An assessment of the impact of maritime (In)security in the Gulf of Guinea: special emphasis on Sao Tome and Principe

Paulo de Araújo Ribeiro De Ceita
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MARITIME (IN)SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
(SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE)
by
PAULO DE ARAÚJO RIBEIRO DE CEITA
Sao Tome and Principe

A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
MARITIME AFFAIRS
(MARITIME LAW AND POLICY)

2020

Copyright Paulo de Araújo Ribeiro de Ceita 2020
Declaration

I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the University.

(Signature):

(Date): 22/09/2020

Supervised by: Associate Prof. Dr. Henning Jessen, LL.M. (Tulane)

Supervisor’s affiliation: Maritime Law and Policy Specialization
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank God Almighty for guided me and given me strength and speed to write this dissertation and consequently conclude this Master's program after extremely painful moments lived with the death of my esteemed Father, Eugenio de Ceita, on 11/17/2019.

Not wanting to omit any name, I hereby express my gratitude to all the professors and staff at World Maritime University (WMU), in particular my supervisor, Associate Professor Henning Jessen, whose office door was always open whenever I had a challenge or had a question about my research or writing. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work, but steered me in the right direction whenever he thought I needed it.

A note of appreciation to all those who contributed with their brilliant subsidies in completing the questionnaire, as well as comments and specific corrections that are extremely relevant to the problem.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my family for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout 14 mouths of study and through the process of researching and writing this dissertation. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you.
Abstract

Title of Dissertation: An Assessment of the Impact of Maritime (In)Security in the Gulf of Guinea (special emphasis on Sao Tome and Principe)

Degree: Master of Science

Maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is generally recognized as a dynamic and complex phenomenon, that emerges from several onshore issues such as poverty, poor governance, corruption, sea blindness, unemployment, border disputes, and socio-economic-political exclusion. All these issues drive maritime insecurity in the GoG region which is plagued by Piracy and Armed Robbery, theft of oil and other cargo, illegal fishing and other maritime security threats. These challenges are a paramount concern for countries in this region, particularly Sao Tome and Principe (STP), a Large Ocean State located near the epicentre of most of the attacks. Maritime insecurity in GoG not only poses a threat to STP’s current development status, but also to the country’s future social and economic empowerment plans, such as the 2030 Transformation Agenda. Despite this eminent threat, the impact of maritime insecurity issues in GoG on STP has not been previously investigated and established. This study, therefore, aimed to assess the status quo of maritime insecurity issues in the GoG and in STP, determine the key drivers of these issues, and assess their impact on the 2030 transformation agenda of Sao Tome and Principe. The study incorporated a review of previous research on maritime insecurity in GoG, followed by data collection from 15 participants through an online survey tool, and finally the data was analysed using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. Based on the research outputs, Piracy and Armed Robbery were identified as the major threats of maritime insecurity in the GoG and STP. Secondly, poverty, quick profit and poor governance were linked as key motivators for people especially fishermen, public administration staff, and unemployed persons to engage in these criminal activities. Thirdly, the research demonstrated a positive correlation between maritime (in)security in the GoG and in STP. The findings of this study, therefore, confirms that the maritime insecurity issues in GOG affects the social wellbeing and economic development of STP, and further highlights the specific drivers of these issues in the country and the region. The findings also reveal weaknesses in the current maritime insecurity legislation and mitigation strategies of STP. The study, therefore, recommends that effective management of maritime security in STP and GoG requires a reinforcement of the regional and international cooperation, especially towards revising and harmonising the current legal normative framework, and development of improved corrective action. Being a large ocean state, Sao Tome and Principe’s economy is highly dependent on maritime activities, therefore it is imperative for the country to address the key challenges and drivers of maritime insecurity, for successful implementation of the 2030 Transformation Agenda.

KEYWORDS: Maritime insecurity, Gulf of Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Piracy, Armed Robbery, Illegal fishing, corruption, governance, sea blindness, poverty, 2030 transformation agenda, cargo, oil, theft
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration ........................................................................................................ ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ iii
Abstract ........................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... v
List of Figures ................................................................................................... vii
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
  1.1 Background ................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Problem Statement ....................................................................................... 3
  1.3 Research Objectives .................................................................................... 4
  1.4 Research Methodology ................................................................................ 5
  1.5 Expected outputs and Outcomes .................................................................. 6
  1.6 Organisation of Chapters .......................................................................... 7
CHAPTER TWO - THE CURRENT STATUS QUO OF MARITIME
THREATS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA .............................................................. 8
  2.1 Maritime Security .......................................................................................... 8
  2.2 Overview and Importance of the Gulf of Guinea ..................................... 9
  2.3 Drivers of Maritime Insecurity ..................................................................... 11
  2.4 Major Drivers of Maritime Insecurity .......................................................... 14
    2.4.1 Governance and Corruption ............................................................ 14
    2.4.2 Economic and Socio-Political Exclusion .......................................... 14
    2.4.3 Sea Blindness .................................................................................... 15
    2.4.4 Weak Law Enforcement .................................................................... 15
    2.4.5 Poverty, Unemployment and Densely Populated Urban Centers .... 15
    2.4.6 Border Disputes ................................................................................. 16
    2.4.7 Scarcity of Refined Petroleum Products ........................................ 16
    2.4.8 Oil Discoveries .................................................................................. 17
  2.5 Major Threats of Maritime Security ............................................................ 17
    2.5.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea .................................................... 18
    2.5.2 Theft of Oil and other Cargo ............................................................. 18
    2.5.3 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing .................................... 19
    2.5.4 Trafficking of Counterfeit Items, People, Narcotics and Arms ......... 20
  2.6 Regional Counterpiracy Efforts .................................................................. 20
CHAPTER THREE – CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO
TOME AND PRINCIPE .................................................................................. 22
  3.1 Overview of Sao Tome and Principe ............................................................ 22
  3.2 Complex relationship with the sea ............................................................... 25
  3.3 Legal framework related to maritime security ............................................ 27
  3.4 Evolution of cooperation in the field of maritime security ....................... 28
  3.5 Maritime security strategy of Sao Tome and Principe ............................. 29
CHAPTER FOUR – IMPACT OF MARITIME INSECURITY ON 2030
TRANSFORMATION AGENDA OF STP ......................................................... 31
4.1 Major lines of 2030 transformation agenda of STP ..................................................31
4.2 Challenges facing the economy and social development ............................................32
4.3 Relevance of the sea in the STP economy .................................................................32

CHAPTER FIVE - CORRELATION BETWEEN MARITIME (IN)SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE .................................................................35
  5.1 Findings / Analysis ........................................................................................................36
    5.1.1 Maritime insecurity threats to the Gulf of Guinea .................................................36
    5.1.2 How maritime security threat can affect the implementation of the 2030 Agenda ........................................................................................................39
    5.1.3 Mitigation Strategy ..................................................................................................41
  5.2 Discussion .....................................................................................................................44

CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................48
  6.1 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................48
  6.2 Recommendation .........................................................................................................49
    6.2.1 At the international and regional level .................................................................49
    6.2.2 At the national level ..............................................................................................49

References ..........................................................................................................................52

Appendices ........................................................................................................................58
  Appendix A: Consent form for respondent .................................................................58
  Appendix B: Survey of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea & its impact in Sao Tome and Principe .................................................................59
List of Figures

Figure 1: Maritime security matrix................................................................. 9
Figure 2: The Maritime Regional Architecture zones in the Gulf of Guinea ........ 10
Figure 3: Vicious Cycle of Maritime insecurity.............................................. 13
Figure 4: The archipelagic baseline and the outer limits of the territorial sea,
contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of São Tomé and Príncipe...... 23
Figure 5: The major security threats in the Gulf of Guinea............................... 36
Figure 6: Piracy carried out in the Gulf of Guinea ........................................... 37
Figure 7: Who are involved in Piracy and armed robbery?............................... 38
Figure 8: What drives people to join these criminal activities?......................... 38
Figure 9: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe ............ 39
Figure 10: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe ........... 40
Figure 11: How can threat affect the Stakeholders involved in import and export and
other maritime services................................................................. 40
Figure 12: The government capabilities to handle the threat.............................. 41
Figure 13: How is this regulation being implemented...................................... 42
Figure 14: Does the country have enough resources for countermeasures and
maritime domain answers? ................................................................. 42
Figure 15: Does the country have the resources required personnel and training? ... 43
Figure 16: Opinion about military cooperation in place in this domain.............. 44
List of Abbreviations
AU: African Union
COLREG: Convention on the International Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea
CPLP: Community of Portuguese Language Countries
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
ENAPORT: National Port Administration Company
GDP: Gross domestic product
GoG: Gulf of Guinea
GCC: Gulf of Guinea Commission
JDZ: Joint Development Zone
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce
IMAP: Maritime and Port Institute,
IMB: International Maritime Bureau
IMO: International Maritime Organisation
INAC: National Institute of Civil Aviation
INE: National Institute of Statistics
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization
IUU: Illegal, unreported and unregulated
MARPOL: International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MOWCA: Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
MSS: Maritime Security Strategy
PESTEL: Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal
SAA: Secure Anchorage Areas
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
SEV: Security Escort Vessels
SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
STCW: International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
**STP**: São Tome and Principe
**SUA**: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
**UN**: United Nations
**VPDs**: Vessel Protection Detachments
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Maritime transport plays a vital role in the timely delivery of products and services connecting markets and consumers, and it is responsible for the movement of more than 90% of the world sea borne trade, using different maritime corridors for this purpose (ICS, 2020; Shuo, 2019). However, these maritime corridors have been shown to be unsafe in various latitudes, such as Somalia, Gulf of Aden, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Peru, among others. Similar to the aforementioned areas, the GoG, particularly the Niger Delta in Nigeria is considered to be an epicentre of maritime insecurity (Lopez-Lucia, 2015).

In recent years, maritime insecurity has become a major concern in the international maritime agenda (Shafa, B. M. 2011). The Gulf of Guinea region has considered it as major regional problem which jeopardizes the development of this strategic economic area and endangers short-term maritime trade and the long-term stability of coastal States (Kuppen, 2016). This situation has precipitated various countermeasures, taking into account the shipping attacks in the GoG, which have exposed the vulnerability of the maritime space in the region (Abdel Fattah, 2017).

The success of international efforts in reducing piracy incidences in the Gulf of Aden has been followed by a dramatic increase of the menace in other areas such as the GoG (Forum, 2019). The effective implementation of maritime security strategies has become a challenge for countries whose maritime domain harbors rich and significant natural resources (Kamal-Deen, 2015). From fisheries to hydrocarbons, the waters surrounding the African continent and particularly the countries along the GoG region harbor rich natural resources, which face a range of security threats. Besides, this energy-potential region is geographically close to major world markets, in particular European and North American markets (Kamal-Deen, 2015).

Maritime piracy in Africa, particularly in the GoG, finds support in a complex composition of sea blindness, which means that, despite the ocean’s huge importance, governments provide very little attention to what is happening in their waters. This can be attributed to internal State issues such as political instability, under-equipped naval
forces, the ever-rising population in the region, unemployment among the youth who constitute the majority of the population and deterioration of the marine environment resulting from pollution, causing scarcity of fish (Boateng & Jiping, 2020). In addition, the illegal movement of fire weapons has been made possible for fishermen who find it more profitable changing rows for rifles, to avoid hunger and poverty. 
In most cases, it is important to point out that the ease of acquiring money through illegal means is being used by criminal organizations as an activity to finance their objectives, as well as compromising and weakening certain strategic sectors of the states and their structures. 
The assumption of the existence of corruption and easy money “mindset” associated with gaps in the legal system, a weak and permissible judicial system and the limited technical-military capacity, opens the way for the rampant development and installation of criminal organizations associated with piracy. This quietly endangers the Democratic Rule of Law, thus guaranteeing the free and effective control of the waters under its jurisdiction, as well as proactive cooperation in this field, which endangers maritime security (Boateng & Jiping, 2020).
Maritime (in)security, has received several approaches in a bid to unravel it in different perspectives. However, it still exists, and poses a serious concern to the international maritime community and particularly to STP, an island nation located in the GoG, which seeks to define the sea as one of its strategic pillars for development. 
Sao Tome and Principe is a small island State that in recent years has been shifting towards a new economic paradigm that is focused primarily on the sustainable use of natural marine resources in different sectors. In addition, this paradigm aims to leverage on tourism, offshore oil and gas, and marine transport in order to diversify its “national economy which is mainly dependent on cocoa agriculture (Alegre, 2009). This strategy has been established based on various factors such as its geostrategic position of the archipelago, as well as the richness of its waters with immense potential ranging from hydrocarbon to fishing, tourism activities as well as port services (Government, 2015). 
However, it is important to note that STP is also located in the GoG where increasing maritime security threats such as piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, waste
dumping, pollution among other criminal activities, affecting the exploitation of coastal resources, the peaceful use of sea lines of communication as well as the stability of littoral states, are happening (Ali & Tsamenyi, 2013). These challenges have continually increased despite the palliative efforts made by the international community in the framework of naval cooperation and in the attempt to establish homogeneous practices to counteract (Ali & Tsamenyi, 2013).

The islands are therefore, facing a new challenge in their paradigm of maritime security, due to the threats above, a lack of effective maritime domain awareness, a robust legislative and judicial arrangements to deal with the transnational natures of the issues and inadequate response capabilities. Through analysis of the report of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) - International Maritime Bureau (IMB) expression such as “piracy attacks occur intermittently in waters of STP (ICC-IMB, 2019), or a general cargo was attacked near Sao Tome within the Nigeria/Sao Tome and Principe in the Joint Development Zone – JDZ are more frequent (International, 2020). Such occurrences are due to several factors, particularly its geographical proximity to the Niger Delta (Nigeria), which therefore renders it vulnerable to pirates operating out of the Niger Delta.

Nevertheless, the maritime security threats above have not received adequate and proportionate criminal classification, a worrying normative void for the country whose transformation and development agenda and economic growth relies on revenues from the sea and related services.

1.2 Problem Statement

According to Kamal Deen Ali “The GoG remains a region of great importance. In fact, global interest for the region has risen, and the maritime domain is once again central to this strategic outlook”(Kamal-Deen, 2015). Considered as a vast and diverse region, stretching from Senegal to Angola, including approximately 6,000km of coastline, the GoG is “endowed with vast marine and energy resources” (Okafor-Yarwood, 2019a), being undoubtedly an important critical route for international commerce and a geopolitical checkpoint for transportation of extracted oil, (EU, 2018) as well as goods to and from the dynamic market of central and southern Africa (Pigeon, 2020).
However, these strategic vectors have been threatened by various factors such as the increase in pirate attacks, as well as the rise in criminal activity linked to piracy and illicit crude oil trade, human trafficking, narcotics, weapons and pharmaceuticals, illegal smuggling, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, waste dumping and pollution (MVOMO, 2013).

The aforementioned threats have been a concern to the international community and their impact pose a particular challenge to the maritime security in the archipelago of STP which has a maritime dimension comparatively bigger (160 times) than its terrestrial dimension (Governo, 2018). These threats require STP to reconsider and address the gaps in laws, the low level of implementation of national laws, and the institutional discord that may hamper its response capacity. In addition, the country has defined the sea as one of its strategic pillars for development, whose revenue generation streams from tourism activities to fisheries, deep water port services, and oil exploration (Government, 2015).

1.3 Research Objectives

The Gulf of Guinea is faced with a complex situation of maritime insecurity (Pigeon, 2020), through the rise of criminal activity at sea, particularly maritime piracy being the most viral threat having its epicentre in the Niger Delta – Nigeria (Lopez-Lucia, 2015). Sao Tome and Principe’s geographical proximity to Equatorial Guinea and particularly to the Niger Delta (Nigeria), where many piracy groups are based, raises the risk of attacks on vessels serving the island nation in general and especially the nascent oil industry.

STP has been relatively safe from the piracy acts experienced in the GoG, however the situation has changed with increased number of attacks being registered in the country’s EEZ area in 2019 and most recently in 2020. Furthermore, STP has a transformation agenda, that includes the construction of a deep-water port, the development of the nascent oil industry and the tapping of the undeniable potential for tourism.

Therefore, given its development agenda, geostrategic position and proximity to GoG, it is imperative for STP to identify the current maritime security threats, their drivers,
and the gaps in the current legislation and mitigation strategies, in order to establish and implement effective solutions to maritime insecurity.

1.3.1 General Objective
This study primarily aims to assess the maritime insecurity threats in the GoG and to evaluate its potential impact on the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives
1. To identify the maritime security threats in the GoG and STP
2. To assess the potential impact of the maritime insecurity on the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP
3. To determine potential mitigation strategies to address maritime insecurity in STP

1.3.3 Research questions
Main research question
What is the maritime security threat in the GoG, and how can it impact the new 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP?
Specific research questions
1. What are the maritime security issues threatening the GoG?
2. What are the maritime security issues affecting STP?
3. What are the drivers of maritime insecurity in GoG and STP?
4. What are the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies and their gaps?
5. How does maritime insecurity affect the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP?
6. What are the potential improvements needed for the current maritime insecurity mitigation measures?

1.4 Research Methodology
The study applied the following research approaches:
1. Existing literature featured in publications for research as well as scholarly articles World Maritime University library resources and internet resources was used.
2. An overview of maritime security and the conceptual relation between maritime security and four important concepts, namely marine environment, economic development, human security, and national security are described in detail. Thereafter, the interdependence of these two concepts to the GoG will be critically analyzed.

3. The researcher examine the legal framework with provisions that contribute to maritime security in STP, including relevant international conventions and principles of customary international law. This part of the research was primarily a desk-based study, which the main focus of this paper was conduct a detailed comparative study of national and international law.

4. To achieve the objective of this dissertation, the qualitative research method, as well the doctrinal legal research method is used.

5. Data was collected from 15 participants from different institutions and individuals such as: Prosecution Service; Ministry of Defense and Internal Order; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and Communities; Ministry of Finance and Blue Economy; Coast Guard; National Police; Maritime and Port Institute; and Individuals who held leadership positions at the level of government and public and private institutions to assesses the potential impact of maritime insecurity in GoG in 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP (see the survey in appendix B).

1.5 Expected outputs and Outcomes
The expected outputs of this study are unravel the current status quo of maritime insecurity in GoG and in STP, main maritime security threats, drivers, the potential impact on the STP Transformation Agenda, and the gaps in current mitigation strategies, proposed improvements. In the other hand, the expected outcome of this dissertation are expected to contribute to the critical knowledge of maritime (in)security in GoG and provide a holistic view as well as proactive approach to strengthen the maritime security in STP. Moreover, it will suggest actions that governments in the region can consider to better control and mitigate criminal activities at sea.
1.6 Organisation of Chapters

This research has been organized with a structure of six chapters. Chapter one provides the background of the research, the statement of the problem, the research objectives, the research methodology and the structure of this research. Chapter two offers a literature review of the current status quo of maritime threats in the GoG by assessing the character of the GoG, highlighting the specific drivers of maritime insecurity and the major threats, as well as the Regional Organizations that contribute to the improvement of maritime security in the region. Chapter three provides an overview of STP and discusses its complex relationship with the sea, the existing legal framework related to maritime security, the evolution of cooperation in the field of maritime security, and the maritime security strategy of STP. Chapter four assesses the relevance of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, the challenges facing the economy and social development and the relevance of the sea in the STP economy. Chapter five assesses the impact of maritime insecurity on 2030 transformation agenda of STP through the findings and correlation between maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and maritime security in STP. Chapter six provides a conclusion and recommendations to overcome the identified weaknesses and challenges.
CHAPTER TWO - THE CURRENT STATUS QUO OF MARITIME THREATS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Chapter two features a literature review of the status quo of maritime threats in the GoG by assessing the characteristics of the GoG, secondly, the chapter highlights the specific drivers of maritime insecurity and the major threats, and finally the Regional Organizations that contribute to the improvement maritime security in the region.

2.1 Maritime Security

It is ab initio important to address special attention to understand the term maritime security. The term “maritime security” has become ubiquitous, for contemporary policymaking, and very evident in the different strategic agenda, although Maritime Security is a buzzword, there has been no consensus interpretation on the term (Bueger, 2015).

Understood by some practitioners as a nebulous concept, maritime security encapsulates a large task involving several entities from international, public and private sectors aiming at, preserving the freedom of the seas, facilitating and defending commerce as well as maintaining good governance at sea (Feldt et al., 2013).

The U.S. Navy defines maritime security as “tasks and operations conducted to protect U.S. sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration” (U.S. Navy, 2006).

In 2015, Bueger proposed an alternative approach which focuses on defining maritime security relationships with other concepts dealing with maritime space governance. In particular, as he concluded, the relationship to the following four principles is considered as vital: sea power, marine safety, the blue economy and human resilience (Bueger, 2015). This is described in Figure 1.
These four principles are set out and point to different issues of maritime governance that may or may not be incorporated into maritime security. Sea power is concerned with the role of military force and the maritime aspect of inter-state warfare, and national survival challenges. Marine safety, such as issues shipping control, port security, seafarer health, search and rescue service, but also marine environment protection. Blue economy is concerned with the commercial possibilities the maritime provides, from resource extraction to tourism. Lastly, human security considers coastal communities' living conditions dependent on the sea, in particular, their food security and the possibility of their marginalization in territorially-oriented governments (Bueger, 2015).

2.2 Overview and Importance of the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea is often painted as a vast and diverse region which covers two important geopolitical and economic areas (see Figure 2). This includes the Economic
Community of Central African States - ECCAS and the Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS (Kuppen, 2016). It encapsulates about 16 countries whose coastline is approximately 6,000 kilometres from Senegal to Angola, and including the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The maritime domain of this region is endowed with a vast wealth of minerals, hydrocarbon deposits and diverse marine and fishery resource species. Its waters serve as a vital international trade route, and a shipping spot check as evidenced in the report by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood & Maisie Pigeon (Pigeon, 2020).

![The Maritime Regional Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea](image)

*Figure 2: The Maritime Regional Architecture zones in the Gulf of Guinea. Source: (Kuppen, 2016).*

This region is surrounded by some of Africa’s most proficient oil producers, including Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea. Therefore, the Gulf is a major transit route for oil tankers on their way to international markets (Harbo, n.d.). According to Mañe, the geographical position of the GoG embodies an important comparative advantage for oil supply (Mañe, 2005). Indeed, despite its relative
proximity to the world’s main consumers of energy including North America and Western Europe, the GoG benefits from the absence of narrow shipping maritime lanes known as checkpoints, between the region and those parts of the world. Based on previous work (González, 2016) on the turbulent background of political turmoil in the historic oil zone in the Middle East, the GoG has become one of the areas more attractive to the interests of large transnational capital in recent years, owing to its commercial, geographical, and political characteristics, situated in the confluence of the West and Central African coasts, at the Atlantic Ocean. In this sense, several authors such as (Boateng & Jiping, 2020) have recognized that the GoG is a region that draws a lot of interest to many nations in Latin America, Europe and West Africa. This is because these countries depend on this region for conducting their business. According to Dakuku Peterside, the GoG is a strategic maritime region in the world, having geographical contiguity to Europe and the Americas. It is a veritable source of global energy needs, food stock supply as well as raw materials for industries. It is also, a vital transportation route and relevant as a “flow” and manoeuvre space for military operations (IDN, 2020).

The region's market size is estimated to have around 470 million consumers with $950 billion in Gross domestic product (GDP), approximately $180.50 billion in exports and $105.70 billion in imports (GMSC, 2019). It is the hub of extensive trans-Atlantic trade linking Africa with Europe and the Americas. The geographical contiguity with Western Europe in relation to the Middle East and Asia strengthens the significant competitive advantage (GMSC, 2019) of the transportation of goods and people by rising sea transport costs.

2.3 Drivers of Maritime Insecurity

Although the GoG has seen an increase in the rate of insecurity issues coupled with the robberies in the local water territories and piracy in deep-sea, the majority of these factors have contributed to the rise of insecurity in the GoG. Lawrence Ofosu Boateng and Jiping stress that a political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal (PESTEL) analysis of maritime piracy and maritime security in the GoG show that the region is affected by several factors that compromise the ability to counterattack crimes at sea such as piracy and army
robberies (Boateng & Jiping, 2020). The factors range from political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental. In the same base of thought, (GMSC, 2019) establishes that matters such as weak governments and poor implementation of the laws and conventions, increase in population, lack of unemployment and poverty are drivers that make youths engage in these criminal activities at sea (see Figure 2).

The problem of maritime insecurity in the GoG is not a new phenomenon (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). Piracy itself has a long history but in the GoG, a contemporary form of piracy has flourished in the last 25 years. Lindskov Jacobsen and Riber Nordby underline that pirates are not born at sea. Onshore issues such as sea blindness, unemployment/youth unemployment and poverty, political disputes, corruption and weak governance and, legal challenges affect maritime security and challenges that in different ways feed into the problem of maritime insecurity in the GoG. In the same line of analysis Jacobsen, (Jacobsen, 2017) stresses that it is generally known that maritime security in the GoG is a highly dynamic phenomenon involving a number of issues (legal deficiencies, insufficient military hardware, and problems such as corruption, political instability and youth unemployment) as well as a multiplicity of external respondents (Jacobsen, 2017).
Many theories have been proposed to explain the drivers of maritime insecurity in the GoG. Although the literature covers a wide variety of such theories, this review will describe the following eight major drivers emerging repeatedly throughout the literature reviewed.

1- Governance and corruption,
2- Economic and socio-political exclusion,
3- Sea blindness,
4- Weak law enforcement,
5- Poverty, unemployment and densely populated urban centres,
6- Border disputes,
7- Scarcity of refined petroleum products,
8- Oil discoveries.

A comprehensive review of the above topics will create a better understanding of the true origins of the drivers of maritime insecurity in the GoG.
2.4 Major Drivers of Maritime Insecurity

2.4.1 Governance and Corruption
As described by (Lopez-Lucia, 2015) corruption is pervasive in the navies, maritime administrations and law enforcement agencies of the GoG countries which limit their capacity to deal with criminality. There is evidence that corruption and complicity that exists in Nigeria significantly contributes to the prevalence of piracy in the GoG (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). In line with the above, some officials provide political protection to pirates and prevent their arrest or order the release of pirate vessels (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).

Hastings and Phillips argue that, in the GoG, traditional State political institutions and formal economy institutions primarily restrict and encourage informal networks of business engaged in piracy (Hastings et al., 2015). More indirectly, corruption ensures that only a small percentage of oil revenues meet local communities. More indirectly, corruption means that only a small amount of oil revenue reaches the local populations, this leading to poverty and unemployment which can turn people into pirate (Fiorelli, 2014). Corruption is a sensitive problem and is always difficult to deal with (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).

Transparency over oil revenues is almost non-existent, allowing both the political class and international private companies to monopolize them (I. C. Group, 2012). In addition, the elite are also involved and allow the criminal networks that are established around the oil sector.

2.4.2 Economic and Socio-Political Exclusion
The root causes of maritime instability are the truncated socioeconomic expectations' for the vast majority of GoG people, and economic marginalization, frequently compounded by political exclusion (MVOMO, 2013).

A notable trend is that poverty rates are much higher on the coast than in areas within the hinterland, rendering them more vulnerable to criminal gang opportunities. As reported by the ICC International Maritime Bureau the scale of piracy is an indication of the radicalization and inclination of distressed populations to turn to crime (I. C. Group, 2012).
Clear evidence suggests that the increase in piracy in the GoG is linked particularly to the protesting local militias in the Niger Delta against marginalization and unfair distribution of oil revenues at the cost of the overwhelming majority of citizens living in severe poverty (I. C. Group, 2012).

2.4.3 Sea Blindness

“Sea blindness” was described as a 'lack of general maritime knowledge' at the political level and within the general public (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). It was also highlighted as a key obstacle to addressing effectively the piracy threat in this region. According to (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015) sea blindness is recognized as a significant onshore obstacle that inhibits the degree of political involvement needed to tackle the piracy and maritime crime problem more effectively.

2.4.4 Weak Law Enforcement

Poor law enforcement applies to three categories: weak legal system and lack of effective legislation; lack of training and expertise (patrolling, forensics or equipment maintenance); and lack of competence (Nnam K. Obasi, 2011).

According to Barrios and Luntumbue, GoG states suffer from an ability deficit to protect and track their maritime jurisdiction (Barrios, 2013; Luntumbue, 2011). The States have inadequate and deficient coastguard service as well as infrastructure and relatively few patrols.

Evidence has showed that Nigeria is the only country in the region with sufficient naval or coastguard capacity to deal with maritime crimes (MVOMO, 2013). As such, it leaves unanswered most of the distress calls it receives due to the expansive nature of the GoG region and state sovereignty issues (I. C. Group, 2012).

Although this can be attributed in part to corruption by diverting funds from building maritime capabilities, a number of analyses also point to the neglect by the GoG states of their maritime jurisdiction, and their lack of emphasis on maritime protection (House, 2013; MVOMO, 2013).

2.4.5 Poverty, Unemployment and Densely Populated Urban Centers

Lopez Lucia argues that scholars and researchers also highlight the high level of unemployment in the GoG as being one of the underlying causes of piracy (Lopez-Lucia, 2015), motivating illegal activity and gang culture as a viable financial
opportunity and a sense of social identity (see also (Ukeje, 2015); (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).

The high level of youth unemployment rates in the GoG countries is one of the root causes of piracy most frequently discussed by analysts and scholars. This promotes illegal activities such as oil theft, armed robbery or trafficking because they can be the only viable sustainable source for financial resources (Barrios, 2013), (House, 2013). Additionally, involvement in criminal gangs also gives the unemployed youth a sense of 'social belonging’ (Barrios, 2013). In a background of extreme economic inequality and tensions resulting from migration from internal and political conflicts, these highly populated urban centres’ create conditions for increased crime (I. C. Group, 2012).

2.4.6 Border Disputes
Since oil discoveries, border disputes between the GoG states have escalated. The risk is that the disputed areas become ungovernable allowing for the proliferation of illegal activities. These contested areas also hamper the already complicated cooperation between the countries concerned security forces (I. C. Group, 2012). The two major conflicts in the region are between Nigeria and Cameroon over 2008 officially terminated Bakassi Peninsula, and between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire over their maritime borders following the 2010 discovery of oil in the territorial waters of Ghana; however, the latter has been settled judicially by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, 2017).

2.4.7 Scarcity of Refined Petroleum Products
Despite Nigeria having an offshore extraction industry, the country has a shortage of refined petroleum products. Although Nigeria has four refineries, the refineries do not operate at their maximum capacity. This has made the nation a net importer of refined petroleum products (Onuoha, 2013). This situation has fostered a growing black market for stolen oil; the proliferation of illegal refineries; the smuggling of subsidized fuel from Nigeria to neighbouring countries; increased incentives for pirates to target tankers with refined petroleum products (I. C. Group, 2012), as well as the lack of maintenance of legal refineries has
led to the uncoordinated supply of petroleum products to Nigerian communities; thus promoting furthering social discontent (Nnamdi K. Obasi, 2011).

2.4.8 Oil Discoveries

New oil discoveries in the GoG countries may serve as a catalyst for violence and crime through various mechanisms, inter alia, creating or exacerbating tensions between countries hampering bilateral and regional cooperation to resolve maritime insecurity (MVOMO, 2013). In addition, there are possible expansion of transnational groups along the coast following new opportunities and incentives (Luntumbue, 2011) and undermining economic growth and institutional productivity through the processes distribution of welfare effect (Nnamdi K. Obasi, 2011).

2.5 Major Threats of Maritime Security

In this section the author provides an overview or a short description of the maritime security threats to lay a foundation to better understand the correlation between maritime (in)security in the GoG and maritime security in STP, addressed in the chapter five.

Maritime security threats have many faces; however, piracy and armed robbery (Anyimadu, 2013; Feldt et al., 2013), hold all the attention in different preview works, when it is come to assess the threats at sea in the GoG (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). A number of other illegal maritime activities were also pointed out and deserve the attention of other authors. In the same vein, Abiodun et al. pointed out that the maritime sector in the GoG has been troubled by a number of security problems for a very long time now, but it seems that the piracy issue has gained more attention at the cost of other forms of insecurity (Francis Abiodun & Mohammed Yakubu Dahiru, 2020).

Maritime insecurity in the GoG is recognized not only for the presence of piracy but also for the flourishing of other threats. Various dimensions of insecurity besieging the GoG which include piracy and armed robbery often cited as the main threat as well as theft of oil and other cargo, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of counterfeit items, people, narcotics and arms. Yet, these threats are
coupled with practices such as hostage-taking or kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering among others.

2.5.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta is currently the geographic centre of the current wave of piracy in the GoG; however, this is spreading to the larger region. According to Pigeon, pirate groups in the Niger Delta are directly responsible for destabilizing the broader GoG waters by targeting vessels and kidnapping crew members (Pigeon, 2020). Evidence shows that 98 incidents of piracy and armed robbery of vessels were reported in the GoG between January and December 2019 (Pigeon, 2020). In this regard, the 2019 the Annual Report from International Maritime Bureau (IMB) related to Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships demonstrated that kidnapping of crew is not just a phenomenon challenging one sector of shipping, but all vessels have been targeted. Furthermore, evidence shows that the GoG is responsible for more than 90% of global crew kidnappings, an increase of 50% per year, with 121 crew members kidnapped in 2019 compared to the same period (1 January – 31 December 2019 ) in 2018 with 78 (ICC, 2020).

2.5.2 Theft of Oil and other Cargo
Because oil tankers and cargo are big and valuable, these ships carrying expensive cargo are designed to be hard to board. However, bearing in mind the value of the goods these enormous vessels are becoming the pirates’ special target in the GoG as can been seen in the 2019 Annual Report from the International Maritime Bureau related to Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ICC-IMB, 2020). Theft of oil is often the result of concerted actions among local gangs, accomplices in the oil industry and security agencies and organized crime networks which take advantage of the weaknesses resulting from the inspection of the extensive maritime area representing the GoG as well as the level of corruption that exists in the various sectors dealing with this issue (Adejimi Osinowo, 2015)

The limited capability of military and law enforcement forces to respond to robbery at sea, hijacking and kidnapping further encourages these practices. Few countries in the region provide or authorize Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) for merchant vessels within their
EEZ and/or territorial waters (ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, 2020). The Nigerian authorities do not allow shipping companies the use of foreign armed guards, which is a key ingredient in suppressing pirates from the Gulf of Aden, as well as restricting the fight against pirates in the territorial waters of West Africa, where the majority of attacks take place (IUMI, 2020).

In the same line, the region's shortage of refined oil products has created a black market for stolen oil, prompting pirates to target oil tankers. Often the economic profits from piracy can be very high, while the risk of being captured, let alone punished, is low (Rohwerder & Steffen, 2016).

### 2.5.3 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

Evidence shows that, fish accounts for up to 80 percent of the animal protein of the population in GoG and is often the only source of animal protein consumed in the area by coastal communities (Okafor-Yarwood, 2018). It also adds to the income of many of the region's countries. However, the capacity of this resource to continue contributing to the socio-economic development of countries in the region is existentially threatened by an unfolding ocean catastrophe triggered by unsustainable activities such as IUU fishing, which accounts for more than 65% of legally recorded catches (Okafor-Yarwood, 2019b). The IUU fishing is commonly found to be associated with corruption (Interpol ES, 2014), forgery, fraud, and money laundering. Additionally, there are other crimes that often involve fishing vessels, such as piracy or armed robbery at sea, drugs or arms trades, and mixed migration (Denton & Harris, 2019). Increased threat to regional security is also due to the effects of declining fisheries. On the other hand, Yarwood argues that unabated IUU fishing in GoG is due to the lack of awareness of their maritime domain by the respective government, reflected in the dearth of human resources and inadequate financial investment to solve maritime security problems, and lack of cooperation between countries in the region, which makes current monitoring operations ineffective (Okafor-Yarwood, 2019c).

Those affected in the absence of state support to create resilience to vulnerabilities are tempted (Kamal-Deen, 2015) to participate in illegal activities that have wider consequences for regional security.
2.5.4 Trafficking of Counterfeit Items, People, Narcotics and Arms
In the GoG, at the interface between porous land and sea borders, organized crime in the form of drugs, human beings, arms, rough diamonds, counterfeit goods, illegal waste trafficking, cybercrimes and related money laundering also occurs (UNION, 2014). Illicit smuggling of counterfeit goods is also associated with other serious crimes, and is a lucrative route for organized crime gangs, with a mix of high income and reduced fines arising from increased social tolerance of other crimes.
It is considered a highly lucrative industry, where criminals rely on persistently high demand for inexpensive goods combined with low cost of production. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, many seaports in the busy Guinean Gulf lack proper oversight, which is a vulnerability for authorities and certainly an opportunity for criminal organizations. Faced with this lacuna, corruption is gaining ground and can further undermine the apparent ability allowing for the development of contraband routes (Anyimadu, 2013b).

2.6 Regional Counterpiracy Efforts
The Global Maritime Security Conference 2019 stressed the strategic role the maritime industry plays as a ‘value creator and growth engine’ in economies of nations. For this reason, maritime security in the GoG is not only a regional challenge but also a worldwide challenge that requires high-level commitment and a collective response altogether, along with effective interventions at the global, continental, regional and country levels (GMSC, 2019).

The threats to the GoG raised by piracy have been apparent for quite some time now with attacks on shipping that have exposed the insecurity of maritime space in the region. This situation has driven a number of regional associations such as the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) to build and activate a variety of countermeasures (Kuppen, 2016).

In this context, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions (2018) in 2011 and (2039) in 2012, paving the way for further international collaboration to protect ships and counter-piracy in the GoG. The first resolution (2018) adopted by
the Security Council in October 2011 called on West African states to create and improve domestic laws and regulations to formally criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to collaborate with the shipping industry, and with each other, to establish an information-sharing system that would monitor incidents in the region (IMO, 2017).

Based on that approach, the resolution (2039) encouraged countries along the GoG to work together on establishing a counterpiracy strategy that would cover West and Central Africa. In 2013, with the help of the International Maritime Organization, regional multilateral bodies — the ECOWAS, the ECCAS, and the GCG cooperatively formed an agreement known as the Code of Conduct for Yaoundé (Ifesinachi, K.; Nwangwu, 2015). The Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa, encompasses a wide variety of maritime offences (Abdel Fattah, 2017; IMO, 2017). Signatory nations, including all states bordering the gulf, and island nations, coordinate the use of two regional information-sharing centres, the Central African Regional Maritime Security Center and the West African Regional Maritime Security Center, linked via the Interregional Coordination Center - ICC in Cameroon ’s capital, Yaoundé.

In other words, this instrument provides international stakeholders with a mechanism for the design of commitments and training activities, improving cooperation between them. Further, it allows people and centres operating at operational and tactical levels to collaborate on a multi-national basis in areas such as information sharing and, where local circumstances require it, organized joint patrols, liaison officers and hot pursuit (Pigeon, 2020).

Although, the Yaoundé Code has proven to be a promising mechanism for enhancing synergy and multinational cooperation, there are still some obstacles as lack of political will, technical and budget that slow or affect the sharing information and to respond promptly to it.
CHAPTER THREE – CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Chapter three provides an overview of STP and discusses its complex relationship with the sea, its existing legal framework related to maritime security, the evolution of cooperation in the field of maritime security, and the maritime security strategy of STP.

3.1 Overview of Sao Tome and Principe

São Tomé and Príncipe is an archipelago located in the heart of the GoG, consisting of two main islands and adjacent islets. Crossed by the line of Equator, the archipelago has a total area of 1001 km², and is administratively divided into six districts (São Tome) and an autonomous region (Principe).

However, arising from an ancient volcanic activity, the archipelago has a very rugged relief, with mountainous summits that reach 1,500 m. Considered one of the smallest countries in Africa, STP has no land borders and is located about 250km /350 km off the west African coast (see Figure 4), off Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria, between latitude 0° 20' 49,02" North and 6° 44’ 41,85” East (São Tomé Island), and latitude 1° 36' 46,87" North and longitude and 7° 23’ 39.65” East (Príncipe Island), according to the ellipsoid used international (M. Ribeiro, 2020).
Figure 4: The archipelagic baseline and the outer limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of São Tomé and Príncipe. Source: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/STP.htm
Located relatively close to the coast of Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, STP have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that covers approximately one hundred and seventy thousand square kilometres (170,000 km²), and is, therefore, an extensive maritime area to ensure security (Governo, 2018).

As part of its external relations, São Tomé and Príncipe is a member of several international and regional organizations, including: Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), African Union (AU), Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), United Nations (UN) and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Commission of Gulf Guinea (CGG), International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Weltzen, & Alegre, 2017).

According to official data from the National Statistics Institute, the country's population in 2017 was about 197,700. In 2020 the estimated population number is 210,249 with just over 50% women (106,121) and a young population (around 60% under 25 years of age). It is currently estimated that 62% of the population have been affected by poverty. This is mainly due to limited employment opportunities, particularly for young people (INE, 2020).

São Tomé and Príncipe ranks higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa on the UNDP Human Development Index and has made good progress in improving other social indicators. Sao Tome and Principe has a gross primary education level of 110%, a life expectancy of 66 years, an infant mortality rate for children under five years of age per 51 live births, access to an improved water source for 97% of the population and access to electricity for 60% of the population (Morais, 2018).

The former Portuguese colony, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe (RDSTP), became independent on 12 July 1975. Since its rise to independence, the country has experienced two types of political regimes: the one-party system from 1975 to 1990 and multiparty (democratic) from 1991 to the present day. The Constitution of 10th September 1990 enshrined the birth of the second Republic. The Second Republic is synonymous, in the Sao Tome context, with openness to democracy, multiparty system, separation of powers (Género, 2012).
With a gross national income (GNI) per capita estimated at $1,847 estimated by the IMF, STP is one of the smallest economies in Africa and a country extremely vulnerable to external shocks (FMI, 2018). The State of Sao Tomé and Principe, as a micro-economy and little diversified, is very dependent on external aid and financing (W. B. Group, 2018). The most dynamic sector of this economy is the tertiary sector, with a weight of approximately 73% of GDP, with trade and tourism services having the greatest importance in this sector (INE, 2017). The country's trade balance is in deficit, reaching around -28.6% of GDP. In order to provide greater stability to its currency, in 2010 the country adopted a fixed exchange rate policy, by anchoring its euro currency, in establishing an exchange rate (1 EUR = 24.5 STN), leading to lower inflation growth, which has been around 5% (FMI, 2018).

The GDP in 2019 grew by 2.7%, identical to the growth registered in 2018, according to the data of the General State Budget for 2020 (Nacional, 2019). The projections for GDP growth for 2020, pointed to a growth of 4%, but in the face of the current Covid-19 pandemic crisis, the UNDP estimates that GDP will contract by around 19% (PNUD, 2020).

There is a strong dynamic in the country, embodied in wide-ranging reforms covering several sectors, including the judicial system, aiming at improving the public sector, giving credibility to the country's image and attracting investments that can in turn boost the private sector in the same way. However, due to their physical characteristics and the form of governance, they remain as key challenges for sustained and inclusive growth, high public debt, a deficit in revenue collection and a deficient economic infrastructure - including transportation, roads, water and energy (W. B. Group, 2018). In addition, the economy has a narrow export base and is highly dependent on external support.

### 3.2 Complex relationship with the sea

São Tomé and Principe, despite being geographically characterized by their insularity, their relationship with the sea is complex or marked by underestimated importance in the first years after their independence. In this period the sea was seen only as an economic resource for subsistence, a reservoir for fishing activity, and above all
framed as a threat, taking into account the tensions experienced at the time and the fear of attacks to subvert power (Nascimento, 2011).

In this context, there was no local debate on the potential of the sea, so there was also no clear awareness of the threats to maritime security. This situation began to change with the discovery of offshore oil, a fact that shaped the country's policy, the relationship with the sea, and the relationship with neighbouring countries above all allowed the archipelago to draw the maritime boundary delimitation agreement (Legal, 2018).

With respect to maritime boundary delimitation, São Tomé and Príncipe signed two treaties: one with Gabon, on 26 April 2001, and the other with Equatorial Guinea, on 26 June 1999. There is no Treaty on the delimitation of boundaries concluded with Nigeria 21 February 2001, but only a joint oil and other resource exploitation treaty situated in the EEZ of both states (M. Ribeiro, 2020).

Added to this picture is an old desire that still exists today, namely building a deep-water port to serve as a rotating platform of services for the region. However, unfortunate facts also mark this timid shift in consciousness. Ship casualties that took lives in the seas of STP put the relationship with the sea on the agenda, taking into account the authorities uncertainty to help ships in times of distress as was the case with ships such as, Bambazele in 2002, Marisol in 2006, Therese in 2008 and Micau in 2010 (Nascimento, 2011).

These problems are still echoed today when it comes to safety of navigation; however, the geostrategic character of the archipelago coexists with an adjustment in the

importance of the sea on its agenda and with the magnitude of the challenges related to maritime insecurity in the region.

### 3.3 Legal framework related to maritime security

The complex relationship with the sea and, consequently, the security described above, is also undoubtedly felt in the political agenda and in the legal order of the archipelago. Therefore, timidly STP started looking at the sea, and its security features, gradually then moved forward towards the construction of a legal framework that could respond to specific situations linked to the sea, particularly establish the blue economy.

This legal structure was metamorphosed but accentuated by the discovery of oil, the rising interest in fishing in the country's territorial waters, the fatal marine casualties as well as the ratification of certain conventions that the country is part of. Sao Tome and Principe is a party to the United Nations (UN) Law of the Sea Convention, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Drug Convention), and the Convention Against Corruption. In addition, Sao Tome and Principe is also a party to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as amended by 1978 Protocol, the Convention on the International Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1978), the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annexes I,II and IV, and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and its Protocol, among others Sao Tome and Principe is also a member of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (Weltzen, & Alegre, 2017). In addition to the set of the aforementioned conventions, the country adopted the Integrated Maritime Strategy for Africa 2050 and the respective action plan, adopted the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Agenda of United Nations for 2030 (Governo, 2018).

From 2000 to 2018 the approach to the sea has been gradually changing and so does the need to look at all the EEZ matters, including security. This metamorphosis caused the flourishing of several legal instruments, including:

1. Law nº 09/2001 - Law on Fisheries and Haulic Resources;
2. Law nº 13/2007 - Maritime Safety and Prevention against Sea Pollution laws;
3. Law 6/2012 - The Penal Code of STP
4. Decree-law 9 / 2012- Organics of the Armed Forces of STP;
5. Law nº 11 / 12 - Regulates drug trafficking, consumption and detention in the territory of the STP;
8. Decree law nº 03 / 2018 - Approves the Maritime Authority System;
9. Law No. 01/2018 - Judiciary Police Organic;
10. Decree-Law No. 04/2018 - Approves the Creation of the National Maritime Authority;

It is still true that these legal instruments fill the legal framework with provisions that contribute to maritime security. However, according to Marta Ribeiro in the report of evaluation of the legal framework of STP applicable to combating crime at sea, they are several weaknesses in the legal framework. Furthermore, the intensification of piracy in the EEZs of Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as in the EEZ of São Tomé and Príncipe and in the joint exploitation zone, illegal fishing and related illegal activities, as well as the illegal transfer or supply of fuel to ships are, at present, the main threats to prevent and combat and that require a robust legal framework and the operational, human and material means necessary for its application (M. Ribeiro, 2020).

In this regard, besides pointing out several weaknesses in the legal framework, the abovementioned report recommends the reviewing and updating the legal regimes in force, which can guarantee the legal support of the actions taken by the authorities as well as eliminating shocks of competence and responsibilities between the authorities. This revision will ensure in a sustained manner a continuous routine of monitoring maritime spaces, as well as collecting and processing data on illegal activities that are actually practiced in the maritime spaces of São Tomé and Príncipe.

3.4 Evolution of cooperation in the field of maritime security
Suspicious movements of vessels, especially on the STP waters were detected by the radars installed in STP with the military-technical support of the United States of
American, began to awaken the authority to the potential risk from the threats (Thiago Melo, 2014; VOA, 2010).

In June 2013 STP and Portugal signed a cooperation agreement that involves the Portuguese armed forces in the surveillance and inspection of the EEZ (Veiga, 2013). The same agreement incorporated an additional protocol in March 2015 to allow the use of the Portuguese air force in the inspection of the territorial sea of STP, an act that brings added value to bilateral cooperation and the security of the region (Economist, 2015). In the face of growing security challenges in the region, a Memorandum of Understanding that allows the training of the Coast Guard and the signing of a new Defence Cooperation Framework program for the period 2018-2020 saw the light of day in February 2018 (Portugal, 2018; TélaNón, 2018b).

This entire process has been complemented by the presence of the Zaire warship of the Portuguese Republic, which operates with the mixed garrison made up of Portuguese and saotomean soldiers, in patrolling and supervising operations in the EEZ. This illustrates the importance of bilateral cooperation between the two Portuguese-speaking countries and undoubtedly contributing through a joint effort to the security of the region, carrying out dissuasive actions against maritime piracy (A. S. Ribeiro, 2019). Despite the dissuasive effect it has in the STP, EEZ as well as in the GoG region, the Zaire Ship is 48 years old and the average life expectancy for a ship is 40 years (Veiga, 2020).

Therefore, it is important to underline that, in parallel with technical-military cooperation with Portugal, the cooperation with Brazil has also been concentrated on naval defence, which allowed the creation of the first marine unit in STP. Both military cooperation has allowed increasing the capacities of the STP Coast guard (TélaNón, 2018a).

### 3.5 Maritime security strategy of Sao Tome and Principe

São Tome and Principe intend to achieve and strengthen maritime governance by 2030, through a national, regional, and international approach that involves the synergy of several stakeholders. This approach is based on the desire to create conditions that allow the establishment of a safe maritime environment.
In this context, the country is aware of the responsibilities that follow the great extension of the EEZ, with approximately 160,000 km², which corresponds to approximately 160 times of its land area. These responsibilities result from its geographic characteristics as an Island State and the significant territorial discontinuity, in the waters under its jurisdiction and in the light of the International Treaties and Agreements to which it is a signatory. São Tomé and Príncipe has developed a Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) seeking to respond to the need to proceed with the surveillance and protection of its sovereign space, as well as meeting the challenges and opportunities that arise in the management of the maritime space GoG, threatened by the remarkable growth of transnational crimes (Governo, 2018). Maritime Security Strategy represents an important capital document that aims to define the fundamental aspects aligned with the overall strategy of the State for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Maritime Security policy. This strategy is based on four guiding principles:

1. Strengthening maritime governance and the rule of law;
2. Inter-agency cooperation;
3. Multilateral maritime cooperation;
4. Strengthening maritime safety to optimize the “Blue Economy”.

In line with these four guiding principles, three (3) General Strategic Objective were defined:

1. - Strengthen Maritime Governance
2. - Optimizing the Blue Economy
3. - Strengthen Maritime Safety and Security

First steps have been taken in the materialization of this strategy, mainly in the area of training of staff, in practice, of the operational of the Coast Guard. However, the indication that still exists in the understanding of the importance of the sea, as well as the absence of a true introduction and appropriation of maritime governance that is not only expressed on paper or strategic documents, but in practical terms, has compromised the implementation of the desired goal. The Maritime Security Strategy was made with the competition of international partners.
CHAPTER FOUR – IMPACT OF MARITIME INSECURITY ON 2030 TRANSFORMATION AGENDA OF STP

Chapter four assesses the relevance of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, the economic and social development challenges, and the relevance of the sea to STP’s economy.

4.1 Major lines of 2030 transformation agenda of STP

The strategic policy document for STP is the 2030 Transformation Agenda, which is based on the vision of the country contained in "São Tomé and Príncipe 2030: the country that we must build" (Government, 2015). In these documents, the government determined its development priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Agenda focuses on nine thematic and legitimate aspirations of citizens, linked to the four transversal themes: rule of law, democracy, sustainable growth and human development. The Transformation Agenda seeks to lay the groundwork for the country's transition through two main initiatives to be carried out in line with the Public-Private Partnership Agreement and a priority plan for public investment. Such projects and programs need to pave the way for a new competitive private national and foreign initiatives, economic ownership, particularly in the tourism, logistics, port and airport sectors, high value-added agricultural, fisheries, and related economic sea activities (Government, 2015).

As it can be seen in this strategic document, special attention was given to the construction of a deep-water transhipping port and a high-performance international airport throughout the country, which will become a functional centre for logistics services in the sub-region of the GoG.

Sao-Tomean authorities are conscious that vision and its initial implementation plan face many risks, associated to the resources mobilization for development (W. B. Group, 2018). In addition, today the maritime insecurity in the GoG can compromise some inspiration due to the vital dependence that the country has on the sea and on foreign aid.
**4.2 Challenges facing the economy and social development**

Small islands states face serious challenges to development which is a critical constraint. Small island states face numerous systemic challenges related to their geography and population size. For example, the small size of the labour force can prevent economies of scale from forming labour-intensive sectors, while limiting the possibility of diversification and contributing to dependence on imports. Likewise, a small area of land can restrict production possibilities, especially in the agricultural sector. Geographical distance tends to increase marketing costs, aggravating the challenges of a small domestic market. In addition, the high unit costs of public goods (including public administration), combined with a small tax base, can lead to fiscal imbalances. Many of these factors also interact with each other, exacerbating their impact on economic development (W. B. Group, 2018).

Sao Tome and Principe will continue to face significant challenges to utilize its insularity for its own benefit, small market size, vulnerability to natural shocks and climate change, limited human capital and scarce marketable resources to generate inclusive sustainable growth and reduce poverty.

**4.3 Relevance of the sea in the STP economy**

A microstate with 1,001 km of land, but with an EEZ of 160,000 km2, STP has an immense potential to diversify its economy through the sea. Given the limited land surface, the country realizes that promoting its economic development would inevitably and obviously entail the efficient utilization of resources. These are provided by the vast maritime extension and its privileged geographical position in the GoG, which is why a Blue Planning and Finance and Blue Economy ministry was established deliberately to lead the process of economic transformation with a view to that enhancing the utilization of the sea resources.

Despite the potential for economic development that the sea can offer STP's economy (oil exploration, fishing, logistics and port services) is still not being used efficiently. However, today STP's economy is already largely dependent on maritime connections to supply its market with consumer and investment goods because of its situation of insularity(ANSTP, 2020). The bulk of overseas trade (import and export) is actually conducted by sea. According to 2017 National Port Administration Company
(ENAPORT) statistics, about 120,189.1 tons of goods passed through the port (loading and unloading) (ENAPORT, 2018), while at air transport level only 196,575 kg of cargo was transported, according to National Institute of Civil Aviation (INAC) statistics (INAC, 2018). The overall freight carried by air is just 0.2% of the freight carried by sea. In the face of low productive potential, STP is a market economy very open to the outside in terms of imports. In other words, the country imports the necessities of consumer and investment products, and exports commodity services, with a greater focus on cocoa and, more recently, palm oil (BUSINESS, 2020). However, the quantity exported is much smaller than the quantity imported, thus presenting a historically deficient balance of trade (ANSTP, 2020).

According to National Institute of Statistics (INE) data, exports in 2017 represented about 7% of total imports. The little diversification of the economy, likewise, makes the trade have significant weight in the GDP. In fact, from the data published by INE in its São Tomé and Príncipe in Number 2017 report, it was found that trade had a weight on GDP of around 26.75% (INE, 2017). Indeed, the real importance of the sea in the economic development of this nation is undeniable. These numbers also show the great import dependence for supplying its economy with basic necessities and investment; thus, any and all disturbances that might hinder the normal transit of these goods by sea and at acceptable costs could jeopardize the economic and social stability of the country.

Besides its importance in the present and, in the future, the sea could also be at the core of the latest strategic target for STP’s economic diversification. The Country Economic Memorandum for São Tomé and Príncipe, prepared by the World Bank on pages 46 and 47, points to the blue economy, with the country’s marine resources and geostrategic location in the GoG, if properly explored, as sources of great potential for generating benefits for the STP economy (W. B. Group, 2018).

The country’s biggest private bank, International Bank of Sao Tome and Principe (BISTP), through a publication published in BP Magazine on 9 January 2020 in a message calling for investment in STP, highlighted, among other factors, political stability and social peace as factors relevant to the country’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other African countries. Furthermore, its privileged geostrategic position, literally at
the centre of the world, two hours flight from a group of countries rich in natural resources, located on the African coast and representing a market of about 300 million consumers was also emphasized (BUSINESS, 2020). Continued peacekeeping, converted into the security of people and goods, is essential for this small economy now and in the future in a world of great uncertainty and turmoil, on land as well as at sea.
CHAPTER FIVE - CORRELATION BETWEEN MARITIME (IN)SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Chapter five assesses the potential impact of maritime insecurity on 2030 transformation agenda of STP, through the research findings and the correlation between maritime insecurity in the GoG and maritime security in STP.

The correlation between the maritime insecurity in the GoG and maritime security in Sao Tome and Principe, including its impact on the 2030 transformation agenda, is based on data from the survey conducted, anchored on three (3) pivotal pillars including:

1. Maritime insecurity threats to the GoG;
2. How these threats affect the implementation 2030 agenda; and

For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent to twenty-three (23) respondents, while out of this total, the author received fifteen (15) responses to the questionnaire. Furthermore, taking into account the problem that was proposed to be addressed, the questionnaire targeted, participants from different institutions and individuals such as:

1. Prosecution Service;
2. Ministry of Defense and Internal Order;
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and Communities;
4. Ministry of Finance and Blue Economy;
5. Coast Guard;
6. National Police;
7. Maritime and Port Institute;
8. Individuals who held leadership positions at the level of government and public and private institutions.

It is essential to underline that there were only 23 respondents because they were the most suitable people to respond, taking into account the specificity of the topic and the need to collect more accurate information.
5.1 Findings / Analysis

5.1.1 Maritime insecurity threats to the Gulf of Guinea

The study identified Piracy and Armed Robbery, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and theft of oil and other cargos as the three major maritime security threats in GoG, as illustrated in Figure 5. Additionally, trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and counterfeit items were also identified as threats to maritime security in the region.

![Figure 5: The major security threats in the Gulf of Guinea](image)

From the findings, 25% of respondents, indicated piracy and armed robbery as the major security threats in the GoG. Majority of the respondents also revealed that it is carried out using speedboats by the local gangs that are operating from the coast attacking or supported by a mother ship to hijack ships. Other approaches used include a group of people armed in a small vessel, carrying firearms, machetes and other sophisticated navigation equipment (15%), use of unflagged vessel or pirogue and taking crews hostage to ask for a rescue (10%) as shown in Figure 6.
The study also investigated the persons involved in piracy which revealed that piracy is majorly executed by organized groups (28%) and those that are unemployed (17%), mercenaries (5%), fishermen or former fishermen (11%), terrorists (11%), and persons from the public administration (11%) as shown in Figure 7.
Further investigation into the drivers of these maritime insecurity threats revealed that poverty (34%) is the first driver, then quick profit (15%) as the second and poor governance (11%) as the third variable that drives these people to join the criminal activities. The result of this study also indicated other drivers, including; registered unemployment, social injustice as well as political economic and social instability as the potential driver (see Figure 8).
5.1.2 How maritime security threat can affect the implementation of the 2030 Agenda

The study also sought to reveal the major economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe. As can be seen in Figure 9 and 10, decreased ability to obtain wealth through natural resources, weak economic growth, higher product price for final consumer, more isolation (limited interest in navigational connections), increase in the cost of shipping, increase in the price of imported food products and investments inhibition, are the main economic impacts of piracy. Nevertheless, 22% of respondents highlighted the higher product price for final consumers and weak economic growth as a result of the combination of all the factors mentioned earlier. The findings as well indicated decreased ability to obtain wealth, increase in the price of imported food, increase of the cost of shipping and more isolation as the moderate impact and finally the investment inhibition as the least impact.

Figure 9: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe
In the same line, the study investigated how these threats can affect the stakeholders involved in import and export and other maritime services. The study revealed limited services/business, less investment and increase of insurance premiums as an effect of the threat on the stakeholders. Other respondents pointed out the bankruptcy of companies linked to the sector as can be seen in Figure 11.

![Figure 10: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe](image)

![Figure 11: How can threat affect the Stakeholders involved in import and export and other maritime services](image)
The study also revealed that most (50%) of respondents who took part in the survey indicated that the government has limited resource to handle the threats. Only a small fraction (17%) of the respondents indicated that the government has insufficient resources, while 33% of the respondents did not respond to the question, as shown in Figure 12.

![Figure 12: The government capabilities to handle the threat](image)

**5.1.3 Mitigation Strategy**

Given the possible economic impact, the study also considered the mitigation strategies put in place. As can be seen in Figure 13, 14% of the respondents indicated that despite the difficulties, the regulation has a good implementation. However, 29% of the respondents pointed out that the regulation is poorly implemented while 14% considered that is not implemented. It is important to considerer that 43% of the respondents did not answer this question. While the country has a legal structure with provisions that timidly address this problem, the level of implementation of these provisions is still low, a fact due to several reasons, one of which is the lack of financial, technical and operational means.
The study showed that when it comes to measuring whether the country has the resources for countermeasures and maritime domain responses, the respondents are divided. As demonstrated in Figure 14, 42% of the respondents indicated that the country has no resources although 25% revealed that the country has resources but not sufficient for countermeasures and maritime domain answers.

*Figure 13: How is this regulation being implemented*

*Figure 14: Does the country have enough resources for countermeasures and maritime domain answers?*
The study also sought to reveal if STP has the resources required, personnel and training to face the maritime security threats. Among the respondents, 18% indicated that the country has the required personnel and training, while 41% of the respondents indicated that the personnel and training are not enough. Furthermore, it is essential to note that 18% of the respondents mentioned that the country does not have the required personnel and training as can be observed in Figure 15.

![Figure 15: Does the country have the resources required personnel and training?](image)

The study also investigated the perception of military cooperation in place in STP in maritime security. Overall, the respondents have a favourable opinion on the military cooperation in place in this country; however, 19% of the respondents gave positive feedback but consider that there is a clear need for adjustment and a need for a strong commitment from the STP authority.
5.2 Discussion

Overall this study corroborates the findings from the previous studies in maritime insecurity in GoG, and brings a novel knowledge on how this threats can affect a large ocean state (Chan, 2018) in this case, Sao Tome and Principe. The present findings seem to be consistent with other research that indicated that maritime security threats have many faces, of which piracy and armed robbery (Anyimadu, 2013; Feldt et al., 2013) hold all the critical attention when it is come to assessing the threats at sea in the GoG (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). As presented in Figure 5, 25% of the respondents indicated that piracy and armed robbery represent one of the major security threats in the GoG, the rest of the percentages being fragmented among the remaining threats as shown in Figure 5. Similarly, these results are consistent with findings of other studies like (ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, 2020) about the modus operandi, which indicate that the pirates operate in small armed groups, using speedboats or pirogues which are sometimes supported by mother ships, when operating in a much large area to the specific target. These findings also agree with Lindskov Jacobsen and Riber Nordby’s work, which underlines that pirates are not born at sea (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). Onshore issues
such as poverty and quick profits or easy way to obtaining money quickly, and poor governance are the major motivations that drive people including fishermen or former fishermen, persons from the public administration, and other registered unemployed to engage in these criminal activities.

The data above shows that despite the studies being done since 2011 and numerous efforts to counter rising crime at sea in GoG since 2013, these threats are still eminent in the region, the current mitigation strategies have been ineffective or are poorly implemented hence the failure to successfully resolve these threats. This shows that there is a dire need to review, develop or enforce better maritime insecurity mitigation strategies in GoG. Therefore, this calls for a holistic and realistic approach in the improvement of current strategy, that factors in the underlying economic and social drivers of maritime insecurity threat in GoG. Additionally, there is need for strategies that take into consideration the advanced, dynamics and the modus operandi of the criminal which is in constant metamorphosis coupled with fast and modern technologies as well as operational resources. For instance, if onshore issues such as poverty are not well the addressed, based on the findings of this study, they could lead to an increase in more people engaging in criminal activities. Further, poor allocation of rapid and modern resource for the Navy or Coast Guard such as modern speedboats, improve communication technologies could hinder the effectiveness of the coast guards to counter the advanced, technologies and the modus operandi of the criminals in GoG.

In the same line, the findings show in Figures 9 and 10 that a link exists between the going on of maritime insecurity in the region particularly in the waters of STP and the impact on the economy. This is due to the fact that STP is a market economy very dependent when it comes to importing, i.e. the country imports the basics of consumer and investment products, and export services. Furthermore, the quantity produced is much smaller than the quantity imported, thereby, creating a historically poor balance of trade. However, with the flourishing piracy, this situation will worsen considerably. As indicated by the World Bank Group (W. B. Group, 2018), STP appears as a fragile economy in the GoG region, and is highly dependent on foreign assistance, and vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, the present findings (see Figure 10) seem to be
consistent with the sentence above taking into account that threats can negatively affect the stakeholders involved in import and export and other maritime services, generating less investments, limited service/business, less attractive as location, change the markets, increase in insurance premiums, and occasional bankruptcy of companies linked to the sector. As informed in chapter four, paragraph 4.1, STP has a Transformation Agenda that aims to harness the revenues from its sea. The study revealed that high number of maritime security threats in the GoG region could further negatively affect or slow the implementation of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, specifically relating to the economic growth project of the maritime sectors. This is because piracy and illegal fishing, in particular, can affect the entire production and transport chain that depends on this means of maritime transport as demonstrated earlier in Figure 9.

The findings also show that with a devastating effect on the economy, maritime insecurity in the waters of STP, as well as its neighbours, can contribute to the increase in the cost of maritime transport and, increase in the insurance premium of ships that go to STP. This will consequently have repercussions on the final consumer who will purchase the products at the highest price. Furthermore, the increase in prices for the final consumer, in turn, can therefore generate discontent among the population, which at their most expensive level of life, and leave them more vulnerable to the promoters of criminal activity in search of a new member.

The implications of these threats are not just limited to the economy. Therefore, with the need to reinforce tourism, one of the respondents indicated that in the worst scenario, there is a potential risk that criminal groups (pirates) will access the coast of STP, where there are resorts, facing the vulnerability of the coast and the limited resources to assure security. In this context, the main impact is undoubtedly on, poor mobility of people, goods and services as limited commercial transactions provide for the weak economic growth resulting from these capacities, with a real impact on structuring projects linked to the blue economy

However, this study also demonstrated that there is a need for reviewing legal instruments. There are many gaps between them that undermine the coexistence and coordination between the different bodies, affecting their efficiency and, consequently,
their response capacity. In general, the response capacity is very feeble from human, technical, logistical and operational resources. Therefore, the resources available to the country, as well as countermeasures and responses in the field of maritime security, are not sufficient. However, despite the weakness in naval and human resources to tackle these crimes, STP looks and bets on bilateral and multilateral cooperation to mitigate these threats and to guarantee state authority at sea.

Therefore, Portugal and STP signed a Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Joint Inspection of Maritime Spaces under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of STP. As a result of this agreement the presence of a warship of the Portuguese Republic called NRP/Zaire was obtained and placed in its waters with a permanence for approximately two years by Portuguese and São Tomean contingents. Besides, the Obangame Express Exercise takes place annually in the waters of STP jurisdiction, which aims to improve communications, information exchange and interoperability between the media of the various countries with interests in the GoG and on the maritime routes that traverse this region.

The participation of the different entities of STP in this exercise ensures that the procedures, means and human resources are developed and exercised, allowing to increase maritime security in the jurisdictional waters of STP and the GoG.

Although, the study calls once again to a look for the poor allocation of rapid and modern resource for the Coast Guard of STP. Despite the dissuasive effect that the NRP/Zaire have in the STP EEZ as well as in the GoG region, the warship is 48 years, and STP don’t have a better vessel to control its waters, as well as the security of sensitive infrastructure for development. Therefore, if the government don’t commit to allocate appropriate modern speedboats, improve communication technologies to hinder the effectiveness of the coast guards to counter the advanced technologies and the modus operandi of the criminals at sea, the infrastructure for development liked and depend of sea will jeopardise, as well the 2030 Transformation Agenda.
CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Conclusion

This study aimed to assess the impact of maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea with special emphasis on Sao Tome and Principe. Specifically, the study evaluated the status quo of maritime insecurity in GoG and STP followed by an identification of the key maritime security threats in the GoG and STP and their drivers. Further, the study established a positive correlation between maritime insecurity in GoG and maritime security in STP. Additionally, an assessment of the potential impact of the maritime insecurity on the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP was conducted. Further, the study reviewed the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies in GoG and STP, with a special focus on their strengths and weaknesses. Last but certainly not least the study identified potential improvements to the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies in GoG and STP.

In depth, based on the findings of this research the author concludes the following:

Currently, the GoG is challenged by a complex and dynamic range of maritime insecurity threats, linked with an increasing number of attacks to vessels at sea. Piracy and armed robbery is the major threat which affects shipping activities and hence lead to onshore socio-economic challenges such as poverty, which in turn influences more people to be involved in this offshore criminal activities, thereby creating a vicious cycle.

Furthermore, maritime insecurity, particularly piracy and armed robbery, are great potential threats to the implementation of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, a strategic policy document aimed at developing STP as a hub of tourism and also includes a plan for construction of a deep-water transhipping port, which is aimed to be a centre for logistic services for the region. As a consequence of the country location, near the epicentre of major attacks in the region, as well the limited resources to respond, there is a high dependence on imports. Therefore, the consumers and investment products will have an economic and social impact, on the final consumers. Although STP is facing this situation, it has a maritime security strategy. However, the implementation of the strategy is faced with barriers, such as limited resources, political agenda, harmonizing and enhancing the existing national instruments and...
establishing a robust interagency coordination mechanism, weak authority commitment despite the remarkable effort achieved through regional and international cooperation. The regional and international cooperation seems to be a partway to assure maritime security in a large ocean state as STP, even though the complex and dynamic range of maritime insecurity is a challenge.

6.2 Recommendation
To address the range of issues in maritime insecurity and break the vicious circle that affects maritime security in the region, in particular in STP, the author proposes the following recommendations: 

6.2.1 At the international and regional level

Sharing information and improvement neighbourhood patrol
Maritime insecurity is a serious threat in the region and is a major concern for countries in the GoG. However, the fight against these threats cannot be done in an isolated and uncoordinated way. The countries in the region should improve their capabilities and effectiveness by sharing information promptly in order to combat maritime insecurity in national or regional waters. The countries in the region should also improve regional patrols by effective collaboration and cooperation to minimise the threats of maritime insecurity in the GoG.

6.2.2 At the national level

1. Regulations
Although the country has a legal structure with provisions that timidly address the maritime security issues, the level of implementation of these provisions is still low. Furthermore, the study pointed out that regulation is poorly implemented. To address these issues, the legal normative framework should be revised and harmonised in line with the maritime security strategy as well as the reality of the country and the best practice in the region to address the problem. In parallel with the harmonization of the legal framework, the government should provide training for magistrates and law enforcement officers, as well as for all officials who work in the field of maritime
security. This will enable STP to resolve the issue of dispersed laws, to better
determine its jurisdiction, eliminating shocks of competence and responsibilities
between the authorities, to be in line with international conventions and to have a
robust and dissuasive legal framework, thus well-trained staff prepared to response the
dynamics of crime both on land and at sea.
Most importantly, it will serve as a basis for accommodating, promoting transparency
and accountability in public affairs, the infrastructure to support growth programs and
the simplification of legislation/business environment included in the 2030
transformation agenda of Sao Tome and Principe.

2. Improvement of the well-being
This study showed that poverty is a key driver of piracy and armed robbery among
other maritime insecurity challenges. Therefore, the author recommends that the
government of STP should device strong strategies to financially empower its citizens,
especially in the coastal area. Specifically, the government should increase
employment opportunities and/or create conditions that support entrepreneurship and
self-employment, as a way to alleviate poverty which has been shown to influence
people to participate in criminal activities at sea. These efforts are vital to generate the
revenue for all, in particular for vulnerable fractions of the population such as the
coastal communities, thus decrease their vulnerability to join the criminal activity at
sea. Additionally, this will achieve poverty reduction in rural and coastal regions and
promotion of youth employment, which are the objectives of the 2030 Transformation
Agenda of Sao Tome and Principe, and in line with the United Nation Sustainable
Development Goals (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

3. Financial resources
The study showed that the personnel and training are inadequate as well as limited
financial resources. Limited financial resource allocation in the Coast Guard has also
been shown to hinder successful mitigation of maritime insecurity in STP. The
government should, therefore, allocate more resources to ensure that Coast Guard have
enough resources to respond to maritime security threats. Additionally, capacity
building efforts should be increased to improve the level of reaction and promote capacity building for personnel at all levels to ensure proper implementation and enforcement of the maritime security strategy. Further, a proactive approach should be incorporated in the training. These efforts are vital in improving the vigilance and capability of the Coast Guard. It also will serve as the basis for accommodating the growth support infrastructure included in the 2030 Transformation Agenda of São Tomé and Principe.

4. **Interagency coordination mechanism**

The study revealed that inadequate communication persists between the agencies that have maritime security related mandates. A robust interagency coordination mechanism should be established to set clear lines of responsibilities and ensure the sound implementation and enforcement of the maritime security strategies by the relevant state agencies. Additionally, the government should create conditions and encourage the sharing of information between agencies which will be the support to effective implementation of maritime security strategy and a pathway to well enforce the regulation.

5. **International and regional cooperation**

São Tomé and Príncipe has the most comprehensive exclusive EEZ in the GoG of, about 160,000 km2, which corresponds to about 160 times its land area. However, its limited financial and operational resources compromise an effective patrol and control of its waters. The study also showed a positive perception of international and regional, cooperation, particularly the military cooperation in place in STP. However, the study also revealed a clear need for adjustment and a need for a strong commitment from the STP authority. The STP authority should improve the international and regional cooperation in place and attract more attention by proposing to accommodate and coordinate a regional program of maritime security due to its location. This will reinforce the surveillance of the waters, improve the cooperation and place the country on the international agenda as a hub of a regional program of maritime security, and drive the implementation of the maritime security strategy.
References


Alegre, M.-C. C. (2009). TOWARDS A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IN SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE.


ICC. (2020). *ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS*.


IDN. (2020). *Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building Instituto da Defesa Nacional nº 38*.


Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019a). Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea.


https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.016


---

*Rapid Literature Review About GSDRC. www.gsdrc.org*
Appendices

Appendix A: Consent form for respondent

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in connection with a Dissertation which will be written by me the interviewer, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime Affairs at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.

The topic of the Dissertation is AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MARITIME (IN)SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA. (SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE).

The information provided to me in this questionnaire will be used for research purposes and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will be published online and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data will be immediately deleted.

Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree is awarded.

Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.

Student’s name                  Paulo de Araújo Ribeiro de Ceita
Specialization                  Maritime Law & Policy
Email address                   w1903605@wmu.se

* * *

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.

Name:                                                                                                            
Signature:                                                        
Date:                                                             

Appendix B: Survey of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea & its impact in Sao Tome and Principe

OBJECTIVE ONE: TO IDENTIFY THE MARITIME INSECURITY THREATS TO THE GULF OF GUINEA

1. Q1 - What are the major security threats in the Gulf of Guinea?
   Check all that apply.
   - Trafficking of counterfeit items
   - Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
   - Trafficking of people
   - Piracy and armed robbery at sea
   - Theft of oil and other cargo
   - Trafficking of drugs
   - Trafficking of arms
   Other: ___________________________________________________________________

2. Q1 - Quais são as principais ameaças à segurança maritima no Golfo da Guiné?
   Check all that apply.
   - Tráfico de itens falsificados
   - Pesca ilegal (não declarada e não regulamentada)
   - Tráfico de pessoas
   - Pirataria e assalto à mão armada no mar
   - Roubo de petróleo e outras cargas
   - Tráfico de droga
   - Tráfico de armas
   Other: ___________________________________________________________________

3. Q2 - Rank the threats in order of prevalence
   ____________________________________________________________________________
   ____________________________________________________________________________

59
4. Q2 – Numere as ameaças por ordem de prevalência

5. Q3 - How is piracy carried out in the Gulf of Guinea?

6. Q3 - Como é realizada a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné?

7. Q4 - Who are involved in Piracy and armed robbery?

8. Q4 – Quem são as pessoas envolvidas na pirataria e no assalto à mão armada?

9. Q5 - What drives people to join these criminal activities?

10. Q5 - O que conduz as pessoas a participarem nessas atividades criminosas?
OBJECTIVE TWO: TO ASSESS HOW THIS THREAT CAN AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 2030 TRANSFORMATION AGENDA OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE;

11. Q1 - What is the main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe?

12. Q1 - Qual o principal impacto econômico dessas ameaças em São Tomé e Príncipe?

13. Q2 - How do they affect the livelihood of the people of Sao Tome and Principe?

14. Q2 - Como elas afetam a subsistência da população de São Tomé e Príncipe?

15. Q3 - How can the threat affect the stakeholders involved in import and export and other maritime services?

16. Q3 - Como as ameaças podem afetar as partes interessadas envolvidas na importação e exportação e outros serviços marítimos?
OBJECTIVE THREE: SUGGEST MITIGATION STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF MARITIME INSECURITY SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE.

19. Q1 - Which regulations does the country have against these maritime threats?

20. Q1 – Que instrumentos jurídicos o país dispõe contra essas ameaças marítimas?

21. Q2 - How is this regulation being implemented?

22. Q2 – Como esses instrumentos jurídicos estão a ser implementados?
23. Q3 - Does the country have the resources for countermeasures and maritime domain answers?

24. Q3 - O país tem recursos, contramedidas e respostas no domínio marítimo?

25. Q4 - Does the country have the required personnel and training?

26. Q4 - O país possui recursos humanos e treinamento necessários?

27. Q5 - What is your opinion about military cooperation in place in this domain?

28. Q5 – Qual é a sua opinião sobre a cooperação militar em vigor neste domínio?

29. Q6 - Any further suggestions?
30. Q6 - Alguma sugestão?