Yaoundé Architecture. The non-binding nature of Article 19, the limit of hot pursuit in territorial waters; Article 9 and Article 2 are too considerate of states’ unwillingness to hand over sovereignty to the transnational structure, the Yaoundé Architecture. This indicates that the Architecture has no forces, assets, platforms or capabilities on its own. Signatories are not willing and some cannot provide these capabilities to the Yaoundé Architecture (Yücel, 2021).

Operational capacities of countries in the GoG vary and dealing with the issues of the GoG would require cooperation in their surveillance, enforcement and response to the issues (Orellana, 2019). The ability to have joint operations would help to an
extent solve the issue of capacity. It would help bridge the gap of difference in the capabilities and sophistication of equipment (Walker, 2015).

The limitation of resources in the states of the GoG has caused a limitation in the distance they can go for patrols and how effective they can respond to insecurity issues in the region (Orellana, 2019). Some states in the GoG have however increased their coastal surveillance capabilities to an extent with the assistance of the United States and the European Union (Orellana, 2019). Sustained surveillance and security in the GoG require unity and that is lacking, hence the weakness of the navies in enforcement and which is doing little to prevent maritime insecurity in the region (Hassan & Hasan, 2017).

The lack of capacity has made it difficult for states to patrol their maritime space. Most navies in the region are limited in maritime capacity and are ineffective in ensuring maritime security. Resorting to an international capacity building would address the issue of capabilities by a large margin. Also, encouragement of joint operations and information-sharing amongst state navies and coastguards would help get the states to deploy their scarce resources effectively to ensure a safe and secured maritime space in the GoG. With the resources and willingness of states mentioned, there is the need to validate the effectiveness of the Maritime Centres.
Chapter 7. The Effectiveness of Maritime Centres in Yaoundé Code of Conduct Implementation

7.1 Coordination and Cooperation in the Yaoundé Architecture

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct emphasizes the coordination and cooperation of signatories for a safe and secured maritime space in the GoG. Coordination and cooperation mainly rely on information sharing and conducting operations together. The Code seeks how information about maritime insecurity can be effectively shared freely and properly to ensure coordination, cooperation and bringing together of resources to deal with maritime insecurity. According to Danso & Allotey-Pappoe (2021), information sharing is the bedrock of the whole Architecture and the Code, hence, states and stakeholders of the maritime domain should be willing to share information to ensure its effectiveness.

The Yaoundé Architecture ensures information sharing from the bottom to the top of the structure. Information usually moves from MOCs of coastal states through the zonal level to the regional level and then to the international level. Also, information is shared with several stakeholders in the maritime domain and those with an interest in the domain. Information sharing is mostly done using emails. The sea vision system, telegram and Very High-Frequency channels are also used.

Signatories and stakeholders are reluctant to share information. The Reluctance in information sharing amongst states may be attributed to signatories trying to protect their sovereignty and commercial shipping companies, vessels and other stakeholders lacking trust in the Maritime Centres. Also, UNCLOS Article 302 gives grounds to states to avoid the disclosure of information and that hampers the encouragement of information sharing in the GoG (Walker, 2015).

Stakeholders lacking confidence in the information sharing process, stating there was a lack of security for information being shared facilitated the development of an
information sharing platform known as the Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (YARIS) by the Architecture. The system is meant to ensure and provide secured information sharing amongst maritime actors. It is also to ensure better coordination between Maritime Centres. With YARIS, information can be shared with all stakeholders on a need-to-know basis. Information retrieved by Maritime Centres can be displayed and allows for analysis of the occurrence of incidents.

A respondent commented on information sharing;

“Information is shared between the coastal states, MMCCs, and all Maritime Centres at the zonal and regional levels. Information is also shared with several stakeholders such as shipping companies, fisheries commission, port authorities, maritime administration, oil companies and some embassies with their vessels in the GoG. It is to help them ensure safe and secured shipping through the waters. Contacts have been provided for vessels to call in case of any incident, however, they do not contact Maritime Centres directly but rather resort to calling Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-GoG (MDAT-GoG) who then relays such information to the Centres”

Another state that;

“Coordination and cooperation happen mainly between MMCCs as the Code suggests, however, it is limited due to the lack of resources of these MMCCs. After the MMCCs coordinate to deal with an insecurity issue, they rely on signatories to assist with platforms to execute the task. Some signatories lack the needed platforms hence coordination is unexploited. Also, the Information sharing process is not very effective and the YARIS system has been developed to help in the safe and secured sharing of information. The system is still under development and all stakeholders are being trained to use the system effectively”
Coordination includes joint operations; joint operations would get signatories to coordinate their resources to fight insecurity in their maritime space. Signatories through the Maritime Centres have signed up MoUs to join their resources together to undertake joint patrols and operations in the GoG to reduce the rate of insecurity issues in the region. The MoUs are to ensure that, countries with weak platforms meet up with countries that are relatively strong in platforms to merge up their resources, capabilities and platforms to protect their maritime domain. An officer explains;

“Coordination and cooperation as the Code suggests are the appropriate means to tackle insecurity in our waters. Due to the differences in the level and state of resources of signatory navies in the region, undertaking joint operations would help bridge the gap in resources and ensure effective patrols on the waters for a secure maritime space. Signatories of Zones E and F have signed up MoUs for joint patrols and operations. For Zone E, the signing was done in 2018 and was made operational in 2021. A joint operation was conducted and all signatories contributed greatly. Each signatory made available a ship for the operation and it was a success”

Okafor-Yarwood et al (2020), state the promising nature of the Architecture’s instrument in international cooperation. It however mentioned the challenge as the political will of signatories to champion it. Kamal-Deen (2014) confirms the political authority of the framework and the degree of the sovereignty of signatories as the challenge and that, the effectiveness of transnational cooperation depends on sufficient political authority.

About 70% of respondents confirmed coordination has been good so far within the Architecture but with some hitches in information sharing. They believe the reason for having staff from all member states is to allow easy access to information from the states. However, this is for now defeated as multinational staff have not reported
to Maritime Centres and getting information from states is difficult. Better coordination and cooperation yield achievements as elaborated in the next paragraph.

7.2 Achievements of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Level of Implementation

The Yaoundé Code is not an idea on paper but works with results on the waters in the region. The Code has seen many achievements since its implementation. Several improvements in the maritime space of the GoG region can be attributed to the Code. Cameroon 2013 lead to the establishment of the regional frameworks (CRESMAO and CRESMAC). The establishment of the CRESMAC was one of the first steps taken for the successful implementation of the Code, after which other structures of the Architecture followed (Günther, 2015).

The Code of Conduct formed the basis of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and also the maritime strategy for the ECCAS region. The EIMS made provision for the establishment of the Maritime Centres in the region. Also, signatories are requested to develop national strategies and incorporate the EIMS which has the Code incorporated into their strategy. Some countries such as Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and others have developed their national strategies and are implementing them hence the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Additionally, signatories have been encouraged to incorporate the Code into their national laws and criminalize crimes such as piracy. Most states in the GoG lacked anti-piracy laws and even though most still lack the law in their national laws, some countries such as Nigeria and Togo have laws for the prosecution of pirates and that is a great achievement.

Even though maritime insecurity issues were dealt with through the collaboration of countries in the GoG before the Code, the Architecture through the Code has reinforced and broadened the extent to which cooperation can be carried out.
MMCCs have taken up the coordination role and are removing the gaps that existed between the states of the region to help deal with the insecurity issue in the region effectively. Also, Coastal states of the region are putting together their resources to conduct joint operations. Maritime Domain Awareness on general maritime issues and how they can be dealt with is being achieved, not forgetting the avenue created for foreign naval vessels to offer assistance and distress vessels calling in for assistance. A respondent summarized the achievement as:

“The Yaoundé Code of Conduct has made some achievements since its adoption. The level of cooperation amongst member states is improving. The cooperation now between member states is better than before. The global strategy that was signed by the head of states at Yaoundé was to have the regional economic bodies develop their strategies to incorporate the global strategy. ECOWAS developed the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and ECCAS also has its maritime strategy. These strategies integrated all the requirements from the global strategy and also from the Code. Before the adaptation of the Code in 2013, there existed insecurity issues in our waters and countries collaborated to deal with the issue. However, the Architecture has ensured and widened the horizon to which this cooperation can be done”

“Cooperation between states before the Architecture was not strong. But currently, the coordination and cooperation between the states are more cordial. The Architecture has also helped states to pull resources together in the conducting of operations together. Various zones have their states conducting operations together in their maritime space. It has raised the awareness to understand what the maritime domain can offer, what the challenges are and how collectively, these challenges can be addressed. A lot of foreign naval vessels are coming in within the framework of the architecture to offer assistance. They still have bilateral relations with coastal states, but this time around, a focal point is available to coordinate the activities of
the states and the foreign countries. A central point has also been made available for distress vessels to call for assistance”

Other achievements of the Code include the launching of the GoG Declaration on Suppression of Piracy on 31 May 2021, which has helped to reduce the number of pirate attacks and kidnappings in the GoG. It is expected that, in 2023, pirate attacks would decrease by 80%. Measures that were taken resulting in the reduction of attacks include; The enforcement of maritime laws by international navies in international waters of the GoG, the Nigeria Navy clampdown on pirate camps, several meeting held between the ICC and Nigeria under the GoG Maritime Coordination Forum, Shared Awareness and Deconfliction and increased number of Security Escort Vessels cooperation between the Nigeria Navy and commercial shipping (Baltic & Integrated Maritime Council [BIMCO], 2022).

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct can be said to be achieving its intended purpose since its implementation as illustrated by an officer;

“‘The purpose of the Code is being achieved at the moment. This is because the Code has stated some requirements such as the incorporation into national laws, criminalizing piracy and other crimes into national laws, developing national strategies etc. Also, it states that states are to take charge of their maritime domain and secure it and share information between IMO bodies and regional bodies etc. The Regional Centres are in charge of the implementation of the strategies set by the economic bodies. ECOWAS is implementing the EIMS while CRESMAC is also in charge of the implementation of their strategy. CRESMAO encourages their signatories to sign MoUs between themselves for joint patrols and operations in their various zones. These requirements are being carried out by states in one way or the other in their national laws and this means that the Code is in a way achieving its purpose to an extent”
These achievements are mainly based on the involvement of stakeholders and the support of signatory states. Some of their relationships are as follows.

7.3 Relationship between Signatories and Other Stakeholders

The achievements of the Code involve the support gained from stakeholders. International actors such as the UN regional offices for West and Central Africa, UNODC, IMO, Donor countries and international entities have assisted the Architecture in the effective implementation of the Code. The assistance provided includes training, technical assistance and capacity building. Capacity building includes the training of national navies, facilitation of exercises and provision of equipment to improve the state of capacities of navies and Maritime Centres. The UNODC especially has been very helpful in the provision of assistance to the Maritime Centres. They have contributed to training law enforcement agencies through their Global Maritime Crime Programme and that has helped in the apprehension and prosecution of crime (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

The IMO has also contributed greatly by adopting Resolution A.1069 (28) on the Prevention and Suppression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activities in the GoG. Also, cooperation with international and regional partners to help tackle the issue is encouraged. Governments have also been inspired to contribute financially to the trust fund of West and Central Africa maritime security to build national and regional capabilities.

The EU supports by providing security capacity building. The US, Germany and France are also providing support in the training of national navies and providing equipment as well as capacity-building programmes (Husted, 2019). The Danish is a critical partner with the GoG states. They have since 2015 led the GoG Inter-regional network (GoGIN) in supporting the Yaoundé Process. They have promoted the blue economy in the GoG by securing the seas of the region. They have also increased their support to the GoG over the increase in piracy in the region since 2019
The Danish have funded programs to enhance regional maritime security through the assistance of maritime and law enforcement institutions at both national and regional levels. Their partnerships with the UNODC, IMO, Danish Defense and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) have strengthened maritime response in the region (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021).

A staff highlighted that;

“Maritime Centres have gained support from several countries and organizations. UNODC has supported Zones E and F in terms of equipment and the conduction of operations. The German Government has also supported MMCC zones E, F and D with about 70% of the equipment in the Centres. Training has also been conducted for personnel. Capacity building support from the UK through their high commission. The US in the initial stages provided the sea vision system to conduct and ensure better surveillance of the maritime space. Other countries such as Korea and France are also contributing to ensure that the Code is being implemented successfully”

Due to the weak capabilities of the states in the GoG, they rely on foreign partnerships for assistance. Non-regional naval forces have been deployed in the GoG to help combat the issue of maritime insecurity. The deployment by some states focused on training and exercises and also protecting ships that fall within national interest. The Italians, Danish and Russians have been more involved in dealing with maritime insecurity issues in the region. The presence and activities of their warships have been very instrumental in tackling piracy, especially in the GoG (BIMCO, 2022). This is supported by a respondent’s comment;

“The assistance provided by stakeholders does not end with training. Some states have gone the extra mile to deploy their vessels in the maritime domain of the GoG. Due to the lack of capabilities of most states in the region to get beyond their
terrestrial seas to the EEZ, these vessels are deployed at the EEZ of most states to take up security issues. They provide security for vessels by patrolling and surveying the area. They are also able to chase the bad guys operating around that area. Also, exercises are being conducted between the GoG states and the foreign naval vessels. Exercises such as Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS organised by the US and Exercise Africa Grand Nemo by France include the participation of signatories and this has been instrumental in ensuring security in our maritime domain.”

The support of stakeholders and foreign navies to the states of the GoG to combat maritime crime has contributed to ensuring maritime security in the region. It has helped in the capacity building of personnel and the adaptation of some good practices. The participation of signatories in the joint exercises organized by the US and France, EXERCISES OBANGAME EXPRESS and AFRICA GRAND NEMO gets countries and the Architecture to exercise how to effectively coordinate and cooperate in real-time situations. Also, training, communication and exercising on the chain of information sharing and flow are undertaken during the exercise. These exercises help to test the Yaoundé Architecture. Despite the achievements and support from stakeholders, there exist some challenges which would be deliberated.

7.4 Challenges in the Implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct since its adoption and implementation has made several achievements with the support of stakeholders but is yet to be considered fully effective for its purpose. The Yaoundé Architecture has faced several challenges in the implementation of the Code. The challenges range from institutional, logistics and regional.

The main issue that challenges the implementation of the Code is the lack of funding, logistics and capacity. The Maritime Centres lack the needed capacities to operate effectively. Signatories that are to empower these Maritime Centres, some of which
are burdened with funding joint maritime security operations and hence cannot support Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code. Most of them also lack the capacity and desire to cooperate. The lack of support for these Centres has resulted in them relying on external donors. This is difficult to sustain and the effective operations of the Maritime Centres are undermined (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). An officer explains;

“The Maritime Centres are faced with several challenges in the implementation of the Code. The main challenge encountered is logistics constraints. The capabilities needed for effective implementation of the Code by Centres are lacking. The ECOWAS and ECCAS have tried to equip the Centres and other stakeholders have also supported with logistics but it is still not adequate. Signatories are encouraged to provide logistics but some of them cannot fund it. This has reduced the effectiveness and the extent these Centres can go to implement the Code successfully”

Also, the majority of the coastal states in the GoG lack effective legal powers to prosecute most maritime crimes such as piracy. The absence of domestic laws to prosecute these crimes is a challenge in the execution of the Code. Few states such as Nigeria and Togo can prosecute piracy in their courts. This has ended in very few prosecutions of maritime crime in the GoG (Yücel, 2021).

Some also have weak penalties to be applied when these crimes are prosecuted. With this challenge, the efforts of the navies and coast guard to tackle the issue of maritime insecurity and accomplish one of the aims of the Code is being jeopardized (Orellana, 2019). This great challenge gets criminals to move from countries with strict laws on the prosecution of crimes to those without and that still challenges the entire GoG region (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). A staff emphasized;
“Most of the signatories to the Code do not have the required legislature to prosecute maritime crimes. Even though they are required to incorporate such laws into their national laws, most of them are still reluctant and others are also going through a hard time ensuring that, this is done. Only a few countries such as Nigeria and Togo have criminalized some maritime crimes such as piracy in their national laws and can prosecute such crimes in their courts. This challenges the implementation of the Code as criminals will commit more crimes in waters of the countries that cannot prosecute such crimes.”

Additionally, the not binding nature of the code has signatories not fully adhering to the guidelines the code provides. This challenges the kind of compliance that is needed for effective maritime security (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The Architecture is not providing the needed framework and does not compel signatories to adopt these frameworks in their national laws (Yücel, 2021).

Furthermore, trust is lost by shipping companies and organizations. There exists a challenge of stakeholders keeping information to themselves and refusing to share such information. This challenges the ability of Maritime Centres to develop their situational awareness and that would continue when stakeholders remain secretive with such information. This happens because, states, shipping companies and organizations fear interference with their safety of navigation and lack trust in the maritime Centres (Walker, 2015).

They resort to sharing information with the MDAT-GOG. This organization is located in Brest, France and Portsmouth, United Kingdom. Commercial vessels resorting to this organization means a lack of trust in the authorities of GoG states and their capabilities (Yücel, 2021). To ensure continual access to information to ensure safe and secured maritime space, there is the need for the required resources, capabilities and platforms to be acquired (Walker, 2015). Diverse languages of signatories also hamper information sharing (Yücel, 2021). A respondent stated;
“Coordination in the implementation of the Code has been fairly good, however, some hitches in the retrieving of information and sharing of information are being faced. Multinational staff is required in Maritime Centres to allow easy access to information from various signatory states. With the lack of these staff, the Centres find it difficult to get information from some states. The stakeholders of these states are usually reluctant to provide information and that is a challenge. They attribute this habit to the lack of trust in the Centres and do not know the reasons why such information is being sorted for. Shipping companies also lack trust in the Centres since they have the impression that these Centres will delay in responding to their needs because they do not have the resources to do so. They resort to giving information to MDAT-GoG since they trust their capabilities and believe they can be relied on. The issue of trust needs to be broken and this can be done when Centres are equipped properly with the needed resources.”

The non-regional naval forces deployed in the GoG have also identified some weaknesses that exist in managing maritime insecurity in the GoG. They include the absence of agreements between coastal states and non-regional naval forces of handing over criminals to the coastal states. This is because legal processes are required and prison facilities of the coastal states are to meet the standards of international human rights. Also, it is requested that non-regional navies keep coastal states informed on any activity that involves law enforcement and since all these are lacking, managing insecurity is difficult (BIMCO, 2022).

The Code would be implemented and accomplish its aim when signatories to the code perform their duties as they are supposed to (Danso & Allotey-Pappoe, 2021). The Architecture through transnational cooperation would help combat maritime crime since it provides the platform for seamless information sharing. There is the potential for harmonization of anti-blue crime responses and also enabling joint actions and patrols (Yücel, 2021). Much still needs to be done. The success of the Code does not just rely on regional action between states in the Gulf but also on
effective coordination between the two regional organizations ECCAS and ECOWAS (Günther, 2015). The Yaoundé Code would be compared with the Djibouti Code to aid in making recommendations.
Chapter 8. Comparison of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with the Djibouti Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is what is referred to as the Djibouti Code of Conduct.

Similarly, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which was modelled from the Djibouti Code of Conduct in its full version is known as the “Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa”.

Maritime transport is indispensable to ensure the movement of essential goods such as food and energy as well as raw materials and manufactured goods globally. With the globalisation of economies, more than 80% of world trade is carried by sea (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017). The rapid economic growth of the Western and Eastern blocs of the African continent and other parts of the world merits attention to the security issues that linger at sea.

However, piracy has a long history, and piracy and illicit activities at sea are still posing threats to the safe transport of goods and the safety of crew and mostly causes higher operating cost. Distinctively, in the late 1990s and 2000s, there was an appreciable surge of maritime security issues in the African blocs (Allen, 2017). Against this backdrop, the Djibouti Code was formulated in 2009 and the Yaoundé Code in 2013. Thus, the concept of these agreements is to combat piracy and sea robbery through information sharing, capacity building and cooperative arrangements.

8.1 Similarities

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct and consists of 14 articles out of 17 articles of the Djibouti Code. This indicates several
similarities between the Codes. The most palpable similarity between the Yaoundé Code and the Djibouti Code is that they are both geared towards making the maritime space of the economically important regions of the African continent safe.

Both Codes contain prospects of the eventual calling of states to make the Code binding to signatories, however, both Codes remain non-binding. In fairness, the signatories to the Codes have agreed to cooperate, in manners consistent and legal with international standards, in:

1. The examination, capture and indictment of people, who are sensibly associated with having committed demonstrations of theft and armed robbery against ships, including those actuating or deliberately working with such demonstrations;
2. The ban and capture of suspect ships and property on board such ships;
3. The rescue of ships, people and property subject to theft and armed robbery and the help of appropriate consideration, treatment and bringing home of sailors, anglers, other shipboard faculty and travellers subject to such demonstrations, especially the individuals who have been exposed to savagery; and
4. The conduct of shared operations - both among signatory states and with naval forces from nations outside the area, for example, choosing police or other approved authorities to set out on watch boats or aeroplanes of another signatory.

What's more, the Codes give a structure to correspondence, coordination and collaboration.

8.2 Differences

Despite the similarities of the Codes, some differences exist. Regional coverage for both codes will stand out as the major difference between the Yaoundé Code and
Djibouti Code. Just as their similarities are geared towards making economic activities via their seas safe, the differences are just as keen.

First, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct covers the West and Central African bloc while the Djibouti Code of Conduct runs from South Africa through to Egypt engulfing the nations on the horn of Africa. The Djibouti Code was an IMO initiative and was officially issued as an IMO document. It focused initially on only piracy and armed robbery until 2017 when it changed through the Jeddah amendment. The Jeddah amendment adopted articles from the Yaoundé Code and amended the Djibouti Code to include other illicit maritime crimes and training. The Yaoundé Code on the other hand was an ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC initiative and did not only deal with piracy and armed robbery against ships but adopted a multidimensional approach to maritime security by dealing with a wide range of transnational organised crimes (Egede, 2021).

The Yaoundé Code enjoins its members to seek empowerment and training from foreign powers relative to the Djibouti Code which embraces capacity building of states to increase their state of security. Training of coastal guards and staff from all institutions directly involved was conducted as part of the framework of the Djibouti agreement. Also, the IMO has a provision for their staff to train personnel and staff in terms of capacity building. A regional training centre in Doraleh-Djibouti has also been provided for further capacity building in the region. Direct foreign interference like naval patrols from NATO helped in the effectiveness of the Djibouti Code (Menzel, 2018).

Lastly, the Djibouti Code incorporates nations of non-African origin. Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are all signatories to the Djibouti Code whereas only nations from West and Central Africa signed up to the Yaoundé Code agreement. There exists the Djibouti Code of Conduct trust fund, a multi-donor voluntary fund. The same cannot be said for the Yaoundé Code of Conduct even though the IMO has intentions for that.
Observably, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Djibouti Code of Conduct are all meant to repress piracy and its related activities as much as possible. These diverging points could be laid out as the differences there are to the Codes. After examining the similarities and differences, how effective are they?

8.3 Effectiveness of Both Codes

Both the Djibouti and Yaoundé Code of Conduct has been effective since their adoption, especially the Djibouti Code of Conduct. The rate of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa region, especially piracy has reduced to the barest minimum and much can be attributed to the effective implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. The Codes have increased the rate of information sharing amongst member states and Maritime Centres. Also, cooperation and coordination have been encouraged and states in the regions of these Codes are facilitating the agenda. This has assisted in the fight against maritime crimes. The Code has created very strong platforms for partnerships amongst the signatories and international stakeholders and that has gained support from these stakeholders in ensuring maritime security.

Furthermore, despite the financial and political challenges being encountered by signatories, their continuous commitment to the Codes, and their efforts in the implementation have favoured the Codes. Their support has contributed immensely to strengthening the efforts in place to ensure security in the regions.

The Djibouti Code and the Yaoundé Code are instrumental agreements in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and the GoG regions. They have helped in combating maritime crime and continue to ensure the rate of these crimes remains minimal in their waters. States and Maritime Centres have been helpful in their implementation despite the challenges they face. The Djibouti Code has gained many achievements since the rate of piracy in the region is almost extinct. The Yaoundé Code is gaining ground and much is being done through the Yaoundé Architecture to attain success.
Some measures instituted by the signatories of the Djibouti Code may be adopted by the signatories of the Yaoundé Code to attain the same heights as the Djibouti Code.
Chapter 9. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

The chapters discussed earlier presented evidence on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the Yaoundé Architecture, the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code, the achievements of the Code, challenges faced and finally compared the Yaoundé Code to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. This chapter provides a summary of the study by stating some findings, concludes the study and profess some recommendations.

9.1 Summary of Study

The key findings of the study are summarized as follows;

1. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct aims to ensure maritime security in the GoG by creating a strong bond of cooperation and coordination amongst signatories of the Code. The unrestricted sharing of information within the Yaoundé Architecture where Maritime Centres exist is the main source of coordination and cooperation.

2. Maritime Centres are the main implementers of the Yaoundé Code and require the necessary equipment and resources both financial and human to ensure effective implementation of the Code. These resources are being provided by the ECOWAS, ECCAS, signatories and other stakeholders with interest in the GoG region.

3. Signatories to the Code have been grouped into different Maritime Zones with Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres. Signatories have the responsibility to provide support to the Maritime Centres with human and financial resources. The Maritime Centres rely on the capabilities of the signatory navies to implement the Code.

4. Most Signatory states lack the needed capabilities and platforms to combat maritime crime in the GoG. This affects Maritime Centres as they do not have a pool of resources to operate on their own but rely on the states. The
Maritime Centres lack the needed resources to effectively implement the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Even though they receive assistance from stakeholders both in the region and internationally, there is still more to be done in terms of capabilities.

9.2 Conclusion

This study was carried out to examine and discuss the capabilities of Maritime Centres in the effective implementation of the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, The Yaoundé Code of Conduct. A discussion was made about the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Architecture that implements it. Further discussions on the capabilities of Maritime Centres, the achievements of the Code and the challenges encountered by Maritime Centres in the Implementation of the Code were carried out with evidence from interviews conducted. The analysis of the outcomes from the interviews identified the limited resources and capabilities of Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code.

The full implementation of the Yaoundé Code would mean its effectiveness. This is possible when technical and financial matters are met. However, the implementation of the Code is mainly hampered by the limited ability and capacity of signatories and Maritime Centres. Signatories to the Code are faced with differences in capacity and wealth and that is a challenge for effective implementation of the Code. Solving the root cause of the problem such as bettering the economy and providing good governance perspectives as well as the procurement of equipment, platforms and better training would help effective implementation of the Code. The IMO’s intent of implementing a trust fund for the Yaoundé Code of Conduct similar to the Djibouti Code of Conduct is a great step toward solving the issue of diverse capacity and wealth of signatories.
9.3 Recommendation

The following recommendations are suggested from the study;

1. The ECOWAS, ECCAS AND GGC being at the political level of the Architecture and signatories of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct should consider making the code a binding document.
2. Signatories of the Yaoundé Code are encouraged to domesticate it into their national laws and develop their national maritime strategies as required.
3. A system for funding the Maritime Centres should be developed by ECOWAS and ECCAS. It should be consistent to enable smooth operations of the Maritime Centres.
4. There is a need for the political and strategic level of Yaoundé Architecture to enhance cooperation at all levels of the Architecture and place importance on the need for trust. Also, states in the GoG region should develop and support a culture of information-sharing. This would facilitate and strengthen the cooperation of the states and encourage states to willingly share information for better implementation of the Code.
5. Stakeholders of the GoG maritime domain should continue to assist Maritime Centres to enable them to collect data, analyze them and share such information in a trustworthy and transparent manner.
6. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct known as the maiden document for the Yaoundé Architecture should be reviewed and amendments made by the Architecture to incorporate modern trends being encountered. This may be likened to the Jeddah amendments made to the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
7. Also, platforms and capabilities should be built for Maritime Centres to bridge the gap between information sharing and the abilities of Maritime Centres to respond. Additionally, signatories should endeavor to provide Maritime Centres with the required staff to ensure the availability of the multinational staff in Maritime Centres to facilitate information retrieving and sharing.
8. An evaluation of the Architecture should be conducted to review the organograms of the various Maritime Centres and access their efficiency to make the Architecture better.

9. The consideration of airpower to survey the maritime space is required and very important. Pirates are going further deep offshore more than 200nm to attack. The presence of air power would allow a quick location and patrol of the area before a ship arrives for further action.
References


https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf,


Appendices

Appendix A: Sample of Semi-Structured Interview Questions

Semi-structured interview guide; Assessing Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct).

The issues of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea led to a summit bringing together the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in June 2013 in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon. The summit led to the signing of a Declaration of Heads of State and Government of Central and West Africa States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain; the Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC on Security in the Maritime Area of Central and West Africa; and the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct). These instruments, especially the Yaoundé Code of Conduct inspired the elaboration of the Maritime Safety and Security Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea (Yaoundé Architecture).

The Yaoundé Architecture is a maritime security architecture framework that reflects the areas of responsibility and the location of relevant entities and structures contributing to maritime security. The Yaoundé Architecture is organised into different levels of authority and Maritime Centres coordinating maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Political level of the Yaoundé Architecture is made up of the ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC. The ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC deal with all political matters associated with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.

The Maritime Centres of the Yaoundé Architecture are the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), two Regional Maritime Security Centres, one for Western Africa, and the other for Central Africa, and five Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC). The ICC is a multifunctional body created by the ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC in Yaoundé to oversee the Yaoundé Code of Conduct implementation. This body provides the strategic level of the Yaoundé Architecture. The ICC coordinates the interregional efforts of the two Regional Maritime Security Centres, the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) and the Central Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAC).

CRESMAO and CRESMAC deal with international coordination for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea at the regional level. The coastal space of the Regional Centres has been further divided into operational Maritime Zones designated by letters. The activities of the Maritime Zones are coordinated by Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC). CRESMAO
has three Maritime Zones with their respective MMCCs, namely Zones E, F and G, while CRESMAC has two Maritime Zones with their respective MMCCs, namely Zones A and D. The MMCCs form the multinational level of authority.

This interview guide aims at collecting views of relevant stakeholders within the maritime security setup in the Gulf of Guinea, ICC, CRESMAO, CRESMAC and MMCCs.

**General Yaoundé Code of Conduct**

1. How has the Yaoundé Code of Conduct been incorporated into the national laws of your signatory country?
2. What contributions have signatories made to the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?
3. Are signatories contributing equally to the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?
4. In your opinion, is the Yaoundé Code of Conduct achieving its intended purpose in the Western or Central region?
5. How are Maritime Centres currently using the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to deal with all maritime insecurity issues in your region or zone?
6. What challenges are faced in the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?
7. How would you rate the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?

**Western Regional Centre (MMCC for Zones E, F, G) and Central Regional Centre (MMCC for Zones A, D)**

1. What legal frameworks exist for the ICC, CRESMAO, CRESMAC and MMCCs in furtherance of the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?
2. What is the state of coordination and cooperation between ICC, CRESMAO, CRESMAC and MMCCs?
3. How are the Maritime Centres contributing to the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?
4. Are the Maritime Centres provided with the necessary resources for their operations?
5. How are the Maritime Centres staffed?
6. How are Maritime Centres funded?
7. What resources are available in the Maritime Centres for the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct?

8. Do the Maritime Centres have a pool of resources available for carrying out operations?

9. What challenges are the Maritime Centres facing concerning resources and capabilities for their operations?

10. How is information sharing among the Maritime Centres carried out?

11. Is there an online real-time information sharing platform for the Maritime Centres? If yes, can you provide more information? If not, why?

12. Is there an integrated maritime surveillance and information sharing system for monitoring illegal activities in the region or zones? How is surveillance conducted?

Other Stakeholders

1. If there exists an information-sharing platform, is it accessible to both civilians and military stakeholders in the region or zone?

2. Are the Maritime Centres assisted by external stakeholders?

3. Do the signatories of the region and zones partake in joint operations with foreign navies for maritime security? If yes, what operations are they?

4. What contribution have the joint operations with the foreign navies provided concerning maritime security?

5. What assistance is the Maritime Centres providing to any aspect of commercial shipping in the Western or Central region?

6. Do you have any additional comments?
Appendix B: Ethical Consideration

Appendix B.1 Sample of Consent Form

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in connection with a Dissertation which will be written by the Interviewer, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.

The topic of the Dissertation is ... Assessing Maritime Centres in the Implementation of the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa (Yasoundi Code of Conduct) ...

The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will be published online and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data will be immediately deleted.

Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree is awarded.

Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.

Student’s name ...Richardis Kall Anabla-Tiah...
Specialization ...Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration...
Email address ...w1011017@wmu.se...

***

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.

Name:  

Signature:  

Date:  

...
Appendix B.2 WMU REC Proposal Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of principal researcher:</th>
<th>Richards Roli Anoba-Tash</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name(s) of any co-researcher(s):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If applicable, for which degree is each researcher registered?</td>
<td>MSc in Maritime Affairs (Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of supervisor, if any:</td>
<td>Professor Aref Fakhy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title of project:</td>
<td>Assessing Maritime Centres in the implementation of the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the research funded externally?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, by which agency?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where will the research be carried out?</td>
<td>Western And Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the participants be recruited?</td>
<td>Colleagues at the Maritime Centres and recommendations of naval officers from countries in West and Central Africa in WMU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many participants will take part?</td>
<td>Ten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will they be paid?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, please supply details:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the research data be collected (By interview, by questionnaires, etc.)?</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the research data be stored?</td>
<td>On an external hard drive and mobile phone with strong password</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How and when will the research data be disposed of?</td>
<td>Delete all data after my Masters degree is awarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a risk assessment necessary?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature(s) of Researcher(s):  

Signature of Supervisor:  

Date: 5 April 2022

Please attach:  
- A copy of the research proposal  
- A copy of any risk assessment  
- A copy of the consent form to be given to participants  
- A copy of the information sheet to be given to participants
Appendix B.3 WMU REC Approval

REC DECISION # REC-22-11(M)

Email, PhD <PhD@wmu.se> (sent by cef@wmu.se)  

Apr 13, 2022, 2:00PM

to me, Aref

Dear Richardis Anabia-Tiah,

I am pleased to let you know that the members of the WMU Research Ethics Committee (REC) have now approved the research-related documents that you submitted to this office on 6 April 2022, concerning your research study involving human participation.

You are now free to start your data collection work in consultation with your supervisor.

With kind regards,

Carlo Fischer  
REC Secretary  
Faculty Support Officer  
Research Projects and Doctoral Programs  
World Maritime University  
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